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NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, MULTIPOLARITY, AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

By CIRO ELLIOTT ZOPPO*

TRADITIONAL theory of international politics maintains that, other things being equal, a multipolar balance-of-power system is more stable than a bipolar system.[1] Arms-control theory, on the other hand, generally contends that an increase in independent nuclear powers is a direct threat to the stability of the international system.[2] A bipolar nuclear deterrent relationship is believed to be inherently more stable than one in which equilibrium is maintained among several nuclear powers in independent or alliance relationships. Though the relatively greater stability of a bipolar system may be preferred, its stability is, nevertheless, contingent. Maintaining the stability of mutual nuclear deterrence while restraining aggression is the primary goal of arms control.[3]

* This article was written while I was a Research Associate at the Harvard Center for International Affairs. The views expressed are mine. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 3rd ed. (New York 1960), 346ff.; Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957), 33-36, and "Bipolarity in a Revolutionary Age" in Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York 1962). For a dissent, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, XCIII (Summer 1964), 881-909. Kaplan states that the number of "essential" actors in a balance-of-power system must be at least five, preferably more (*System and Process*, 22). Morgenthau, while not specifying a minimum below which it is unsafe to go, makes clear his belief that the reduction in the number of great powers from eight at the outbreak of World War I to two superpowers after World War II has had a deteriorating effect on the operation of the balance of power, and implies that five to eight would suffice to maintain flexibility and equilibrium (pp. 347-50).

[2] Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (New York 1961), 147-57; R. N. Rosecrance, "International Stability and Nuclear Diffusion," in Rosecrance, ed., *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons* (New York 1964), 293-314; Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York 1961), 38-39; Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX (April 1961), 355-87. For a contrary view, see Fred Charles Iklé, "Nth Countries and Disarmament," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XVI (December 1960), 391-94; Pierre Gallois, *Stratégie de l'âge nucléaire* (Paris 1960) or, in English, *The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, trans. Richard Howard (Boston 1961).

[3] Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January 1959), 211-34; Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton 1961), 97-119; Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton 1959), 397-409; Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 230-54; Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton 1961), 226-55.

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The apparent contradiction between arms-control concepts and traditional balance-of-power theory arises, in part, from the different ordering of conditions believed to create stability, particularly with respect to the effects of military technology. Arms control focuses on the role of nuclear weapons, making deterrence the indispensable condition of international stability. It sees a unique correlation between the stability of deterrence at various levels of national armaments and the stability of the international system.[4] International-relations theory, on the other hand, does not generally give preeminence to nuclear technology in the calculus of stability.[5] Most writers, while rating military *power* very high, include military *technology* as a factor of only relative importance. They note the possible far-reaching effects of nuclear weapons but do not directly relate stability in the international system to stability in nuclear deterrence.[6] The interrelation between the stability of deterrence and stability in the international system may, nevertheless, be fundamental. The invention of intercontinental missiles and nuclear warheads has brought into question traditional concepts about the nature of war, the uses of military force in the pursuit of national policy, and the role of military power in the maintenance of international stability.

The main reason for the decisive influence of nuclear weapons in the context of international stability is the awesome destructive potential of nuclear war and the unbelievably compressed time in which such destruction could take place. Moreover, no country wherever located and however strong militarily can, under current and foreseeable circumstances, realistically believe itself immune from the power and reach of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons and their delivery mechanisms are manifestations of an unprecedented and spectacular intrusion of technology into politics. The interplay between the military applications of modern science and the foreign-policy goals of nations in an international

[4] Thomas C. Schelling, "The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (April 1962), 392-406.

[5] A notable exception is John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Nuclear Age* (New York 1959).

[6] Stanley Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton 1961), 206-15; Kaplan, *System and Process*, 22-35. Kaplan has, however, suggested that the retaliatory power of ICBM's in large numbers is a stabilizing factor (p. 45), while postulating that increases in the destructive power of weapons may make it eventually possible for one of the major actors in the system to eliminate all other actors and establish a hierarchical system. He notes that such a system would be so nonintegrated and nonsolidary that dysfunctional tension would paramountly characterize it (p. 57).

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system beset by intense ideological strife and power rivalry is a central problem of deterrence, the contemporary doctrine of international security, and its corollary, arms control. It is reflected in propaganda, the domestic politics of governments, and the diplomacy of the major powers.

Military nuclear technology has so far emerged only in the Communist camp and the Western Alliance, for nuclear technology is highly demanding of treasure and scientific talent. Relatively few powers seem presently capable of achieving major nuclear rank, though primitive nuclear capabilities are within reach of an increasing number of countries. Nuclear weapons have not only changed military power relationships between nuclear and nonnuclear states, but have also widened the gap between the superpowers and other major powers. The technical complexity and the cost of the delivery and command and control systems required to make nuclear warheads strategically effective against a superpower drastically reduce the chances that other nuclear powers in the system will achieve major rank. It is therefore likely that only the superpowers can fulfill the dynamic requirements of global deterrence. All declared aspirants to nuclear status have tested weapons. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, however, only Britain and France have so far produced as well as tested weapons, and have made public their strategic force goals. Chinese nuclear development is uncertain in scope if not in intention. Indeed, from the point of view of global politics, the actual or planned arsenals of these aspiring powers are debatable military and, to a degree, political assets.

Two important qualifications to these limitations should be mentioned. With the dissemination of information and knowledge about nuclear technology becoming increasingly unavoidable, it will become progressively easier and cheaper for middle-rank and even minor powers to develop and produce nuclear weapons. The costs for fabricating nuclear devices could be considerably less than those incurred by countries that pioneered in the development of nuclear conflict technology. About a dozen countries have or could have the option to go nuclear in the immediate future.[7] Secondly, powers whose security requirements and political aspirations are regional, or powers faced with a local enemy not a superpower, would not need the sophisticated and costly delivery mechanisms required by the major powers to attain their goals. Many nations already possess jet bombers.

[7] For comprehensive discussions of proliferation, see Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (London 1962); and Rosecrance, *Dispersion*.

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Even missile technology is not completely excluded for some would-be nuclear powers. Nuclear military technology thus both spurs and limits national ambitions and in the process deeply influences international stability.

The inhibitions in the use of nuclear weapons fostered by their awesome destructiveness have magnified their importance as objects of political agitation and as instruments for political warfare. The surprises and the innovations of the technological arms race alone have created intense political issues in domestic and international politics. For example, the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and the resulting loss of America's strategic invulnerability sparked a host of political problems in the Atlantic Alliance.[8] Heightened radioactive fallout from the testing of newly invented thermonuclear devices led to agitation, from 1954 on, against nuclear testing, and to dramatic national debate among scientists, politicians, and soldiers. It compelled international negotiations which led in 1963 to the banning of atmospheric nuclear tests. On the other hand, awareness of the singular properties of nuclear weapons has faced the leaders of expansionist and status quo powers alike with a dilemma over the means and scope of military power. These conditions tend to obscure customary distinctions between a stable and a revolutionary international system, and have qualified the use of military power at all levels of conflict for all states in the international system, but especially the major powers. Pertinent and important for stability has been the questioning of the concept of balancing the power of national units in the system through conflict or coalition diplomacy.

The Dilemma of Expansionist Goals, "Absolute" Weapons, and National Survival

Since the end of the Second World War, the methods used by revisionist nations have run the gamut from propaganda to warfare by regular armies in the field.[9] But except for local situations not

[8] The ICBM has had a lasting political and military impact, but the strategic invulnerability of the United States had already been questioned before Sputnik. By 1955 the Soviet Union had created a small force of intercontinental bombers operational against the United States (Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, rev. ed. [New York 1962], 173-79). The operational invulnerability of SAC had been questioned even earlier, though in different fashion. A study made for the Air Force found in 1954 that the overseas elements of American strategic air forces were vulnerable to surprise atomic attack (Albert Wohlstetter and others, *Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases*, The RAND Corporation, R-266 [April 1954], released June 1962).

[9] Except when the context in which the term is used clearly indicates the contrary, a revisionist power may not be Communist.

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directly involving the military presence of the contending superpowers, or their allies or satellites, the revolutionary dynamism in the international system has been generally curtailed, circumscribed, or smothered by tacit or explicit understanding between the two major antagonists of international politics. It is a paradox of the nuclear era that the original élan of revolutionary and revisionist powers is being replaced by concern lest violence surpass the bounds beyond which general war might occur in the system.

The use of military action by the principal actors—including the most outspoken revolutionary, Communist China—has been bridled.[10] Except for the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, the most powerful and decisive elements of the superpowers' military establishments, nuclear weapons, have not so far been used strategically or in local engagements. The national territories of the superpowers and their major allies, while becoming the main potential targets of nuclear war, have also become sanctuaries during peripheral conflicts. While the Soviet Union and China have deliberately fostered the local use of violence in Korea and Vietnam—conventional wars involving the military forces of one or more of the major powers—restraint has been exercised and limits have been observed.[11]

This has resulted neither from a lack of expansionist and revolutionary aims on the part of the Soviet Union and China nor from the unwillingness of the United States and its allies to use force or the threat of force, including the threat to use nuclear weapons, to protect national interests. It has, rather, resulted increasingly from a dilemma engendered by the properties of nuclear weapons (and by the increase in American and Soviet nuclear carriers and their stockpiles) which have changed the destructiveness of military power from relative to near-absolute so that it can threaten—and possibly achieve within a matter of days or even hours—the destruction of national societies. Thus notwithstanding the intensity of the ideological commitment, the magnitude of possible destruction does not flow primarily from political intention[12]

[10] Alice Langley Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VIII (June 1964), 99-115.

[11] For an extended discussion, see Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York 1963).

[12] The example of Carthage notwithstanding, bidders for hegemony have generally sought to conquer or control, not destroy, other nations. The destruction of Carthage itself does not appreciably weaken this generalization. The Second Punic War, described by the historian Cary as "the World War of ancient times," ended, for all practical purposes, the rivalry between Rome and Carthage, establishing Roman hegemony

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but from the characteristics of the weapons themselves and the operational imperatives they might dictate if nuclear war broke out *and became uncontrolled*. Not that nuclear war is inevitably all-out war,[13] but even a limited strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers, confined to strategic weapons and their supporting facilities, might result in collateral damage with high casualties and considerable destruction compressed into hours.[14]

This capacity of nuclear weapons to compress drastically in time and to intensify greatly the magnitude of pain and destruction is one of the fundamental differences between nuclear war and previous wars. Even more salient is the fact that "you can punish your enemy before you have achieved victory, and if you design your force properly you can punish your enemy while going down to defeat."[15] As a result, competition and opposition among the major powers in the system have become strangely hobbled in the use of national military power to attain foreign-policy goals. And while threats of nuclear war have been made by both Soviet and American leaders in crisis or local-conflict situations, the avoidance of all-out nuclear war seems to have become an established "rule" of the international system.

That this rule has emerged in an era of ideological strife among major powers testifies to the impact on international politics of the nuclear technology of conflict. The validity of the rule is, however, contingent. Deterrence depends on the ability of both sides, particularly the politically defensive one, to keep credible, by demonstrating both military capacity and political resolve, the threat to go to war. The military capacity, built and maintained over time, must be capable of inflicting such pain and destruction on the enemy as to divest him of incentives for surprise or preemptive attack (either out of con-

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in the Western Mediterranean and indirect but effective Roman control over Carthage. The third and final Punic War was unjustified on political and military grounds. Only the gallantry of the Carthaginians kept it from becoming a mere military execution. Anyway, the treatment meted out to them was not the usual Roman approach to conquest. See Max Cary, *A History of Rome* (London 1954), 156-94.

[13] Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, *Limited Strategic War* (New York 1962), provides a rich discussion of hypothetical strategic but limited strikes.

[14] For example, it has been estimated that a Soviet counterforce strike limited to three hundred megatons could kill up to eleven percent of the American population. See Norman A. Hanumian, *The Relations of U.S. Fallout Casualties to U.S. and Soviet Options*, The RAND Corporation, P-2412 (August 18, 1961), 9-14; or see Hanumian's statement to the Military Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (August 8, 1961), 207-33. Shelter programs would help considerably but would not eliminate casualties.

[15] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Nature of Deterrence*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (October 13, 1964).

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fidence or in desperation). Political resolve must be demonstrated in each crisis or conflict by a willingness to run the risk of general war.

Credibility is, therefore, a variable critically dependent on the contingencies of each crisis or conflict, as well as on previous performance. Each confrontation must test anew the validity of the rule. Yet under present circumstances, the magnitude of the costs that nuclear war is likely to visit (although not equally) upon attacker and defender alike tends to undermine the credibility of the threat to resort to general war. So while even expansionist and revolutionary powers have come to question whether general war serves the ends of policy, in crisis and conflict confrontation it becomes necessary to raise the threat of nuclear war by words and acts in order to maintain deterrence.[16]

Under the impact of a dynamic nuclear military technology, expansionist goals are becoming increasingly qualified in fact if not in the rhetoric of the cold war. Until strategic superiority and inflexible determination were made jointly manifest by the United States in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union could attempt nuclear blackmail. Soviet miscalculations about raising the risk of general war prior to installing strategic missiles in Cuba[17] and withdrawal in the face of overwhelming local United States superiority in conventional forces and the threat of potential escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange suggest that Communist powers, although more likely to probe for the limits of action, are nevertheless unwilling to risk central war. This has not generally been the case with the seekers of hegemony in the modern era. Two global wars in this century and the Napoleonic bid in the last attest to the contrary. Now, however, the ineludible need to accept the rule that there should be no resort to general war, except as *ultima ratio*, has led to doctrinal crisis—first within the Soviet leadership, then between the Communist governments of Russia and China—which is part of the broader conflict about prerogatives, ends, and the means of expanding communism.

The first, but abortive, effort to question war as an instrument of policy was made in 1954 by Malenkov, who declared that nuclear war would result in the destruction of world civilization—destruction, that is, of capitalist and Communist societies alike. Malenkov was

[16] A penetrating analysis of how "the threat that leaves something to chance" operates in the shared risk of general war is found in Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, Part 3.

[17] Arnold L. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 363-89.

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made to recant.[18] By 1956, however, his successor, Khrushchev, had publicly revised Communist dogma about the inevitability of all-out war between the Communist and capitalist camps.[19] Further, by 1958, he had reversed this dogma, granting that a nuclear war "would cause immeasurable harm to all mankind.[20] This questioning of general war as an instrument of policy by party leaders has continued and has been accompanied by a "gradual erosion of the dogma of inevitable communist victory," in the event of another war.[21] Imperialistic drives, chained rather than excited by versatile strategic weaponry of global reach, lightning speed, a capability of near-total destruction, and an attendant operational doctrine tending to favor surprise attack, would be a paradox indeed were it not for the severe inhibitions, alluded to earlier, in using nuclear war to achieve paramount national objectives.

If general war is not to decide whether the bid for hegemony by a superpower succeeds or is defeated, various tactical forms of conflict acquire more than customary importance in the contest to influence and control the international system. In some of these, such as the propaganda manipulation of the specter of nuclear holocaust by Communist leaders to inhibit the use of military force by Western nations, the action involved is mainly political. In others, violence is inextricably interwoven with political acts. These situations have involved insurgencies, limited and local wars fought by regular military units, and terrorism by small, organized, subversive minorities.

Even at these lower levels of conflict, however, the nature of the nuclear deterrent relationship fetters the military actions of expansionist and defensive powers alike. Tactical nuclear weapons have not been used in combat. However, there are signs in recent military writings that the Soviet doctrine of the inevitability of escalation into general war might become qualified.[22] And no firm doctrinal consensus against the use of nuclears in local conflicts exists among American writers on military strategy.[23] Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has for

[18] Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York 1959), 71ff.

[19] Leo Gruliow, ed., *The Documentary Record of the 20th Party Congress and Its Aftermath*, Current Soviet Policies II (New York 1957), 37.

[20] Speech at the Budapest Opera House, April 3, 1958, quoted in Roman Kolkowicz, "The Role of Disarmament in Soviet Policy: A Means or an End?" in James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr., eds., *The Prospects for Arms Control* (New York 1965), 99.

[21] Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 70-71.

[22] *Ibid.*, 119-24.

[23] Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War: An Essay on the Development of the Theory and an Annotated Bibliography*, Occasional Paper No. 3, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (May 1962).

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some years officially asserted that local wars in which the nuclear powers use nuclear weapons will inevitably escalate to general war.[24] The United States has equipped its forces with dual-capability weapons (i.e., with the option of using either nuclear or conventional warheads) and has declared its willingness to use nuclear weapons in local conflict if necessary. A deep psychological demarcation seems to exist in the minds of American policy-makers between conventional and nuclear weapons, however, and there are as yet no official indications that the distinction is fading. President Johnson's and Premier Kosygin's statements accompanying the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam are good illustrations.[25] These attitudes on both sides have tended to limit the number of potential conflicts in which the superpowers participated and to localize or deflate the violence of those that occurred. Communist efforts to subvert the international system by exploiting, instigating, or militarily participating in local conflicts have been tempered by fear of escalation to nuclear war. This attenuation in the use of military instrumentalities has basically resulted from two conditions: first, Soviet strategic inferiority and the greater vulnerability of Soviet forces to preemption; and, second, the realization by the Soviet leadership that the political gains they might achieve by brandishing nuclear weapons would be dwarfed by the costs should miscalculation lead to war. At no time since nuclear weapons have become operational has the Soviet Union actually had superiority over the United States in strategic forces—though between 1957 and 1961 Premier Khrushchev attempted to exploit for political ends a fictitious Soviet superiority in missiles. This deception was finally exposed by the American government in 1961.[26] Moreover, before measures reducing the vulnerability of strategic weapons to attack were implemented by the United States, and to a degree by the Soviet Union, reciprocal fears of surprise attack also aggravated the political tensions of the cold war.

In any case, if the polemics of the Sino-Soviet conflict are a valid guide, assessments of the risk of escalation from local conflict to nu-

[24] V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy*, trans. H. S. Dinerstein and others (Englewood Cliffs 1963), 44-45, 299; Wolfe, 119, 121.

[25] Good examples of careful wording are the statements made during the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964 by President Johnson (*New York Times*, August 5, 1964; joint Department of State and Department of Defense statement, *New York Times*, August 13, 1964) and by Premier Kosygin upon his return from his visit to Hanoi ("Kosygin's Television Report on Trip to Far East," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, March 24, 1965).

[26] For an extended discussion see Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago 1966).

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clear war have become a vital consideration for the Soviet Union. The Chinese, like the Russians, have for some time also believed that general war between communism and capitalism is not inevitable. Both Russians and Chinese have favored indirect military assistance to "national liberation movements," but have been reluctant to participate overtly in insurgencies. The dispute has been about the limits of action permissible against the West without serious risk of precipitating nuclear war and about the degree of destruction such war might entail. In practice, the Chinese have been cautious. Nor do they seem unschooled in the implications of nuclear weapons. There is evidence for the view that the Chinese are strongly influenced by the possibility of American intervention with nuclear weapons in local conflict or in a war with China.[27]

The United States, too, is confronted with a dilemma over means and ends. The expected effects of tactical nuclear weapons make it difficult, if not impossible, to discriminate between combatants and civilians in limited war and especially in insurgency. In such conflicts, where the political object is not to annihilate an enemy country but to defeat military or insurgent forces in order to reestablish political integrity, the use of nuclear weapons could subvert the rational use of military violence and negate the political object. For while force must be sufficient to attain the goals of policy it must not be so excessive as to cancel them.[28]

Thus it seems that the hiatus between expansionist goals and the use of military methods to achieve them has been crucially affected by the nuclear technology of conflict. But nuclear technology is also

[27] Alice Langley Hsieh, "Communist China and Nuclear Force," in Rosecrance, *Dispersion*, 163-69; and Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York 1965), 27-40, 53, 54.

[28] The distinguished soldier and military historian J. F. C. Fuller in discussing the impact of nuclear weapons on war has cautioned against accepting them as simply another discovery like gunpowder by relating them to the political ends of warfare in the following words: ". . . Directly the political factor is introduced, in all wars, except those of the most primitive kind, the destructive means employed to achieve a profitable end must be limited. For example, when in feudal times the aim of a king was to bring his truculent barons to heel, the artillery of that period was found invaluable to deprive them of their power of resistance—their castles. But had its destructive effect been such that, not only their castles, but their retainers, serfs, orchards and cattle within a radius of several miles would be obliterated, nothing would have been left to bring to heel—the means would have swallowed the end (*The Conduct of War: 1789-1961* [New Brunswick 1961], 313).

Clausewitz has also made the point: "As war is no act of blind passion, but is dominated by the political object, the value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased. . . . As soon, therefore, as the expenditure of force becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value, this object must be given up . . ." (*On War*, trans. D. J. M. Jolles [New York 1943], 21).

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related to the character of Western, essentially American, military power and the political determination to use it. Whether the Soviets and the Chinese use the tactics of tension or those of détente depends significantly on the strength of the West and the resolve of its leaders to resist Communist probes, threats, and political maneuver. The Soviet leaders are aware that while the prospects of using war as a deliberate instrument of policy have greatly diminished, the political returns from exploiting the possession of military power may have increased. The salient strategic truth of our times may well be that "men's minds are the most profitable and perhaps the only suitable targets for the weapons of the nuclear age."[29]

This discussion does not address the highly problematic question of whether an international system of Communist states might be achieved through piecemeal subversion, insurrection, and coups d'etat. But it underscores *the essential role of states with nuclear capacity in defining the rules of interstate politics*. In the balance-of-power system, war was a legitimate, if not a preferred, means of reestablishing stability in the system. Neither the number of wars nor the participation of the great powers in them were crucial determinants of stability. Moreover, provided the existence of so-called essential actors was not threatened in defeat, minor states could be conquered, partitioned, or incorporated as a matter of political adjustment. An essential characteristic was that war was not to be fought for unlimited objectives by any of the great powers.[30] We have been moving toward an international system in which political intentions are peculiarly shaped by "the state of the art" in military technology. Revolutionary powers, whose professed objective is the achievement of world hegemony through all the instrumentalities of state power, have been forced to forsake all-out war as an instrument of policy, and to show caution in the use of their military forces in the pursuit of national goals all along the spectrum of conflict.

The preoccupation with nuclear war arising from local conflict which shapes the dilemma of expansionist aims and qualifies use of military force in both large-scale and limited conflict reflects more than fear of miscalculation. It also stems from an awareness, by both the United States and the Soviet Union, of the contingent, perhaps transitory, nature of nuclear stability, which is the product of complex technical and political factors.

[29] Thomas W. Wolfe, *Some Factors Bearing on Soviet Attitudes Toward Disarmament*, The RAND Corporation, P-2766 (July 1963), 14.
[30] Kaplan, *System and Process*, 22-23.

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Stability: Invulnerability of Strategic Forces and the Shared Risk of General War

Stability in the international system is the result of many factors in dynamic combination. Paramount is the interaction between political goals and military means. Nuclear technology critically shapes the modalities of the present system and directly affects the chances of maintaining international stability. Technology is centrally located in the process of deterrence. It is directly relevant to the probability of general war and to the possibilities of controlling nuclear war if it breaks out. The possible effects of nuclear warfare have increasingly narrowed the number of strategies that might permit the superpowers to exploit a temporary military advantage to achieve a more permanent and favorable distribution of power without risking unprecedented and prohibitive self-destruction. It is becoming increasingly true that strategic miscalculation might quickly and irreparably become a question of national survival for the most powerful as well as for minor powers. And on the stability of deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union depends the stability of the international system itself.

In a word, because the new military technology has raised the issue of physical as much as political survival, technological factors have been elevated to a central concern with respect to maintaining stability in the system. Brodie stresses that prior to the Second World War changes in military technology, even when rapid, were confined to instruments having only tactical significance. The atomic bomb differed from "all previous military inventions in that its effects could not clearly be confined to the tactical." Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, "developments in the character, variety, and abundance of these weapons have affected . . . several distinct revolutions in military technology."[31] These have radically altered military strategy. Deterrence is informed not only by the state of political relations among antagonists, but also by their relationship within the context of military technology.

For example, it is hard to divorce technology from measures that make strategic weapons less vulnerable to surprise attack, technical intelligence more accurate, command and control more effective—all acts tending to forestall situations that might lead to inadvertent war, and thereby tending to enhance stability. Technology is also in-

[31] Bernard Brodie, "The Scientific Strategist," in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., *Scientists and National Policy-Making* (New York 1964), 242, 243, 250, 251.

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separable from acts that if taken beforehand might increase the chances of terminating war before the contestants expended all or most of their nuclear weapons. The impact of weapons and weapon systems on deterrence is not to be underestimated. The attainment of a steady-state peacetime operational deterrence is neither easy nor automatic.[32] Wohlstetter has detailed the essential aspects of the problem in his classic essay on the precariousness of nuclear stability in a bipolar world.[33] Maintaining deterrence during escalating conflict involving the superpowers may become very difficult, yet essential, during a limited nuclear conflict involving strategic strikes.

In 1962, the Kennedy administration amplified the concept of deterrence that underlay American national policy. Deterrence was now seen not only as a matter of comparative risks but also as a continuous, sometimes urgent, effort to undercut or neutralize the incentives for a surprise attack which nuclear forces might foster in the leaders of the Soviet Union—or as an effort to dampen preemptive urges on both sides. Deterrence was to be extended into general war itself. The administration revealed a strategic doctrine anchored to "flexible response." By this it meant a control of nuclear forces that discriminated between population and military targets in order to induce reciprocal restraints that might keep the fighting from spiraling into all-out war. Targeting enemy nuclear weapons instead of cities during the initial phase of the engagement could create the possibility of ending the war by negotiation—before the respective national societies became irreparably crippled by high fatalities, leaving only the urge for ultimate revenge.[34]

The need to work constantly on the technological factors affecting the stability of mutual deterrence has been recognized by military doctrine. The influence of the nuclear technology of conflict in

[32] "Steady state" is used to describe a dynamic equilibrium that maintains stability by reacting adaptively to preserve the essential variables in the system. This has been called "the principle of ultrastability" and is stated formally as follows: "An ultrastable system acts selectively toward the fields of the main variables, rejecting those that lead the representative point to a critical state but retaining those that do not" (W. Ross Ashby, *Design for a Brain* [New York 1952], 91). In nuclear deterrence, "steady state" refers to the process of research and development, procurement, deployment, war-fighting capability, and declaratory policy which over time and taken together with environmental circumstances, including the capabilities and the intentions of potential enemies, would dynamically operate to maintain the deterrent balance.

[33] Wohlstetter, "Delicate Balance." For a theoretical discussion of what is involved, see also Wohlstetter's essay on conflict systems design, "Strategy and the Natural Scientists," in Gilpin and Wright, 174-239.

[34] Remarks of Secretary of Defense McNamara at the Commencement Exercises, University of Michigan, June 16, 1962, in Department of Defense news release No. 980-62.

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shaping international action is not amenable to precise measurement but cannot be denied. Even though this influence is not always obvious it can, under particular circumstances, become decisive. While the shift in emphasis from fighting general war to deterring it—a shift caused to a telling degree by this technology—has strongly influenced preconceptions about the use of military force held by the decision-makers in the system, the question of war-fighting remains, nevertheless, a significant consideration. The capacity to fight a nuclear war is basic to prewar and intrawar deterrence.

The dynamic nature of the technology of nuclear weapons is as important as their effects in shaping political expectations. Often unforeseen scientific and technological factors continually qualify the capabilities of existing weapons, suggest new ones, render others obsolete. In the course of a few years, these factors qualify and may radically change the international military environment, raising new political issues. The latter may involve attempts, such as the nuclear test ban, to control nuclear technology and, through such control, to curb the nuclear aspirations of additional countries.

Ironically, as the rapid advance of techniques for measuring the physical potential for waging war (the effects of nuclear weapons, for example) have made the assessment of the military capacity of nations more amenable to precise measurement and more systematic prediction, the rapid pace of technology has made military doctrine subject to rapid obsolescence, untested by war.[35] This rapid pace also

[35] A study on long-range forecasting in which eighty-two respondents participated—most of them professionally conversant with the characteristics and the problems of modern weapons—could suggest initially fifty-eight distinct weapon-systems developments. Even after dropping those which a consensus considered either unfeasible or of such limited feasibility as to make development in the foreseeable future very unlikely, there remained thirty-two possible systems of the future. While no implication is intended that these are forecasts of military instrumentalities in the offing, it might be interesting to list those weapon systems that the panel of experts predicted would become operational before 1980: tactical kiloton nuclear weapons used by ground troops; extensive use of devices that persuade without killing, such as water cannon and tear gas; miniature improved sensors and transmitters for reconnaissance and arms control; rapid mobility of men and light weapons to any point on earth for police action; incapacitating chemical agents; use of lasers for radar-type range-sensors, illuminators, and communications; incapacitating biological agents; cheap, lightweight rocket-type personnel armament (silent, plastic, match-lit projectiles, capable of single or gang firing); lethal biological agents; orbiting space reconnaissance stations; advanced techniques of propaganda, thought control, and opinion manipulation; effective antisubmarine capability; longer-endurance aircraft, perhaps nuclear-powered, for logistic supply or bombardment; biological agents destroying the will to resist; penetrating nuclear weapons for deep cratering; automated tactical capability (battlefield computers, robot sentries, television surveillance); ICBM's with other than nuclear warheads; and deep-diving submersibles made of materials that decrease detection probability (T. J. Gordon and O. Helmer, *Report on a Long-Range Forecasting Study*, The RAND Corporation, P-2982 [September 1964], 32-39 and Fig. II, i).

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complicates the problem of maintaining international stability, difficult to define and to operate even when the classical balance of power prevailed. Uncertainty about power calculations has persistently led nations to seek military superiority vis-à-vis their actual and potential enemies in order to gain a margin of safety that would allow them to maintain their independence. In contemporary terms this margin is defined by the means to limit damage to the nation, means resulting from a capability to disarm or intercept enemy weapons while terminating hostilities in such a way as to obtain national political goals through negotiation. The quest for military primacy may also create in nations that have gained an apparent edge over their antagonists strong urges to attempt to change the distribution of power in their own favor. On the other hand, nuclear weapons have greatly qualified these propositions as guides to policy.

Some kinds of strategic miscalculations may not only be irreversible but become simply intolerable. Victory is likely to be pyrrhic. In our century, war has become total in the sense that it has been waged by total populations, with all available means, and for total political stakes. Nuclear weapons, while intensifying the devastation and pain of war and making the stakes greater than ever before, have changed at least one of these characteristics. Deterrence, by putting a premium on strategic forces in being, has created a situation in which the means for waging general war must be always at hand. Moreover, if the industrial-economic base exists and relevant skills are available, neither the production nor the use of strategic weapons involves most of a nation's manpower and skills. A sophisticated technology and a substantial industrial base are prerequisites for the production and the development of nuclear weaponry. But the effort required to develop and maintain strategic nuclear forces is not total in the sense that similar efforts were during the Second World War.

Finally, thermonuclear war (but not limited conflict involving the tactical use of nuclears) can be waged by armed forces relatively modest in size. And the decisions that might bring about the war itself ultimately rest more than ever on the judgment of a handful of decision-makers from the superpowers—perhaps only the Soviet Premier and the American President.[36] The unprecedentedly compressed time available for critical decisions and the fact that strategic options

[36] For an analysis of what this means when seen from the American perspective, see Richard E. Neustadt's remarks on the President as risktaker, in which the Cuban crisis is used as an illustration, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, *Hearings*, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), Part 1, 67-68.

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must be built into force structures in advance have given a new meaning to miscalculation. One of the revolutionary characteristics of modern strategy is that "decisions are 'canned' in advance. . . . There is not much time for adaptation, new indoctrination, ironing out misunderstandings, and changing plans. The options that have been anticipated are programmed into weapon systems; those that have not been anticipated may be physically unavailable."[37]

This suggests a rather tenuous connection between the relative sizes of the opposing strategic forces and the likelihood of controlling events if miscalculation occurs. The characteristics or variety and the mode of employment of military forces—more than their total capacity for destruction—may become the decisive factor once the confrontation escalates from a local crisis or a conventional fight.

Nuclear weapons have also introduced novel ways of measuring military worth in the strategic realm. The number of weapons is important but is only one of the indices of power. Their reliability and accuracy, their yield, range, payload, speed, and vulnerability, as well as the variety and "mixes" of weapon systems, are at least as important. These indices, together with the number of potential targets, the warning time available for the strategic forces to respond to attack, the resilience and flexibility of their control by the political authority, and so on, have become increasingly interrelated aspects of military potential.[38]

Superiority of forces, relative to an opponent, may, nevertheless, increase flexibility of response, and within certain limits reduce the number of fatalities.[39] The characteristics of weapon systems and their

[37] Thomas C. Schelling, "Comment," in Knorr and Read, 257.

[38] An example will be suggestive. If the effectiveness of a missile in destroying a military or demographic target is measured as the two-thirds power of the yield of its warhead, then an improvement by a factor of three in the yield-to-weight ratio would halve the number of missiles needed to kill a target. That is, two missiles with the improved characteristics would be the equivalent of four of the more primitive variety. Moreover, a given total yield does more damage in several small packages than in one large one. Finally, increases in the yield-to-weight ratio of warheads does more than merely increase their efficiency; it increases the flexibility of their uses (Kahn, 244, n. 13; and G. I. Pokrovsky, *Science and Technology in Contemporary War*, trans. R. L. Garthoff [New York 1959], 74-76). Other illustrations of the kind of essential considerations that must be included in evaluating the military effectiveness of weapon systems and opposing strategic forces may be found in Glenn A. Kent, *On the Interaction of Opposing Forces Under Possible Arms Agreements*, Occasional Paper No. 5, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (March 1963); and Jeremy J. Stone, "Bomber Disarmament," *World Politics*, XVII (October 1964), 13-39.

[39] Secretary McNamara has testified that for any given level of enemy offensive capability successive additions to each of various weapon systems have diminishing marginal value. That is, each increment added to existing strategic forces has progressively less and less effectiveness. See, "Statement of Secretary of Defense, March

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command and control, the capacity of the decision centers of both sides to survive the initial exchanges, capabilities for postattack reconnaissance, and the correspondence of war-fighting or targeting strategies chosen by the belligerents are also critical. But, as noted, once war starts, the capacity to exercise policy options by discriminating control of strategic forces might become as problematic as the timeliness in bringing hostilities to an end—though a rational, restrained conduct of war is nevertheless possible.

The problem of controlled central war is pervaded with uncertainties. Three kinds are major: technical, operational, and strategic. Technical uncertainty stems from potential inability to develop weapon systems with required features. Operational uncertainty results from the difficulty of predicting performance during actual combat. Strategic uncertainty is the most difficult to deal with because it involves such interactions between potential enemies as are hard to seize in advance. At the heart of this problem is the question of what the adversary power, or powers, will actually do—that is, the kind of force they build, the kind of attacks the power initiating the war will launch, and the effectiveness of the weapons used.[40]

Currently, there seems to be little *declared* congruity between the deterrent and the general-war strategies the superpowers might choose in a conflict. The United States has been building a strategic force that, in addition to creating the option of separating military from urban targets, would also allow the staggering of a retaliatory strike into separate and successive waves.[41] Lately, however, the emphasis has shifted toward a countervalue (population and industrial targets) doctrine.[42] While it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union in an attack on the United States would fire all its weapons simultaneously in a salvo launch, Soviet strategic doctrine (seemingly rejecting the notion of the controlled use of strategic forces, that is, self-imposed and reciprocal restraints) stresses the all-out nature of nuclear war.[43] A

2, 1965," Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), Part III, 35; and Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1967-1971 Defense Program and 1967 Defense Budget (March 8, 1966), 47.

[40] "Statement of Secretary of Defense, March 2, 1965," 36.

[41] U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture*, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), 332-571.

[42] Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee (March 8, 1966), 45-52.

[43] Apart from considerations of doctrine, it may be that technical difficulties besetting Soviet missile deployment might, nevertheless, curtail the ability of the Soviets to salvo their weapons (James Trainor, "USSR Can't Salvo ICBM's," *Missiles and*

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Soviet strike that included major American cities would leave the United States little choice but to retaliate in kind. This may change as Soviet strategic weapons become increasingly secure against attack, because of measures reducing their vulnerability, and as they increase in numbers and variety. Moreover, currently enunciated doctrine need not exclude a more flexible and discriminating use of Soviet strategic forces if nuclear war occurs—a course not inimical to Soviet interests should strategic nuclear exchanges begin. Meanwhile, with inferior strategic forces the Soviet Union possibly believes that a doctrine of restraint might undermine the deterrent effect of its military posture. Marshal Krylov, commander-in-chief of Soviet Strategic Rocket Troops, has described the mission of his forces as "the destruction in the shortest possible time of the enemy's war-industry potential, the disruption of his government and military administration, the elimination of weapons of nuclear attack, and the annihilation of major troop concentrations, operations centers, arsenals and enterprises producing weapons of mass destruction."[44] Strategies remain seemingly incompatible. But with the publication of the second edition of Sokolovskii's *Soviet Military Strategy* in 1962, the strategic dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union seems turned toward more genuinely reciprocal influence.

According to Secretary of Defense McNamara, the United States will have, during the 1960's, the capability of "completely destroying the Soviet Union as a civilized nation" with a retaliatory strike that would eliminate virtually all military targets in the Soviet Union while retaining protected strategic forces in reserve for use against Soviet urban and industrial areas.[45] "As time goes on and the Soviet Union continues to harden its missile sites and . . . to build missile-firing submarines, it will become increasingly difficult to destroy a substantial portion of [Soviet] residual forces." Even a "full first-strike capability . . . accompanied by vast programs of anti-missile, anti-bomber, and civil defense" could not preclude American casualties from running into the "tens of millions."[46] In a general war that occurred in the 1960's, American strategic forces could destroy the Soviet Union,

Rockets [August 10, 1964], 14). See also the remarks of Secretary McNamara on the weaknesses of Soviet strategic forces in an interview in *U.S. News and World Report* (April 12, 1965), 52-56.

[44] "Reliable Shield of Peace," *Pravda*, November 19, 1962, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (December 16, 1964), 33.

[45] Cited in William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York 1964), 5.

[46] U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Military Procurement Authorizations, Fiscal Year 1965, *Hearings*, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964), 30-32.

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Communist China, and their satellites as national societies under the "worst imaginable circumstances accompanying the outbreak of war."[47] But while this country could "win" a nuclear war, the cost would hardly allow the United States to consolidate a distribution of military and political power in its favor.[48]

Civil defense preparations are an important qualifier here. Extensive blast and, especially, fallout shelters, antimissile defense of cities and weapons, and related measures could significantly reduce the casualties of nuclear war.[49] Such measures, however, do not presently exist and would take years to implement. Most important, a determined enemy could keep the potential number of fatalities high. Increases and innovations in offensive strategic systems might conceivably undercut the utility of defensive measures but not negate their relative usefulness.[50] The deployment of additional weapon systems such as antiballistic missiles or bombardment satellites would have major psychological and political impact, creating additional opportunities for political and deterrent exploitation of nuclear weapons. But in the context of the arms race, such development might also lead to deployment of weapons with large explosive yields and might promote larger strategic forces. Whether this would lead to an increased capacity to inflict damage and fatalities should deterrence fail may depend on technological trade-offs between the offense and the defense and the circumstances of the war itself.[51] Important qualifiers might result from the arms race. But without technological breakthroughs which no one has imagined, weapons development tends to reinforce the assumption that it is likely to become increasingly difficult to reduce the pain and damage of nuclear war.

[47] Secretary McNamara, Address before the Platform Committee of the Democratic Party, *New York Times*, August 18, 1964.

[48] More than a few attack patterns and basic assumptions are tenable in projected general war exchanges and no definitive predictions can be made. Nevertheless, according to Secretary McNamara, "a full-scale nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, lasting less than an hour, would kill almost 100 million Americans—the equivalent of 300 World War II's . . . and over 100 million Russians" (*ibid.*; quoted also in *U.S. News and World Report*, 55-56).

[49] D. G. Brennan, ed., *Arms Control and Civil Defense*, Hudson Institute, HI 216-RR (December 2, 1963), Appendix A; and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, "Civil Defense—Fallout Shelter Program," HR 3516, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) Part II, Vol. 2, 5120, 5147. See also McNamara, Statement before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (February 18, 1965), 39, 47-48.

[50] U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations 1966, *Hearings*, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), Part III, 35.

[51] Jeremy J. Stone, *Anti-Ballistic Missiles and Arms Control*, Hudson Institute, HI-314P (December 12, 1963), 45; and Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee (March 8, 1966), 45-56.

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Thus it seems that the number of strategies permitting the superpowers to turn a temporary military advantage into a long-range favorable distribution of power within the international system, without risking a degree of self-destruction of unprecedented and prohibitive magnitude, is shrinking.

We seem to be moving toward a situation in which miscalculation at the strategic level might become quickly and irretrievably a matter of political and—with some important qualifications—physical survival for the nations involved in the nuclear confrontation.[52] What international decision-makers prematurely held as an image of nuclear war at the outset of the nuclear arms race is becoming a more accurate description of a range of possible postattack environments, in *uncontrolled* general war.

This suggests that while in the international system now prevailing a strategic edge in favor of the status quo superpower may be indispensable for maintaining the resolve of the superpowers to tolerate each other, in the long run, stability may also depend on whether the inferior superpower can feel that it possesses enough strategic capability to undercut with a relatively high degree of assurance its

[52] An idea of an illustrative range of postattack environments with levels of casualties, probable economic consequences, and the tentative identification of postattack situations under which the achievement of economic viability would be *technologically* feasible may be found in Sidney G. Winter, Jr., *Economic Viability After Thermonuclear War: The Limits of Feasible Production,* The RAND Corporation, RM-3436-PR (September 1963). For example, in an attack upon the United States in which out of 1000 to 4000 megatons, 750 to 2000 were delivered on nonmilitary targets, "the loss of industrial capacity would be a serious to insuperable obstacle [to economic] viability, unless extensive pre-attack preparations were made. Much would depend on whether the attacker [attempted] to maximize the economic difficulties created by the nonmilitary portion of the attack; . . . good to excellent fallout shelters would be required to keep casualties below 60 per cent of the population." In order to deliver the megatonnage indicated on urban targets, from 375 to 1000 missiles with 2 MT warheads would have to impact, or a mixed force would have to deliver an equal amount of megatonnage in various-size packages, not counting the counterforce requirement. The Soviet missile force was estimated in late 1964 to be about 200 ICBM's, not all in hardened silos, and 142 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, a small percentage of which may be carried by nuclear submarines. An additional 250 bombers, 100 on two-way missions to the United States, 150 capable of reaching targets in Canada, Alaska, and the northwest United States, could be put by the Soviet Union over North America (McNamara, Address before the Platform Committee; and *Missiles and Rockets* [January 4, 1965], 10). The United States had in 1965 850 land-based ICBM's, an additional 300 nuclear missiles in Polaris submarines, and 900 strategic bombers, half of them on a fifteen-minute alert (President Johnson in his Defense Message to the 89th Congress, *New York Times,* January 19, 1965). By mid-1969, the United States is expected to have 1054 Minuteman and Titan intercontinental missiles, 656 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 678 intercontinental bombers (McNamara, in *U.S. News and World Report,* 53). An earlier version of Winter's study may be found in his testimony on civil defense before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (August 9, 1961), 303-30.

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opponent's incentives for preemption. Conversely, and more crucial, an expansionist superpower would have to be made aware that it could not achieve its objectives through general war, or the threat of resort to nuclear war, without risking national suicide *even if it possessed strategic superiority*. The requirements for creating such a condition could be difficult to achieve and depend on predictions of the evolving technological and political environment which are contingent at best.

Stable mutual deterrence, when the defensive power is inferior or even equal to the offensive power, requires *at minimum strategic forces diversified at relatively large weapon inventories and capable of certain and utterly devastating retaliation*. The attacker must know that his survival as a viable nation-state would be put in jeopardy by his surprise or preemptive attack. With respect to the invulnerability of retaliatory capabilities, symmetry is mandatory. But the elusiveness of scientific breakthroughs and the rapid pace of technology may undermine this symmetry by threatening the obsolescence of strategic weapons and of the measures designed to frustrate a successful attack upon them. Thus the potential volatility of military technology promotes a qualitative arms race whose distinguishing feature may be ambiguity of signals between the superpowers about strategic force postures or about intentions to race for superiority or to stabilize at some kind of parity.[53]

Nuclear Multipolarity and International Stability

In addition to nuclear military technology and the "rules," conventions, and tacit understandings between the major powers, what distinguishes the present international system is the nature of the "signals," or the communication, between the superpowers in the context of the arms race and particularly in nuclear confrontations. For while the composition and the posture of opposing military forces suggest the limits and consequences of nuclear conflict, in a system based on deterrence the political value of nuclear weapons outstrips their military utility.

Deterrence, inherently a threat system, is concerned with the exploitation of potential force. As a strategy of conflict it is, therefore, essentially a universe of bargaining situations—a problem of communication between (or among) enemies in situations short of nuclear war (though bargaining may be even more crucial in intrawar deter-

[53] Harvey Averch and Sorrel Wildhorn, *Signals, Ambiguity, and Strategic Force Structure*, The RAND Corporation, P-2771 (August 1963).

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rence). Deterrence, involving mutual interests as well as opposition, has for its object persuading an enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of action. At its purest, deterrence is the "skillful non-use" of military forces.[54]

Deterrence, while operating on a day-to-day basis, is tested during crises and limited conflicts. It would also operate in nuclear conflicts short of all-out war. Tacit and explicit bargaining by declaration and deed varies with each type of situation but is always present while deterrence prevails. The testing, the production, and the mode of deployment of weapon systems, the declarations of governments about their intended or possible purposes, increases or reductions in military appropriations, the stated willingness of governments to negotiate political conflicts, changes in weapon systems, the content of agreements with allies or neutrals, arms-control negotiations, tacit understandings about the limits of involvement and military action in peripheral clashes are samples of the communication process that serves to signal national intentions and constitutes the deterrent relationship between the superpowers.

Strategic nuclear confrontation in crisis or during limited conflict, on the other hand, is focused and tends toward an eclectic ordering of reciprocal signals. In such a situation, the technological dimension of weapons (for example, warning and control systems) acquires singular meaning from the possibility of accidents, false alarms, mechanical failures, unauthorized acts, *but primarily from the misapprehension of intentions these might occasion.* During the last few years the United States has implemented impressive organizational and technical safeguards, such as fail-safe procedures and permissive links, in the command and control of its nuclear weapons in order to prevent miscalculation.[55] The Soviets too seem to have tight organizational control over their weapons. Nevertheless, acute problems of communication between enemies and allies are inherent in crises and limited conflicts. These problems have been aggravated by the advent of nuclear weapons since decisions might at some point become irreversible by greatly changing the physical and psychological environment in which competing decision-makers operate. It is difficult not to take decisions in the context of on-going situations. When these

[54] Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, 5-9.

[55] A detailed description of the physical and administrative restraints exercised by the American government was given by Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton to the International Arms Control Symposium, Ann Arbor, Michigan, December 1962. See his "Arms Restraint in Military Decisions," *Journal of Arms Control*, 1 (October 1963), 322-28.

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involve military actions, tactical considerations tend to obscure other equally or more important aspects of policy—such as political and long-range foreign policy objectives.

Reciprocal communication of intentions would be most demanding and fraught with uncertainties during an escalating conflict in which nuclear weapons were used—above all if escalation involved limited strikes against the territory of the superpowers or of a major ally. Communication in such circumstances becomes a form of bargaining indispensable for controlling events so that conflict retains the rationality needed to keep it from spiraling into general war. Deterrence must not, and need not, fail even during nuclear conflict short of all-out or "spasm" war. How demanding the diplomacy of nuclear confrontation is may be seen, however, from the fact that during the last crisis involving the danger of general war the United States did not consult with its allies until after the crisis had set its course.

The difficulties of maintaining the dynamic requirements for a stable deterrent system and the risks of miscalculation in crises and limited conflict would be severely multiplied by an increase in independent nuclear decision centers—which would in turn increase the fragmentation of coalitions and intensify local fears of aggression through regional arms races between traditional enemies or through the ideological involvement of the superpowers. When a bipolar system of deterrence, in which a potentially transitory nuclear standoff (resulting from the neutralization of opposing strategic forces) is the most stable international situation, becomes transformed into a system of several major and/or minor independent nuclear powers, stability is likely to decrease.

The very flexibility of alignment which brought stability to the balance-of-power system could become a serious threat to the maintenance of deterrence. All problems associated with maintaining nuclear stability would remain. Asymmetries in capabilities, military doctrines, and national goals might well become intolerable in a multipolar international system characterized by fluidity of political orientation or alignment and by latent breakthroughs in military technology. Initial experience with military nuclear development suggests that fledgling and adversary powers may not reach deterrent sufficiency at an even pace or with strategic symmetry. The complexity of deterrent calculations would be severely magnified for all powers in the system. Shifting deterrent relationships could confuse the signaling of intentions between the superpowers at tactical and strategic levels. Whatever modalities of nuclear power politics had been fostered be-

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tween the United States and the Soviet Union by common experience in crisis confrontation might be called into question.

Clearly, whether or not international stability is drastically undermined depends on a host of factors, technological and political, but fundamentally on the pace, characteristics, and dimension of the increase in nuclear capabilities; the likelihood and degree of cooperation between the superpowers in thwarting proliferation; the nature of their involvement in regional conflict; and the recklessness with which additional nuclear capabilities are brandished. Much would depend upon concerted actions by established nuclear powers in preventing a diffusion of nuclear military technology—particularly if breakthroughs make the production of nuclear weapons a much less costly and complicated process.

Because the superpowers predominantly fashion the conventions of the international system, their use of military nuclear technology will crucially influence the behavior of nascent nuclear powers. It has been shown how the drastic and spectacular effects of this military technology and the image of general war it has created in the minds of international decision-makers have blunted the edge of the ideological rivalry between the superpowers and have led to a set of inhibitions reminiscent, in their effects, of the restraints in balance-of-power systems. Quite distinctive and of particular relevance to the subject at hand are the "rules," conventions, and tacit understandings between the superpowers on the *use* of nuclear weapons and related "signals,"[56] or the communication between the United States and the Soviet Union in the context of the arms race and during nuclear confrontations. The distinction made between nuclear and other weapons has been pivotal.

Although politically the image of strategic capability was aggressively exploited by Khrushchev, the *deterrent* use of nuclear weapons has been the distinguishing feature of superpower confrontation. While nuclear blackmail could increase an aggressor's political influence, political pressure so generated has not achieved important redistributions of power in the international system. Typically, the brandishing of nuclear threats has been most effective in thwarting attempts to expand political control rather than as a tool for attaining it. In this context, the political asymmetry between a defensive and democratic power and a dictatorial one should be noted. Soviet threats are more likely

[56] For an elaboration of this theme, see Thomas C. Schelling, "Signals and Feedback in the Arms Dialogue," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXI (January 1965), 5-10.

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to be translated into political pressures when directed toward parliamentary democracies. In parliamentary countries, apprehensions and fears about nuclear war can more readily constrain governmental action. For whatever the likelihood of general war, its possibility directly affects domestic as well as international politics.

The actual employment of nuclear weapons in military conflict, even in limited and tactical fashion, would unavoidably restructure the attitudes of national decision-makers with regard to the role of nuclear weapons in international politics and would change the expectations about nuclear war held by leaders in emergent or would-be nuclear powers. These changes would manifest themselves primarily in a reassessment of the likelihood of escalation; and of the role of nuclear deterrence in conventional and limited conflict and in the parlance of crisis confrontation itself.

Whether the use of tactical nuclear weapons could increase their deterrent value with respect to conventional and nuclear aggression or could wash away those inhibitions about expansionist drives that seem to exist because of fears about inadvertent general war cannot be known in advance. But once the "firebreak" between conventional and nuclear weapons, now sanctified by practice, is erased by the use of nuclears, a central tenet of international communication will have been permanently altered.

"Conventions" about the use of nuclear weapons different from those now tacitly held will have to be worked out. Some other kind of obvious and controlling distinction to replace that between nuclear and conventional warfare might have to be discovered or invented and adopted by the nuclear powers to isolate the image of nuclear war from other more flexible and familiar applications of military force to political purpose. The shared risk of general war would remain as an inhibitor of rash political and military action. But at least during the transitional period leading to new, or renewed, expectations about escalation and the role of nuclear weapons, the ability to communicate strategic or policy intentions would be additionally burdened by the abolition of the nuclear conventional bench mark.

Other related understandings between the superpowers might be eliminated or questioned by the use of nuclears. The deterrent construction placed on nuclear weapons has spawned several other guidelines such as sanctuary notions, geographic limitations, a preference for the tactical over the strategic employment of military force, an inclination to choose military over population targets, and a strong reticence by a donor nation to share nuclear weapons without battle-

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field control. Selective, limited nuclear strikes—and probably also the battlefield use of nuclears—would tend to dissipate such distinctions in the policies of the superpowers and to influence deeply the expectations of other nuclear powers. Nuclear warfare, however limited and restrained, would herald a basic change in the international competition. It would complicate communication among the nuclear powers in more immediate ways than would the increase of nuclear powers in a system characterized by deterrent postures. The "noise" of a multilateral nuclear crisis, and especially of a nuclear conflict, in which one country's tactical move could become another's strategic vulnerability, might swamp deliberate and rational action.

A confrontation of several nuclear powers, with unequal capabilities and with varying doctrines of employment, would increase the difficulty of controlling events if for no other reason than because it might become difficult to ascribe responsibility for nuclear actions. Moreover, a superpower's relative nuclear plenty, which allows various counterforce options, and an incipient or minor nuclear power's modesty of means, which tends to dictate reliance on a countervalue strategy, may lead to urges to preempt and tendencies toward hair-trigger action, especially on the part of the minor power. A superpower's ability to punish a minor but antagonistic nuclear power would depend, *inter alia*, on the superpower's relationship with its major adversary and would imply the latter's tacit tolerance of such action. Quite the opposite is likely, however, since a mutuality of interests between the superpowers is least likely in a system in which their antagonism is the most prominent feature of international politics and is muted primarily by prudence dictated by the shared danger of general war.

Tolerance might be forthcoming if the inferior power in question were an avowed and active enemy of both superpowers and without ideological ties to either. Such political isolation is rare indeed. On the contrary, even so-called neutral or nonaligned states may hope for a measure of nuclear protection from one of the superpowers against a common enemy. While a multilateral nuclear crisis or conflict in which the ultimate sanction remained in the hands of the superpowers is both more complicated and more delicate than those so far experienced in the cold war, a crisis involving the superpowers and one or several minor nuclear powers might be more destabilizing still. Each additional nuclear decision-center increases the requirements for mutual adjustments in relationships originally maintained solely

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by the superpowers and tested anew with each change of leadership in Washington or Moscow.

The crucial variables of future encounters cannot be predicted with much confidence. Much will depend on the circumstances of the particular crisis or conflict confrontation. The heightened requirements for decision and the sobering knowledge of the inescapable political and physical effects of nuclear alternatives might lead contending decision-makers to examine their "acts of choice in crisis and during [the examination] to subdivide these possible acts in ways that make it feasible to continue exercising choice."[57] Yet the use of nuclear weapons in a limited conflict involving several nuclear powers would tend to erode the deterrent relationship of the superpowers, already hedged by technological factors and sapped by ideological commitment.

An international system in which the political strategy of the major powers is acutely dependent on the state of a dynamic military technology is fragile. And it tends more toward national strategic autonomy, or ultimate strategic dependence on the nuclear umbrella of one or another superpower, than toward the aggregate balancing of national units for conquest, defense, or competition.

The peculiar properties of nuclear weapons may not have altered the basic control images of international politics more significantly than has the disruption caused by the rise of communism and its exploitation by expansionist powers in the system. It may be that traditional patterns—those that distinguished the European state system—will reassert themselves when nuclear technology ceases to be "an unsettling innovation" and having found "an equilibrium within its own compass . . . [becomes] absorbed in its larger environment." An international balance of this kind might have come into existence in the form of mutual nuclear deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States. Beyond the attempt to work out some tacitly recognized rules for strategic confrontation, that is, deterrence doctrine and arms-control notions, however, the institutional response to the extraordinary challenges of the current international situation has been generally ineffective. In the area of political controls and organization, the challenge of nuclear weapons technology has hardly been met.[58]

[57] Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Controlling the Risks in Cuba*, Adelphi Papers 17, Institute for Strategic Studies (April 1965), 19, a stimulating analysis of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in which the various reciprocal restraints and opportunities are discussed in the context of escalation.

[58] George Liska, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore 1962), 8, 9.

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A regression to prenuclear rationales and methods because of inability to invent control techniques or organizational patterns of international politics appropriate to the new military technology would bode ill for the present system. The challenge to the nation-state system preceded intercontinental missiles and nuclear warheads, and the failure to meet it has been marked by two global, all-out wars. With the invention of nuclear weapons, the challenge has acquired greater urgency, for traditional patterns in the system favor war-fighting over deterrence, and the patterns developed in this century before nuclear weapons favor total over limited conflict.

Survival may not depend on acts taken in the technological sphere. It is decisions that initiate war. But decisions are shaped by the expectations generated by the environment in which leaders operate. And nuclear technology is an intrinsic and important aspect of international politics.

An international system may be considered stable if it retains all of its essential characteristics; if no single nation becomes dominant; if most of its members survive; and if no all-out war occurs.[59] It is clear that nuclear multipolarity might create conditions whose effects would tend to undermine, not enhance, international stability. How the superpowers adjust to the proliferation of nuclear capabilities among nations may become the real test of the deterrent system, for their behavior is normative. Stability does not depend only upon the number of major powers in the system. Power relationships, political alignments, national objectives, and the conduct of military operations also determine whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional powers undermines stability. Arms competition and political antagonism are constant and normal features of international relations. The skill and timeliness with which the leaders of the major powers adjust to the winds of change may decide, nevertheless, whether the transition to the next international system will be evolutionary or violent.

[59] Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 390.

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A FUNCTIONALIST'S LOGIC

By ROBERT E. DOWSE*

I

FUNCTIONALISM has assumed an important role in the behavioral sciences in recent years, but the employment of this method of analysis is fraught with difficulties. Some of the logical problems of functionalism are reviewed in this article in the form of a critique of Gabriel A. Almond's introduction to *The Politics of the Developing Areas*,[1] entitled "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics." This article focuses attention upon the weaknesses of the approach. In doing so, it is exclusively negative and critical, and is not an attempt at a rounded characterization.

Further, it is not suggested here that the criticisms of the approach outlined in the introduction reflect upon the interesting and valuable area studies that follow the introduction. Indeed, to suggest such would be presumptuous in one with no special claim to knowledge of most of the areas surveyed. Moreover, the area studies have interest and value quite apart from the introduction, as Professor Almond indicates in his preface.[2] Since it is suggested here that the approach described in the introduction confuses a classification with a theory, it follows that this article must combine both refutation and criticism. Finally, the argument is not meant to imply that many of the suggestions advanced in the introduction are not worthy of attention. For example, it seems to be entirely praiseworthy that Almond has attempted to bring into clearer comparative focus the politics of so many hitherto neglected countries. Also, his emphasis on "dualism" rather than simple pattern variables is enlightening. We are dealing here with the curate's egg—excellent in parts.

II

The absolute minimum requirement of a theory of political organization is that it should specify the meanings of the key terms to be used and that it should be cast in a form allowing it to be falsified, i.e., nontautologous. In at least one vital aspect the introduction fails

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[1] Almond and James S. Coleman, eds. (Princeton 1960).

[2] P. viii: ". . . The functional theory presented in the first part of the book has not been fully applied in the individual area chapters."

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to do this. There is no attempt to tell us what is meant by the word "function," and since this is one of the more disputed terms in political sociology, it follows that the omission is a serious one.[3] We are told only that all political systems have seven functions, which are these:

"A. Input functions
1. Political socialization and recruitment
2. Interest articulation
3. Interest aggregation
4. Political communication

B. Output functions
5. Rule-making
6. Rule application
7. Rule adjudication"[4]

If the basic concept is not defined, it follows that there is no conceptual limitation upon the proliferation of categories: the classes of activity ascribed to the political system are not derived from a basic conceptual or propositional framework for the reason that there is no such framework.[5] The form that such a framework must take if it is to be scientific is a series of hypotheses that together make a deductive scheme. A frequently cited case of such a scheme is that bodies falling to earth accelerate at thirty-two feet per second, and from this a whole range of other phenomena can be deduced, e.g., that a body sixty-four feet above earth will drop to it in two seconds, or that from rest a body will fall sixteen feet in one second. It is the deduction that imposes a limit, and an event is explained by subsuming it within the deductive system, and a theory is falsified if one can deduce a statement shown to be false.[6] Not one of these conditions will be found to be applicable to the approach presented in the introduction.[7] Hence,

[3] It may be that Almond is taking for granted the existence of a body of structural-functional theory widely accepted by students of the social sciences. But as a matter of fact such a theoretical corpus does not exist; see Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. ed. (Glencoe 1957), 22-24; and Don Martindale, *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory* (New York 1960, London 1961), 443-44.

[4] P. 17. These are the functional requisites of the political system, but it appears (p. 16) that they were derived from Western political systems. Whether or not they are held to be necessary to any actual political system is not clear, but presumably this would be a matter of investigation. The concept of systemic needs, however, is a very difficult one. See John Rex, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory* (London 1961), 76.

[5] This point has also been noticed by Leonard Binder, in *Iran* (Berkeley 1962), 7.

[6] See R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation* (New York 1960), 12-21. This is very similar to Mill's "inverse deduction."

[7] This will be shown in the body of this article, but in anticipation it may be re-

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a sort of classificatory fecundity takes the place of a disciplined concept. There is no reason why the number of functions suggested for the political system should not have run into hundreds, with only nomenclatural infertility imposing a limit.

Since there is no functional theory to be proved or disproved in the introduction—relevant or irrelevant being the appropriate evaluation of classification, not proved or disproved—it might be well to examine what a functional theory would look like. In mathematics the word "function" is absolutely precise and clear, and similarly the botanist or biologist is normally clear in his use of the word. This is not the case in sociology, or political sociology; instead there is a quite clear sense that functional analysis is inappropriate for a large class of social phenomena. By this it is not suggested merely that functional universalism in either its fullest expression (Malinowski) or modified version (Radcliffe-Brown) is tautologous. It is suggested, however, that if functional statements are made at all rigorous, then their potential "analytical spread" is greatly narrowed.[8] A minimum statement of functionalism—that given a system the parts are interdependent—is obviously unhelpful since it posits what needs to be proved, i.e., the existence of a system. Alternatively, such a statement comes up against the difficulty so lucidly explained by Professor Emmet. If a functionalist theory posits that "*taking some system for granted* as a complex whole, some element does in fact help to maintain it . . . then the statement that some element has a certain function might be looked on as no more than a statement of fact; it might even be said that it could be translated into a plain statement of results, as if we were to say that the statement that the function of the heart is to circulate the blood need mean no more than that the result of the heart beating is that the blood circulates."[9]

Without system analysis, a functional theory is reducible to statements of fact. Let us then look at Almond's analysis of systems. In contrast to the lack of analysis of functionalism, here we do not look in vain, but are told that "the political system is that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the

marked that (1) since there is no deductive system nothing is proved as opposed to asserted, (2) nothing can strictly be deduced unless terms are clear, and (3) tautologies are not amenable to disproof.

[8] That is, Kingsley Davis seems mistaken when he suggests that the very diversity of functional analysis means we are all functionalists. Possibly the lack of analytical vigor is a better explanation; see Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (December 1959), 757-72.

[9] Dorothy Emmet, *Function, Purpose and Powers* (London and New York 1958), 47.

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function of integration and adaptation (both internally and vis-à-vis other societies) by means of the employment, or the threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion. The political system is the legitimate, order-maintaining or transforming system in the society."[10] Now although it is notoriously easy to criticize definitions—especially of intangibles—it does seem that the definition given is open to a string of serious objections.

Firstly, it is a definition in terms of what the political system does. If an actual system then does *not* integrate or adapt, it presumably ceases to be a political system. "If the State does whatever it does by definition, then the proposition that 'the state does X' is no longer an empirical one."[11] As if it were not bad enough to have a basic proposition reducible to a tautology, we are also confronted with a tautology within which two of the basic conditions are totally undefined. At no point are the two concepts of integration and adaptation either discussed or defined. Both are slippery terms, both are essential to any biological or social-system concept, and both remain empty of content. Unless they are defined, unless specified in terms of some standard, it becomes necessary to interpret any response by a system as integration or adjustment. Thus in one definition we are given a tautology within a tautology.

I have earlier asserted that one of two prior conditions for a scientific theory is that it can be disproved.[12] I have also attempted to demonstrate that "A Functional Approach" begins with a series of tautologies. It remains now to insist that such statements cannot be disproved since the subject ("political systems") is held to be the same as the predicate ("integration and adaptation"). If, as a matter of fact, these phenomena cannot be observed, the sense of the tautology is not forfeited, but its use as a theory for explaining actual events is nil. This follows from a point previously made, i.e., that to *explain* something is to bring it within (to subsume it under) a law, and a tautology is not a law.[13]

[10] P. 7. Almond assumes that agreement about the use of the word "system" is widespread and that the term is unambiguous. Neither assumption is correct. For a useful account of the logical difficulties involved in the use of "system," see R. C. Ruck, "On the Logic of General Behavior Systems Theory," *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 1 (1956), 223-38.

[11] W. G. Runciman, *Social Science and Political Theory* (Cambridge 1963), 41.

[12] For the demonstration of this, see Karl R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (London 1957), *passim*.

[13] This may not always be rigorously possible: e.g., "Why has John a cold?" is not completely explained by saying that he was playing with Fred who has a cold, since not everybody who played with Fred caught a cold. We are not yet in a position to make "if—then" law statements about colds as we are with falling bodies or rusting iron.

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It appears that in the definition of system offered in the introduction there is presupposed the proposition advanced by Hempel that "it is essential . . . for functional analysis as a scientific procedure that its key concepts be explicitly construed as relative to some standard of survival or adjustment."[14] This is relatively simple in a homeostatic system—a living organism, a homing torpedo, or a temperature-control system—but hardly so simple in an actual society as opposed to an analytic construct where the state variables can be quantified.

It may be objected that a straw man is being set up here since it could be claimed that Almond's system *is* an analytical construct and not a description of any actual political system. Hence to say that it may be difficult to quantify in a specific social system is to criticize Almond for something he has not attempted. To a certain extent this is true, but the fact still remains that without any attempt to quantify, to assess significance for survival, the analysis cannot focus upon anything as more important than anything else. It can only assert interdependence, and it certainly cannot sustain any sort of procedural priority. One is left with intuition at the beginning of an analysis or with the arduous task of simply describing actual countries in terms of the functional approach.[15]

Having "defined" the political system, Almond then attributes to it "a particular set of properties. . . . *Among* these properties are (1) comprehensiveness, (2) interdependence, and (3) existence of boundaries."[16] It is not clear from the text whether there might not be a hint here that there are other properties, but they are not mentioned. The first property seems to follow from the definition of political system as does the second. It is upon the second, the "interdependence" phenomenon, that this analysis will concentrate, since it is later explained as meaning "that a change in one subset of interactions . . . produces changes in all the other subsets."[17] This is true of an analytic system,

[14] Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in Llewellyn Gross, *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (Evanston 1959), 295-96.

[15] There is a sort of cargo cult implied here. Fill in the appropriate categories and all will be delivered in the end. But meanwhile the prophet has put off the cargo-day by drawing up a few more categories to be filled in.

[16] P. 7 (my italics).

[17] P. 8. A difficulty here is that although the explanation may be true of an analytic statement—it can be attributed—it may, as a matter of fact, be false for an actual political "system." It is possible that there can be more, less, or no functional interrelationship, and that the latter may be more stabilizing than the former. For example, if interdependence is complete, then "negative" feedback (a vicious circle) could destroy a system, whereas with a low degree of systemic interdependence the feedback would be limited. An example of this would probably be Tinker's "broken-backed" states—Burma and Indonesia—where central dislocation is hardly felt peripherally; see Hugh Tinker, "Broken-Backed States," *New Society*, III (January 30, 1964).

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but as formulated it appears unsatisfactory since one is interested in the *extent* to which different elements affect the disposition of other elements in the system; in other words, there is reason to believe that some parts of a system are more important to system maintenance than others.[18] This can be illustrated by using a recent argument of Alvin Gouldner, who suggests that underlying functionalist analysis is the principle of "functional reciprocity." He states this argument in generalized form: "(1) Any one structure is more likely to persist if it is engaged in reciprocal functional exchanges with some other; (1.1) the less reciprocal the functional exchange between structures, the less likely is either structure, or the patterned relation between, to persist (1.2) unless compensatory mechanisms are present."[19]

This suggestion enables us to do at least two things: (1) fill out the notion of interdependence, and (2) bring ideology or force into the discussion. The first point is obvious. By the second is meant that a compensatory mechanism in a system where reciprocal exchange is unbalanced might well take the form of force—for example, Nazism or Stalinism, or ideological utopianism, such as Khrushchevism and Nkrumaism.[20] It follows from this that we can posit that a political system may be dominated by a group ("subsystem") defining its own position *and* the systemic boundaries. It also accords with the fact that political elites are rarely "neutral" vis-à-vis other groups in society and polity.

The third property attributed to the political system is the existence of boundaries. This attribution is a deductive or necessary one since without boundary it is impossible to limit a system, and for purpose-built systems or organic systems we can have a *fairly* clear idea of what the boundary is. But the same is not true of actual social systems. An attempt has already been made to show that in the functional scheme the difficulty of analyzing the idea of a system is enormous; it is necessary to demonstrate that the explanation of a boundary compounds the difficulty. We are, in fact, told very little about boundaries other than "that there are points where other systems end and the political system begins."[21] The usefulness of this definition depends on the countries one has in mind: the definition could not, for ex-

[18] Notice that this leaves untouched the extremely important question of what can be said to constitute change in a system; similarly it neglects the question of how much change is needed before a system becomes a different system.

[19] "Reciprocity and Autonomy," in Gross, *Symposium*, 249.

[20] See my paper to the 1965 Annual Conference of the British Sociological Association, "Ghana: One-Party or Totalitarian?" *British Journal of Sociology* (forthcoming).

[21] P. 8.

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ample, be accepted by a serious student of totalitarian politics. It is very nearly the essence of totalitarian systems that everything is defined in political terms by those controlling the political system. The rulers of a totalitarian society claim total jurisdiction over every aspect of their subjects' lives; they reject the concept of boundary and act as if the political system were total (except, of course, at the most trivial level, e.g., big end or little end). Are we then to go back to T. H. Green and admit Russia, China, and so on, as states by courtesy only? If so, then the idea of boundary turns out, once again, to be a tautology.

There is an equally serious difficulty in the later boundary relativism expressed in the introduction: "When we talk about *good* and *bad* boundary maintenance, we must use criteria appropriate to the system."[22] But if what is appropriate for a Bergdama band is not appropriate for Belgium, then we need a careful specification of how we are to use such value judgments.[23] It is not necessary to labor the obvious, but it must be insisted that if concepts such as survival, adjustment, or stability are appropriate to boundary maintenance, they "require specification to some standard; otherwise they have no definite meaning and are in danger of being used tautologically or else subjectively, with evaluational overtones."[24] It may be doing Almond an injustice, but it appears from his later discussion of boundaries that what he has in mind for a good boundary-maintaining system in developed polities is that of Britain and the U.S.: ". . . A high incidence of associational interest articulation may indicate a good boundary maintenance between society and polity. . . . Good boundary maintenance is attained by virtue of the regulatory role of associational interest groups in processing raw claims . . . and directing them in an orderly way and in aggregable form through the party system, legislature, and bureaucracy."[25] Whether there is a prescriptive element here—that the underdeveloped countries should aim at achieving such systems—is not clear from the text, but presumably no developing country would be advised to create poor boundary maintenance. But it is fairly clear that there is another model of political and economic development available, that of the USSR and China, and it would be extremely difficult to fit these states into a model of "a high incidence of associational interest

[22] P. 9 (my italics).

[23] This difficulty is also noticed by Professor W. H. Morris-Jones in a suggestive review, *British Journal of Sociology*, XIII (June 1964), 169-73.

[24] Hempel, 295. Similarly, Merton, 52: "Embedded in every functional analysis is some conception, tacit or expressed, of functional requirements of the system under observation. . . . This remains one of the cloudiest and empirically most debatable concepts of the functional theory."

[25] Pp. 35-36.

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articulations." Indeed, it can be argued that they are developed just because of the lack of such associational interest articulations. And evidence is not lacking that they are to some extent being used as models.[26]

A minor point, but one that is important given the comparative aspirations of the functional approach, is that as it stands, no comparison between polities in terms of boundary maintenance is possible. Comparison implies something in respect to which likes are compared, and unless some sort of standard of boundary maintenance is suggested—beyond good and bad or appropriate and inappropriate—we have no such standard.

A further series of difficulties concerns the role of the polity in maintaining actual geopolitical boundaries.[27] Is the definition of this role meant to suggest that the polity accepts boundaries as given or that it *defines* them and maintains the defined situation? The former is frequently false, whilst the latter is sometimes so, e.g., South Vietnam, Iraq (the Kurds), and India (the Naga). Similarly, the functional approach is, presumably, committed to the proposition that the power that maintains a country's actual physical territorial boundaries is a part of that country's polity. Are we then to include the American President in the political system of South Vietnam and Formosa? Are we to include Mr. Wilson and President Sukarno in the political system of Malaysia? If not, we are committed to the probably false proposition that the political systems of those countries maintain their own boundaries.

It may be possible for the functional approach to avoid this difficulty by falling back upon its definition that specifies "independent societies." It could then be suggested that those societies whose geopolitical boundaries are externally maintained are not really independent and therefore fall outside the scope of the analysis. Once again, however, this would involve a tautology. Further, South Vietnam is actually classified under the heading "Independent" in Coleman's con-

[26] The lack of any serious attempt to integrate either China or the USSR into the suggested framework seems to be a serious taxonomic weakness. On the implicit liberal bias of a great deal of functionalism, see I. L. Horowitz, "Sociology and Politics: The Myth of Functionalism Revisited," *Journal of Politics,* xxv (May 1963), 248-64.

[27] It is difficult to know whether the word "boundary," as used in the introduction, is purely analytic, arising from the idea of a limited system, or whether it has a geopolitical reference. If it is the former, then the use of the term is open to crippling difficulties, and if the latter, there are also difficulties. For a coherent, although not fully satisfactory, examination of the way in which the term can be used, see David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs 1965), chap. 5.

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clusion to *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, and for this reason it is probably necessary to take the former alternative.[28]

An examination of the same conceptual difficulty from a slightly different angle may be of interest. The problem is determining what one must include in the political system if boundary maintenance is a crucial function of political systems. The assumption is that a social system would "fly apart" or change radically if the elements making for social solidarity were missing. Hence, is that which makes for social integration systemic?

As I understand Evans-Pritchard's classic analysis of the Nuer feuds, these serve a number of purposes amongst which is to help delineate "group" obligation. But at the same time they are potentially disruptive and unless contained might cause the Nuer to "fly apart."[29] This is prevented by the existence of the external enemy, the Dinka, in the face of whom there exists an overriding obligation to cease feuding and come together for mutual protection. Hence, the Nuer boundaries are, in part at least, maintained by the extrasystemic pressure from the Dinka. Query: Are the Dinka then part of the Nuer polity?[30] A great number of "weaker" examples of the same phenomenon can easily be adduced. For example were the Japanese, French, and Germans part of the Australian polity when its boundaries were redrawn in 1901 under supposed external threat from them?[31] It would be tedious to elaborate examples, but the point is clear, viz., as it stands the concept of boundary maintenance is, whether necessarily or not, either tautologous or extremely imprecise.

On a similar level of analytical or definitional rigor is the other key word of the definition—that is, the word "legitimate," which is not mentioned again in the introduction. As with the other parts of the proposed structure, this is presumably a vital and certainly a slippery concept, but since it is not used outside the paragraph in which it first

[28] P. 542.

[29] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (London 1940). Presumably intrasystemic feuding or war can be eufunctional for the system if the right mix is hit upon or dysfunctional if the right one is not discovered. It might prove as difficult to specify in advance the proportions of peace- and feud-providing optimum social solidarity as it would be to estimate the number of convicted criminals necessary for the same purpose.

[30] Evans-Pritchard states quite specifically that "adjacent tribes, and the Dinka who face them, form political systems, since the internal organisation of each tribe can only be fully understood in terms of their mutual opposition." And further, "Opposition to their neighbours gives them consciousness of kind and a strong sense of exclusion" (p. 123).

[31] Something like the same problem would occur in a function-oriented analysis of ideologies, incorporating supersubtle foreigners plotting takeovers, i.e., Stalinism, Nazism, and so on.

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occurs, the functional approach cannot be accused of slipping from meaning to meaning.[32]

Assuming that these criticisms of functional analysis have some sort of purchase, at least one thing follows from them. This is that the desire to advance toward a "probabilistic theory of the polity"[33]—that is, a predictive theory of political development—cannot be undertaken within this approach. Logically nothing beyond that contained in a tautology can be deduced and since the future cannot be put into a present premise it follows that from a tautology prediction is impossible.[34] It is not impossible that, given the character of the functionalist scheme, *anything* likely to happen could *post hoc* be included and claimed as predicted, but this would be an odd sense of the word "prediction" and on a par with the gypsies' predictions of dark strangers and good fortune.

Not only is it impossible to predict on the basis of the scheme offered, but it is equally impossible to limit the number of classificatory categories.[35] If a theory has no limits, then it has no inherent ability to discipline the subunits, in this case, the categories. Hence, one cannot criticize the logic of the categories, but one can question their usefulness.[36] It is perfectly apparent from the proposed classification—the seven functional entities—that they concentrate on the extragovernmental institutions of the polity, leaving the rule-making, rule appli-

[32] Since there are at least seven permissible uses of the word "legitimate," it is not possible to discover the significance of its appearing in Almond's definition. These possible and actual uses are (1) in accord with a "liberal" constitution, (2) in accord with the majority, (3) in accord with national well-being, (4) acceptable without revolution, (5) done by an elected government, (6) having extraterritorial recognition, and (7) in accord with due process of law.

[33] Pp. 8, 58-64.

[34] It is necessary if a hypothesis is to be disproved that it should be in a nontautological form and that the forecast should be a rigorous one. In systemic forecasting this is clearly impossible unless the stated variables are given some sort of quantitative expression and the system itself is clearly defined. Neither of these conditions is met in Almond's introduction.

[35] There is something odd about the bald dismissal of logical analysts as joyous barkers (p. 4) by one who claims scientific status for a theory. A scientific theory, if it ignores elementary logical needs, is neither scientific nor theory.

[36] Almond, in "A Developmental Approach to Political System," *World Politics*, XVII (January 1965), 183-214, apparently fails to grasp the implications of some of the logical points made by such barkers as Hempel and Gouldner. He suggests several dozen new categories, but does make a serious attempt to relate them to each other, if not to a functional theory. His defense of functionalism is that it provides "insights"; this may be true, but is not true enough since indigestion and ideology, science fiction and Marxism—to name but a few—can all rightly claim to provide insight. The point here is an extremely simple one: False theories may yield correct results—alchemy, astrology, and demonology resulted in accurate calendars and primitive psychiatry—but the theories are no less false because the results are subsequently confirmed as correct.

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cation, and rule adjudication—the old division of powers—relatively neglected. This is justified on two grounds: (1) The formal institutions, although based on American, British, or French models, do not follow appropriate norms. (2) Analysis of formal institutions would yield little of predictive value.[37] Yet, unless I have grossly misunderstood the politics of most developing countries, it is precisely the central institutions of government that are becoming of major significance. The whole concept of resource planning, of direction, of political centralization—in short, the rational allocation of scarce resources—has proved of special attraction to the underdeveloped countries. It is, indeed, the case that without an efficient bureaucracy, economic and political development is almost impossible, and it is probably true that an efficient governmental bureaucracy is a necessary condition of economic and political development.[38]

It is not clear that Almond's functional approach need deny the growing importance of governmental institutions in underdeveloped countries, but it is perfectly apparent that its classificatory scheme implies analytical priority for the social and political rather than the formal institutions. At all events it is hard to understand why the treatment of "output" is so peremptory, except in terms of "prediction." Yet even here there is a problem, since it is not at all difficult to imagine that dissatisfaction with a government's failure to observe "constitutional" norms might itself lead to predictive difficulties, such as revolution, especially by armed forces.

However, again it is not necessary to labor the obvious simply to point out its neglect. There is a more important theoretical consideration to be looked at, and again it is a simple one. It is that nothing is explained—in any sense of the word—by a classificatory code unless that code plays an essential logical role in a theory. It has already been argued that there is no such theory in the introduction and therefore nothing is explained.[39] If Almond had set out to do no more than categorize classes of activities into the political and the nonpolitical, and then to subdivide the political into seven subcategories, it would be difficult to disagree with him except on the adequacy or otherwise of his classification. But "A Functional Approach" does advance the

[37] P. 52.

[38] See, for example, Joseph G. LaPalombara, *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), *passim*.

[39] But the familiar is redescribed and thus made unfamiliar, e.g., pp. 36-38. G. C. Homans, "Bringing Men Back," in *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (December 1964), 809-18, claims of functionalists that "much of the work they called theoretical consisted in showing how the words in other languages, including that of everyday life, could be translated into theirs."

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claim to have elaborated a functional *theory* of the polity—a claim that has already been disputed on the grounds that the "theory" fails to accord with elementary and necessary conditions for a theory, viz., specified limited terms and a statement of the theory which can be tested and disproved.

III

I do not wish to become bogged down in a discussion of whether or not a functional theory of politics is possible, or even if a satisfactory one has been advanced.[40] Nor is it argued that structural-functional analysis has not claims to a number of heuristic values. It has, for example, sensitized students to complex relationships, has drawn attention to the social setting of politics, and has proved a valuable corrective to rationalizing and moralizing.[41]

But a few observations on functional analysis and the underdeveloped countries may not be out of place at this juncture.

A major problem is how one is to integrate planned and purposive innovation into the analysis if one assumes, with Nagel, that "functional statements are regarded as appropriate in connection with systems possessing self-maintaining mechanisms for certain of their traits, but seem pointless and even misleading when used with reference to systems lacking such self-regulatory devices."[42] One has to assume that even radical innovation is in some sense system-maintaining, and that no matter what the change the system still maintains itself, an assumption that is only trivially true in the sense that the occupants of a social system rarely all die at the same time. Otherwise one might be committed to the proposition that, for instance, the Russia of 1916 is in all important traits the USSR of 1965. But the fact is that Russia did not possess self-maintaining mechanisms—at least not strong enough mechanisms—to maintain certain vital characteristics. One way of avoiding this difficulty would be to attribute homeostatic characteristics to polities with certain specified tolerances, a difficult but theoretically not an impossible task.[43] But this would immediately

[40] For a much more satisfactory and rigorous account of functionalism than that of Almond, see Merton, *Social Theory*, and Harry C. Bredemeier, "The Methodology of Functionalism," *American Sociological Review*, XX (April 1955), 173-80.

[41] William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Functionalism in Political Science," in Don Martindale, ed., *Functionalism in the Social Sciences*, Monograph 5, American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia 1965), 111-26.

[42] Ernest Nagel, *Logic Without Metaphysics* (Glencoe 1956), 251-52.

[43] The point about a homeostatic device is that it can cope with "stresses" of a limited intensity and duration; beyond that it is likely to be ineffective. It is also only homeostatic in terms of limited purpose, e.g., guiding aircraft or maintaining a temperature range.

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limit the scope of functional analysis and might easily make it inappropriate to the developing areas where rapid, radical, and comprehensive change is taking place.

A possible alternative functional explanation of radical political and social innovation would be to suggest that these are functionally necessary to maintain the society. But this could be done at the very considerable cost of introducing functional universalism, a proposition endorsed by Malinowski, which labors under the disadvantage of explaining everything and hence nothing.[44] Another difficulty is knowing if, after the society has been changed radically, it is the same society. If not, then in what sense was the change system-maintaining? Another possibility would be the introduction of the idea of dysfunction: the radical innovations are a danger to the stability of society. But it is not clear what is gained by this other than translation of what we already know into a different language. Also, if the term is introduced a familiar problem arises, that of specifying a standard of measurement which is nonnormative.[45]

Let us now return to the introduction and specifically to the problem raised by classification of party systems under the headings (1) authoritarian, (2) dominant nonauthoritarian, (3) competitive two-party, and (4) competitive multiparty.[46] The first thing to notice is that, as with the other classificatory schemes, these headings are not shown to have a logical involvement with functional theory, or, indeed, with any other theory. That is, there is no special logical compulsion to use the classification. A far more pressing difficulty is that the characteristics of each type of system are merely described, without any extended attempt to demonstrate that one type of party system would be functionally more appropriate to certain types of political systems. But this is surely what one would have expected from a functional analysis with predictive pretensions? *Post hoc* explanations, like "the political socialization process in countries such as France and Italy tend to produce a fragmented, isolative political culture" (and hence a multiparty system), will not do.[47]

They will not do because they are only partially correct—France and Italy have relatively large and stable Communist or Left blocs—but also because precisely the same phenomena could be urged as producing a single-party system. The single-party system in Africa is frequently justified as being functionally necessary—stabilizing, aggre-

[44] Merton.
[45] T. B. Bottomore, *Sociology* (London 1962), 52.
[46] P. 40. Authoritarian is subdivided into authoritarian and totalitarian.
[47] P. 43.

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gating, and so on—within a political culture of a fragmented and isolative character.[48] But if diametrically opposite systems can be held to be necessary in "similar" situations, what sort of sense does a functional analysis make? It surely makes as good sense to argue that, for example, Lenin and Nkrumah actively *wanted* a single-party system as to suggest that what happened was in some way an expression of systemic functional necessity.[49] As social scientists we can hardly afford to neglect specific origins—especially in the case of the "new" countries where they are recent—unless we are prepared to risk generalizations that are likely to be false or tautological.

Some problems then require not only functional analysis but also historical inquiry. One might take this a little further and suggest that a study of pattern maintenance cannot answer a range of significant questions, since it leaves totally unanswered the question "Why this *particular* pattern or institution and not another?" And without wishing to decry comparative analysis or to retreat into extreme historical specificity it is also necessary to insist that a great deal is missed when the comparative categories are wide-ranging.[50] In a paper of broad implication Huaco suggests that functionalism is incapable, as it stands, of explaining the general phenomenon of stratification.[51] If he is right, then evidently functionalism is in dubious health indeed. But the point is that the committed functionalist must be clear that he *explains nothing specific*.[52]

This brings us, somewhat deviously, to another gap in Almond's analysis which possibly arises from his functionalism. This is, of course, the absence of any adequate discussion of leadership or leaders. Reference has just been made to a possible explanation of the origins of one-party states in terms of the desires or aspirations of leaders, and while this is not sufficient explanation, it would seem to be a possible

[48] This is not, of course, to suggest that precisely the contrary has not also been suggested, i.e., that in the absence of class structure and social differentiation, only one party is necessary.

[49] There is a difficulty here familiar to functional theory: It is sometimes logically false to argue from consequences to causes; but it can easily be the case that those to whom one is attributing agency actually expressed the desire to bring about what occurred. This is true of both Lenin and Nkrumah.

[50] In his extremely interesting paper "The Development of Social Policy in England: 1800-1914," *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, IV (1962), I. H. Goldthorpe develops this point in some detail.

[51] George Huaco, "A Logical Analysis of the Davis-Moore Theory of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, XXVIII (October 1963).

[52] This is implicitly recognized in all the area studies in the volume and, indeed, in practically every other study of nation-building, all of which have strong historical leanings. It should be added that the point I am making can be proved formally; see I. C. Jarvie, "The Limits of Functionalism in Anthropology," in Martindale, 18-34.

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element in such an explanation. If this is the case, then quite obviously structural-functional analysis is inadequate for states where strong leadership is observed. Explanations in terms of "leadership function" will not do, since the *style* of such leadership is so varied where basic situations are so similar.[53] What needs explanation are the differences in politicians' responses and not simply the emergence of leadership due to functional needs of the system.[54] A satisfactory structural-functional proposition of leadership would need to take something like the following form: Similar situations produce similar leaderships. We could then define "similar" within tolerable or generally acceptable limits and test the proposition against actual cases of leadership. Any looser formulation would almost certainly lead one to a tautology—a blinding glimpse of the obvious.

Not only is the discussion of leadership inadequate, but there is no discussion at all of the part played in political decision-making by political ideas. Whether or not ideologies can be analyzed in purely functional terms is not the question. All I am concerned to suggest is that it is difficult to understand what is going on in many of the underdeveloped countries without some appreciation of the way in which political and economic priorities are decided. Functionalism would direct attention to the impact of policy, but not to the significant area of policy generation and policy hierarchy—that is, to the reasons why one policy rather than another is acceptable and one problem rather than another is conceded priority. Politicians do not aggregate in the dark; they do not merely have problems thrust at them and choose which to deal with at random. Rather they have a more or less clear and articulated preference scale with which they recognize and assess what a problem is. Yet not a hint of this can be found in "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics."[55]

In concluding this article it will be proper to attempt briefly to formulate its implications. Firstly, in no sense of the word has Professor Almond been refuted except with regard to his claim to have advanced a theory. In this respect I believe I have refuted him. Secondly, it has been suggested that, like Mahomet's coffin, his classifications appear to be free-floating in the sense of not logically involved

[53] Compare, for example, Houphouet-Boigny with Nkrumah and Touré or, as Crick has suggested, the leadership of Ghana and Israel, in *In Defence of Politics* (London 1964), 90.

[54] Rex, 75-76, is getting at this point in a more generalized way.

[55] Most of the area studies in fact do focus attention on political ideology. For an excellent, stimulating example of comparative political analysis at this level see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (London and New York 1964).

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in a theory. Thirdly, an attempt has been made to demonstrate that if at all rigorously used these classifications sometimes lead to odd and paradoxical conclusions. Finally, and here the terrain is less firm, an attempt has been made to show that for a range of purposive social and political activity, functionalism is not really appropriate. If these conclusions are strongly negative, they are perhaps excusable on the grounds that expressing them may help to clarify the boundary between the scientifically worthwhile and the rest. In a sense the criticisms have stemmed from trivial logical distinctions and considerations, but it should be remembered that to ignore trivial logical points is to risk being not even trivially true.

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THE LONG ROAD TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Problems of Statistical Nonadditivity

By HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR.*

EVER since all the king's horses and all the king's men were unable to put Humpty Dumpty back together again, poets and scholars have often believed that biological, social, and political wholes are somehow greater than the sum of their parts. Most severely criticized among the king's men for their lack or misuse of the relevant surgical skills have been policy scientists using the logical tools of mathematics and the research procedures of the behavioral and social sciences. As world politics has increasingly influenced both individual and national destinies, the analytical and synthetical skills of quantitative international relations theorists, in particular, have come into dispute.

After a review of some recent criticisms of mathematical research, this article suggests and illustrates several statistical procedures for taking apart and putting back together the pieces of international relations theory: myriads of data, endless varieties of conceptual variables, and books full of propositions somehow related to each other. None of these procedures is intended to be definitive, but each is designed to help clarify how and why international phenomena and related theoretical systems represent more or less than the sum of their parts.

I. Recent Criticisms of Mathematical Research

A recurring theme in critiques of mathematically oriented international relations research is the allegedly nonquantifiable nature of the objects, relationships, and propositions being studied. The argument is often generalized into the claim that a quantitative science of politics is impossible. Bernard Crick links both these indictments to increased American involvement in world affairs: "The 'science of politics' has been a political doctrine and an intellectual movement passionately concerned to regain that original American sense of uniqueness and completeness which has been frustrated by the incal-

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culable politics of an undeniable reinvolvement in a complicated and changing outside world. Such a movement could only succeed in the sense of forsaking actual politics for the abstract safety and certainty of pseudo-science."[1]

To this charge that quantitative theory-building is an *escape from reality*, Stanley Hoffmann has added the criticism that such efforts are also a *dismemberment of reality*. Besides disapproving of the ideal of a deductive science of international relations using uprooted foreign methods and concepts that are indiscriminately borrowed from other natural and social sciences, Hoffmann argues that

> Another aberration is the mushrooming of mathematical models supposed to account for large parts of the field. Often, the scientist includes in his model only the variables that can be measured. . . . Hence, far from explaining reality, many such models drive research into the chase and measurement of shadows. . . .
>
> Sometimes the model builders try to measure all the important variables; but this involves some fantastic assumptions, such as the postulate that in our discipline quantification always entails a gain in precision . . . , or that quantities measured independently can be added or combined meaningfully. The result is quite literally a dismemberment of reality, due to the mistake of treating history . . . as a "storehouse" in which facts are piled up as separate and discrete units, and to the mistake of believing that political phenomena can be reduced to a measurable common denominator comparable to the currency unit in economics.[2]

Whether escaping from or attacking and dismembering reality, mathematically oriented researchers are accused by Crick and Hoffmann of *quantifying the unquantifiable*, and of *adding the nonadditive*. Such accusations apply to both psychological and sociological phenomena. Hoffmann, for example, attacks quasi-mathematical treatments of social forces involved in processes of political integration and disintegration. Referring particularly to recent mathematical decision theories, Jessie Bernard, in a less hostile but equally challenging manner, argues for a psychological version of these two theses: "Perhaps most troubling is the assumption in mathematical models that all the

[1] *The American Science of Politics* (London 1959), 247-48.

[2] Hoffmann's "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics*, XI (April 1959), 346-77, is perhaps the most significant recent combination of theoretical insight and methodological confusion regarding nonadditivities in international relations research. The above quotation is taken from a revised version of his "Long Road to Theory" article: Stanley Hoffmann, ed., *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs 1960), 45. See also pp. 40-44, 46-52.

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variables involved can be precisely measured and that in the case of those referring to subjective phenomena—e.g. cost, utility, satisfaction, 'effort,' etc.—they are additive in nature. The last named difficulty haunts researchers in all the social sciences."[3]

PROBLEMS OF QUANTIFICATION

When Bernard and Hoffmann write about the *imprecision* of quantified measurements, their concern differs from the problem of the appropriateness of quantified measures—the problem of quantifying the unquantifiable.

1. *Imprecise measurements.* Ever since Gaus observed that some random measurement errors have a normal (bell-shaped) frequency distribution centered on the true value of the property being measured, statisticians have been sensitized to the problem of inaccurate measurement. The possibilities of systematic (nonrandom) errors have also more recently come under careful investigation. The simple message that Hoffmann and Bernard suggest is easy to state, but difficult to follow: Don't claim for research results greater precision than the measurements allow.[4]

2. *Nonmeasurable concepts.* As Crick believes that politics is "incalculable," so Hoffmann refers to "such nonmeasurable factors as the role of political elites, the attitudes and mores of various groups, the nature and effects of political and economic organization, and so on."[5]

Despite the strong emotions associated with the resistance to quantification, it may be helpful briefly to mention the statistical issues

[3] "The Sociological Study of Conflict," in International Sociological Association, *The Nature of Conflict: Studies on the Sociological Aspects of International Tensions* (Paris 1957), chap. 1, partly reprinted in Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory*, 124-36. The quotation above is taken from p. 133 of the Hoffmann reader. See also Hoffmann's "Long Road to Theory," 364.

Anatol Rapoport has made the same point, with more homely examples, in the glossary of his *Strategy and Conscience* (New York 1964), 308. "Additivity" is there defined as "a property possessed by measurable quantities whose magnitudes can be meaningfully added when the quantities are combined. For example, the combined weight of Cow A and Cow B equals the sum of two weights. However, the utilities of objects or events are not necessarily additive. The utility of a cup of coffee in which an ounce of salt has been dissolved need not equal [for most people it will be a good deal less than] the utility of a cup of coffee plus the utility of an ounce of salt."

[4] Besides the enormous statistical literature on random errors and statistical significance, it might be worth citing just a few of the more imaginative works on nonrandom errors. In decreasing degrees of mathematical sophistication are Ragnar Frisch, *Statistical Confluence Analysis by Means of Complete Regression Systems* (Oslo 1934); Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill 1964), esp. chap. 5; and Raoul Naroll, *Data Quality Control* (Glencoe 1962).

[5] Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory*, 45.

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involved. In statistical terms, the problem of nonmeasurability reduces to the question of whether ratio, interval, ordinal, or nominal scales of measurement are appropriate. Any mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categorization of political organizations (such as "totalitarian," "nontotalitarian," and "concept does not apply") satisfies all the mathematical requirements of a nominal scale. Such numerical labels are appropriate only in the same sense as are telephone numbers, which cannot be meaningfully added or multiplied. Measurement errors may exist for such categories, and should be taken into account by appropriate statistical procedures; if descriptive words can be applied to international phenomena with nothing more than random accuracy, then supposedly empirical concepts have become ineffable ones.

More serious problems of precision and appropriateness are likely to arise when ordinal scales (rankings of objects using ordinal numbers, such as first, second . . .), interval scales (such as the positive integers, distances between which can be measured by equal intervals), or ratio scales (ordinary numbers like 0, −3, 5.7) are used. As a general rule, objects and events being measured should enjoy the same meaningful interrelationships as the numbers applied to them.[6]

PROBLEMS OF NONADDITIVITY

Despite these problems of quantification, Bernard appears more haunted by problems of nonadditive relationships. After reading the list below, one finds it hard not to share her feeling of unreality concerning some additivity assumptions. The nonadditivity label turns out to be a convenient way of grouping most of the major questions raised by the previous quotations.

1. *Nonuniversality.* Even if some kind of fairly precise quantification of national characteristics is possible, Hoffmann doubts that we should add these measurements together with others gathered independently. More technically, should we stop short of attempted universality in our data aggregation procedures? The scientist wants to believe that there is but one world to discover, that his concepts, indicators, and generalizations will have universal validity. But how do

[6] Although many measurement problems can thus be "solved" by using lower "levels of measurement" with higher levels of precision, there remain much more serious issues known technically as problems of measurement reliability (reproducibility) and validity (truthfulness). For a helpful discussion of these problems, the reader is referred to the social science literature on research methods, e.g., Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz, eds., *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York 1953).

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we know that a leap of scientific faith is not a fantasy-laden escape from reality?

2. *Nonadditive relationships.* In effect Bernard asks whether group effort is greater than the sum of individual efforts, or whether the utility of two outcomes is more than adding the utilities of each. Similarly, Hoffmann considers adding the separate effects of sociological background factors promoting international integration to be a "dismemberment of reality." The same problem of nonadditive relations is evident to Hoffmann in quantitative psychological and sociological analyses of foreign policy attitudes: Is one attitude just the sum of several others? Can foreign policies be predicted from merely additive combinations of domestic or international influences? Or will "generalizations based on comparative studies of decision-making" be "misleading if the international context which conditions the behavior of the units is not studied more adequately?"[7]

3. *The impossibility of cumulative science.* When applied to recent American attempts at the scientific study of both domestic and international politics, Crick's label of "pseudo-science" implies a question intended to be even more damning than the cry of nonadditive relationships: How is it possible, by the methods of science, for us to obtain cumulative knowledge about the complex field of international relations? In particular, how can we distinguish causal from spurious or illusory relationships? Aren't international relationships too interdependent, too subject to change for the empirical scholar safely or accurately to disentangle or reassemble their component parts?

Hoffmann's attack on "systems scientism" in the social sciences appears only slightly less severe; he considers that the search for closed systems of causal laws, the use of abstract deductive methods, and the test of predictability are based on a misunderstanding by social scientists of the nature of laws in the physical sciences: ". . . [Physical] laws are seen as far more strict and absolute than they are. The best we can achieve in our discipline is a statement of trends. Because the experimental methods available in the social sciences are 'not capable of demonstrating any causal laws,' we can only eliminate certain hypotheses . . . and thus define limits, within which certain trends can be suggested with 'some degree of approximation'. . . ."[8] Hoffmann's commitment to inductive historical sociology may be seen as a methodological rejection of a kind of scientific theorizing rather than as a basically antiscientific orientation.

[7] "Long Road to Theory," 364.

[8] *Contemporary Theory*, 42. See also pp. 174-84. The sensible inner quotations in

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THE RELEVANCE OF STATISTICS

As for any other social science, the simplest way of demonstrating the particular relevance of statistics to international relations theory-building is by example.[9] The rest of this article will discuss a variety of statistical procedures for testing and building mathematical international relations theories that combine significant inductive and deductive power with a relative freedom from criticisms of escaping or dismembering international reality. These procedures have been designed to cope with some of the most serious weaknesses of recent quantitative research, namely, problems of nonadditivity.

Each procedure will be discussed in relation to an essential step on the long road to international relations theory. Thus "regional factor analysis" will be proposed as a method for testing the universality of different concepts, indicators, and data aggregations; "covariance analysis" will be presented as a means of discovering nonadditive explanations relating independent and dependent conceptual variables; and "confluence analysis" will be suggested as a feasible way of taking apart, putting together, and deductively testing systems of causal generalizations about international relations.

II. Nonuniversality in Concept Formation

As part of the conceptualization process, Hoffmann pleads for greater attention to the task of classification, "description of an anatomical sort." He is particularly bothered by "our incurable tendency to generalize [from] a very small segment of the field. Each concept we use has a different meaning in different contexts of time and space."[10]

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this passage are taken from Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (New York 1934), 266-67.

[9] For those who enjoy historical or genetic arguments, etymologically the word "statistics" comes from a medieval Latin term for "state"; in the eighteenth century it acquired somewhat similar meanings in both British and German intellectual circles, and was defined by one Baron J. F. von Bielfield as "the science that teaches us what is the political arrangement of all the modern states of the known world." See G. Udny Yule and M. G. Kendall, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, 14th ed. (New York 1957), xvi-xix; and Paul F. Lazarsfeld's "Notes on the History of Quantification in Sociology: Trends, Sources and Problems," in Harry Woolf, ed., *Quantification: A History of Meaning of Measurement in the Natural and Social Sciences* (Indianapolis 1961), 147-203.

[10] Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory*, 176. Similar calls for contextually valid definitions of foreign policy attitudes are Richard C. Snyder's plea for "concepts and theories which are *situationally referred*" (italics in the original) and Cantril and Free's development of a Self-Anchoring Striving Scale. See Snyder, "Some Recent Trends in International Relations Theory and Research," in Austin Ranney, ed., *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana 1962), 129; and Hadley Cantril and L. A. Free, "Hopes and Fears for Self and Country," *American Behavioral*

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If concepts themselves are measured by somehow summing a number of indicator variables, the situation may be even worse: for differing "regions" of data, particular indicators may measure different concepts which themselves have different meanings. If this were true, adding together all examples from each region would only obscure these relationships.

Statistically speaking, there is no reason why we should not think of world history as divided into two or more periods and regions with relatively homogeneous members. In each context the same indicators would tap different variables, whose meanings would also differ.[11] A straightforward procedure for testing where and when such homogeneous clusterings occur would be to analyze relations between indicators and concepts in different "regions" of data.

Since factor analysis is a frequently used procedure for studying universal anatomy, i.e., reducing a large number of empirical indicators to a small number of conceptual variables,[12] it therefore seems

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Scientist, VI, Supplement (October 1962). An exciting and comprehensive characterization of conflict contexts is Michael A. Leiserson, "Coalitions in Politics," unpubl. diss., Yale, 1965.

Problems of aggregating dissimilar cases have of course been discussed in other social sciences. In particular see Raoul Naroll and Roy D'Andrade, "Two Further Solutions to Galton's Problem," *American Anthropologist,* LXV (October 1963), 1053-67; Guy Orcutt, Greenberger, Korbel, Rivlin, *Microanalysis of Socioeconomic Systems: A Simulation Study* (New York 1961); Louis Thurstone, *Multiple Factor Analysis* (Chicago 1947), especially the chapter on "the effects of selection."

[11] That scientists lean toward the opposite belief is indicated by the popular doctrine that indicators are interchangeable. See Hortense Horwitz and Elias Smith (pseudonyms for a weightier intelligence), "The Interchangeability of Socio-Economic Indices," in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, eds., *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe 1955), 73-77; and Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review,* LV (September 1961), 493-514. The opposite doctrine, that indicators are variable, *not* interchangeable, is basic to Lazarsfeld's latent class analysis, wherein classes are subsets within which indicators are independent of each other. The procedure is designed to explain bivariate correlations and three variable interactions as due to differences among such subsets. See, for instance, Lazarsfeld, "A Conceptual Introduction to Latent Structure Analysis," in Lazarsfeld, ed., *Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences* (Glencoe 1955), 341-87.

[12] Mathematically less sophisticated than latent structure analysis, factor analysis has long been an important methodology of psychometric research; it has more recently been used to conceptualize dimensions of national character, economic development, and international conflict. See Thurstone, *Multiple Factor Analysis*; R. B. Cattell, "The Dimensions of Culture Patterns of Factorization of National Characters," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* XLIV (1949), 443-69; Brian J. L. Berry, "Patterns of Economic Development," in Norton Ginsburg, ed., *Atlas of Economic Development* (Chicago 1961); R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *General Systems,* VIII (1963), 1-50; H. R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review,* LVIII (September 1964), 642-57. More general applications include Phillip Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of *A Cross-Polity Survey*," *American Political Science Review,* LIX (September 1965), 602-14; Bruce M.

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appropriate to suggest testing the universality of particular indicators or concepts by performing and comparing separate factor analyses for each region of data thought to differ fundamentally in conceptual significance.

REGIONAL FACTOR ANALYSIS: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

Let us apply this procedure of "regional factor analysis" to the problem of forming a general conceptual scheme for describing recent foreign policy conflicts. We shall test the plausible "regional hypothesis" that foreign policy issues among rich nations differ fundamentally from those dividing poor ones.[13] Specific data, taken from ten roll-call votes in the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations (1961-62), are presented and regionally factor analyzed in Table I.

In the usual tabular presentation of the factor analyst, empirical indicators (roll calls) are treated as rows while conceptual variables (hypothetical latent roll-call components or factors) are identified as columns. Thus the "factor loadings" in each row of the table tell us the extent to which a particular indicator "taps" or "loads on" particular roll-call factors, while the loadings in each column indicate which particular roll calls must be most seriously taken into account in conceptualizing a general voting component. Negative factor loadings distinguish roll calls with certain voting alignments from other roll calls with opposite alignments and positive loadings on the same factor: like correlation coefficients, factor loadings range from —1.00 to +1.00.

In Table I let us look first at the factor analysis of roll-call votes of twenty-eight economically developed countries. Drawing on a previous, more extensive analysis,[14] we may characterize Factor I′ as the

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Russett, "Delineating International Regions," in J. David Singer, ed., *Insights and Indicators in World Politics* (forthcoming); and R. J. Rummel and others, *Dimensions of Nations* (forthcoming).

[13] Developed and underdeveloped "regions," containing twenty-eight and seventy-three nations respectively, are distinguished on the basis of per capita gross national products, in Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964).

[14] I have discussed these issue dimensions most fully in Part I of Alker and Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven 1965). The procedure of looking first at the regional, then the universal, and finally the residual (i.e., the regional-universal) factor loadings resembles one suggested by John W. Tukey; see his "The Future of Data Analysis," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, XXXIII (March 1962), 60-61. He refers to multiple response data for which a small number of descriptive variables exist. He considers (a) regressing response data on the descriptive variables and then (b) factor analyzing residual responses (unaccounted for by the regression) as conveying more meaning than a one-step factor analysis: "Consider a study of . . . children's personalities, as revealed in their use of words. . . . [If sexes are

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"East-West" conflict and Factor II′ as the "North-South" voting component. (Note that these factor labels for developed countries correspond to single-primed factor numbers.) Questions such as recognizing the People's Democratic Republic of Korea or the People's Republic of China obviously pit most of the developed American allies against most of the developed non-Western ones, including the Soviet bloc. The West Irian, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa issues also found the Soviets opposing American and Western European interests.

"North-South" issues, on the other hand, cut squarely across military alliances, at least in the West. On a nuclear-tests resolution (vote 4 with a loading of 0.91 on Factor II′) neither the Soviet Union nor the United States supported a Japanese compromise resolution regretting all tests—the Soviet position—and asking for an inspected treaty—the American view. Many middle and small powers nonetheless opposed both superpowers and voted in favor of the resolution. Similarly, on the renewal of the relatively mild Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, some Western allies like Portugal and Belgium did not support renewal and neither did the Soviet Union, which favored a more vindictive anticolonial arrangement. Rather than being disputes between military alliances, North-South issues are usually disputes between small powers wanting to increase their influence on big powers, through the United Nations if possible, and big powers hesitant about or opposed to such a trend.

Turning now to the factor analysis of voting positions of seventy-three economically *underdeveloped* nations, we can *test* the extent to which economic context affects conceptual significance. In particular, we can see which indicators appear to tap similar or different underlying variables. The most obvious similarities exist between Factors III″ and II′; thus Factor III″ seems again to be a North-South voting component. More precisely, we might label Factor III″ (for less-developed countries) as "small power supranationalism" or "UN supranationalism" because its component issues reflect the UN's increased supranational authority resulting from recent collective decisions on nuclear testing, the UN's impact on decolonization, and ONUC's peacekeeping role (votes 4, 8, 10).[15] The main difference between the

known,] elimination of the additive effect of sex would almost surely lead to more meaningful 'factors,' and eliminating of reading speed as well . . . might lead us to even closer grips with essentials." Tukey's "residual factor analysis" procedure is clearly a valuable supplement to the regional factor analysis procedure, especially as a way of uncovering contextually adjusted relationships of universal validity.

[15] In the seventy-roll-call factor analysis reported in Alker, "Dimensions of Con-

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TABLE I. REGIONAL, UNIVERSAL, AND RESIDUAL FACTOR LOADINGS FOR TEN IMPORTANT ROLL CALLS AT THE SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY*

ROLL-CALL ISSUE	DEVELOPED COUNTRIES		UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES			ALL COUNTRIES		REGIONAL RESIDUALS	
	Factor I'	*Factor II'*	*Factor I''*	*Factor II''*	*Factor III''*	*Factor I*	*Factor II*	*Factor I''-I*	*Factor II'-II*
1. Refer South African situation to Security Council.	*64*	[—74]	[90]	—30	09	[90]	01	0	[—75]
2. Protect Arab refugees in Palestine.	*59*	—*69*	25	[—81]	—06	[78]	—19	—*53*	—*50*
3. Representation of China.	[77]	—18	*58*	—*60*	—13	[71]	—23	—13	05
4. Regret nuclear tests; need inspected treaty.	22	[91]	31	06	[87]	20	[91]	11	00
5. Use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity.	[86]	—44	[87]	—31	14	[91]	09	—04	—*53*
6. Put Korean P.D.R. in UNCURK.	[94]	09	33	[—78]	15	[77]	08	—39	01
7. West Irian self-determination.	[—70]	*65*	—14	[86]	—39	[—74]	22	*60*	43

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TABLE I. REGIONAL, UNIVERSAL, AND RESIDUAL FACTOR LOADINGS FOR TEN IMPORTANT ROLL CALLS AT THE SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY* (*Continued*)

ROLL-CALL ISSUE	DEVELOPED COUNTRIES		UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES			ALL COUNTRIES		REGIONAL RESIDUALS	
	Factor I'	*Factor II'*	*Factor I''*	*Factor II''*	*Factor III''*	*Factor I*	*Factor II*	*Factor I''-I*	*Factor II'-II*
8. Renew CINSGT.	—26	[85]	17	12	[86]	—07	[91]	24	—06
9. Ask Colonialism Committee: Is Southern Rhodesia self-governing?	*68*	*—69*	[91]	—27	12	[90]	05	01	[—74]
10. Congo cost.	—36	[82]	—41	—21	[73]	—28	[73]	—13	09
Roll-call variance accounted for by factor (%)	41.6	43.7	32.4	26.8	21.2	48.1	23.5		
Total variance accounted for (%)	85.3		80.4			71.6			

*UN roll calls have been selected from a prior, more comprehensive analysis. After missing votes were estimated, factors accounting for the variance of at least one roll call were extracted using the "principal component method of factor analysis" from a matrix of roll-call rank correlations; regional and universal factor loadings were then derived using Kaiser's "normal varimax" rotation criterion. Loadings 0.70 and above in magnitude have been printed in brackets, those from 0.50 to 0.70 are italicized. Decimal points have been omitted. For more details see Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly."

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two factor analyses is that vote 1 referring the South African situation to the Security Council is a supranationalism issue among developed countries (loading —0.74 on Factor II′), but is not so among underdeveloped countries (loading 0.09 on Factor III″).

The roll calls loading on Factor I′ require a more drastic reconceptualization among poorer countries. Two distinctive sets of issues are distinguishable in the roll calls that produced a developed-countries' East-West factor: "self-determination" topics (i.e., anticolonialism as evidenced in votes 1, 5, and 9) and "cold war and Moslem conflicts" (votes 2, 3, 6, 7).[16]

More generally, these regional factor analyses suggest a number of conclusions concerning the universality of particular concepts and indicators. First of all, their highly similar factor loadings for II′ and III″ mean that roll calls 4, 8, and 10 will serve as approximately interchangeable indicators of supranationalist (or North-South) voting tendencies for rich as well as poor countries. Secondly, however, the supranationalism concept does have a somewhat different meaning among developed countries than it has among underdeveloped ones (which is why a "North-South" rather than a "supranationalism" label was suggested for the developed countries). Thirdly, the reason for the difference in interpretation of these two closely related factors springs from the fact that the South Africa resolution tapped fundamentally different factors in two different contexts: small-power versus great-power attitudes among richer nations, anticolonial or pro-self-determination attitudes among poorer ones. Finally, all these problems of the regional variability of indicators and concepts are clearly magnified by the factor fission phenomenon found when comparing rich nations' East-West differences with poor nations' self-determination, or cold-war and Moslem, conflicts.

THE EFFECT OF DATA AGGREGATION ON CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSALITY

After the preceding analyses of regional phenomena, we are in a position to examine the effects of adding together and then analyzing these

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flict," votes 4, 8, and 10 (but not vote 1) all loaded heavily on a "UN supranationalism" factor. A detailed examination of the appropriateness of the supranationalism label for this particular UN factor is presented in Alker, "Supranationalism in the United Nations," *Peace Research Society: Papers*, III (1966), 197-212.

[16] In the more detailed analyses referred to in the previous footnotes, votes 3 and 6 loaded on a "cold-war factor" and votes 2 and 7 formed part of a "Moslem/self-determination" dimension. For interpretive purposes the rather high loading of Chinese representation on the self-determination factor and the rather low loading of the "West Irian self-determination" resolution on the same voting component suggest both the possibilities and limits of the "self-determination" tendency in UN voting.

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data in a universal fashion. Factor loadings for all 101 developed and underdeveloped states are given in Table I, as are selected residual loadings—regional minus universal factor loadings for certain comparable factors.

Substantively, we find that universally it is appropriate to conceptualize votes 4, 8, and 10 (high loaders on Factor II) in very much the same "UN supranationalism" terms useful for describing the underdeveloped nations' Factor III″. Universal Factor I, on the other hand, seems again to be a more general "East-West" voting dimension, composed of what have previously been described as cold-war, self-determination, and Moslem conflicts.

The most radical differences between related regional and universal voting dimensions can be reconstructed with the residual factor loadings on the right side of Table I. First notice how the underdeveloped nations' "self-determination" factor loadings differ by around 0.50 from universal "East-West" loadings on cold-war and Moslem questions. Secondly, note that the developed countries' North-South dimension differs from universal "supranationalism" by including South Africa, Arab refugees, and Southern Rhodesia as indicators of the "North-South" distinction.

This analysis of residual factor loadings highlights a number of major effects that we can now ascribe to aggregating data from two dissimilar "regions" of the world—the rich nations and the poor ones. First, there are some concepts (factors as labelled) that hold up fairly well in both regional and universal analyses: UN supranationalism appears to be an example of this sort. Secondly, however, *we have found that adding together data from two different "regions" has tended to obscure or collapse conceptual distinctions appropriate within particular contexts. In this important sense the whole is less adequately conceptualized than the sum of the conceptualized parts.* Total roll-call variance explained by the universal analysis is also noticeably less (72%) than the average within-region explained variance (around 83%), not taking between-region variances into account.[17]

[17] Regarding UN votes, which are themselves a relatively homogeneous body of data, it should be noted that "East-West," "North-South," "self-determination," "cold-war" and "Moslem issues" factors were all identified in the larger studies referred to previously. In this sense the analysis above has helped confirm the earlier *larger* universal analysis by not uncovering any *new* factors. By way of contrast, using essentially the same regional factor analysis procedure as that discussed here, Eric Allardt has found several significant regional factors *not* found in a universal analysis. After noting in the case of noninterchangeable indicators that using the same operational indicator for the same theoretical concept would lead to erroneous

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IMPLICATIONS OF ADDITIVITY IN THE FACTOR MODEL

Because the concept formation procedures discussed above are inductive in nature, they can in no way be considered as escaping from reality. In fact, the variance proportions (called "communalities") of particular roll calls tell the investigator precisely the extent to which his conceptual generalizations fit the data being analyzed. As a realistic conceptualization procedure, factor analysis has built-in checks against overgeneralizing about relationships in the data at hand.

Whether the procedure unnaturally dismembers the reality it generalizes about is a more serious problem, for factor analysis does assume additive dependence of indicator variables on underlying factors.[18] If these factors are assumed to be "real" and not merely artifacts resulting from a statistical variance rescaling procedure, they become enormously more meaningful, but the decomposition procedure of factor analysis also becomes more suspect. First of all, the reality of statistically derived and subjectively labelled factors must mean that the manifest data somehow derive from or are caused by these underlying variables. Otherwise we cannot be sure that factor loadings indicate real, nonspurious relationships. Secondly, the factor model assumes that the same coefficient of relevance (i.e., the same factor loading) determines for every sampled individual the additive relationship between his position on a constructed variable and his position on an observed variable.

Serious departures from these assumptions occur when we find for two supposedly homogeneous sets of data that a large number of factor loadings derived from one set differ to a "significant" extent

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results when applied within different subgroups or different areas, Allardt distinguishes "traditional" from "emerging" radicalism because unemployment is his best ecological indicator of insecurity (and Communist voting) in backward areas, while housing problems serve best to index insecurity in the cities. See his "Patterns of Class Conflict and Working Class Consciousness in Finnish Politics," in Allardt and Y. Littunen, *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems* (Helsinki 1964).

[18] Using roll-call terminology, the factor model assumed by almost all methods of factor analysis is

$$V_{ji} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} a_{jk} F_{ki} + U_{ji} \qquad (1).$$

The vote of any nation i on roll call j (V_{ji}) is assumed to result from a *sum* of underlying national scores on K general factors (F_{ki}'s), each national factor score being weighted by the appropriate factor loading (a_{jk}, the loading of roll call j on factor k). Factor loadings are assumed not to depend on i, the country concerned. U_{ji} is the "uniqueness" of nation i's position on roll call j, the part of V_{ji} not explainable in general factor terms. See Henry H. Harmon, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago 1960), chap. 2 for further details.

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from those derived from the other. Indicators then "mean" something different for different sets of individuals. The residual loadings in Table I actually indicate how much "factorial nonadditivity" of this sort occurs when we "elaborate" the universal correlation matrix into two regional ones. They show which factor loadings are in fact "variable constants" related to differences between the data regions.[19]

ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES

There appear to be a number of procedures for coping with the regional variability of indicators and concepts when and if this phenomenon occurs. Data aggregation need not always be forbidden.

1. The least difficult and most easily abused conceptualization procedure is to continue talking about whatever meaningful universal generalizations are found, realizing that the generality of one's concepts is limited and that they have different kinds of meanings in different sets of data. On many occasions, resulting distortions would not be very serious. Thus in the analysis above the "supranationalism" concept was relatively untouched by contextual variations; generalizations without taking these nuances into account would be partly inadequate, but the general concept, if not the relevance of all its indicators, could usually be agreed on. The "East-West" concept, however, falls apart when we discuss differences among underdeveloped countries, making its utility evidently more limited.

2. Sometimes, but not always, regional differences in conceptual

[19] A more elaborate statistical procedure for comparing matrices of factor loadings derived from the same variables is described in Yrjo Ahmavaara, "On the Unified Factor Theory of Mind," *Annales Akademiae Scientiarum Fennicae*, Serial B, No. 160 (Helsinki 1957).

As Thurstone suggests, any such comparison should allow the same factors to account for differing variances in each subpopulation. One of the reasons why Thurstone urges carefully selecting the variables to be included in a factor analysis is that background or experimental variables (in our example, the contextual variable of economic development) influencing particular observed variables can cause them to load on different factors, thus making factor interpretation extremely hazardous.

The ideally homogeneous set of data would be a variety of separate indicator variables not influencing each other but themselves caused in a linear additive fashion by factors, which may themselves be correlated. In such a case, factor analysis may be validly interpreted as offering a causal explanation of the manifest phenomena. I suspect that these assumptions are more approximately valid concerning the opinions and attitudes of frequently interacting individuals (e.g., the General Assembly) than for large (and useful) agglomerations of ecological and/or judgmental data such as the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* or Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

For further discussion of these points see Blalock, *Causal Inferences*, 162-71; R. B. Cattell and K. Dickman, "A Dynamic Model of Physical Influences Demonstrating the Necessity of Oblique Simple Structure, *Psychological Bulletin*, LIX (September 1962), 389-400; Sewall Wright, "The Interpretation of Multivariate Systems," in Oscar Kempthorne and others, *Statistics and Mathematics in Biology* (Ames, Iowa, 1954), 11-33.

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significance can be reduced or eliminated by assuming factors themselves to be correlated with each other. If the "oblique" factors themselves have only limited significance, then "higher-order" factors may be found to explain the factor intercorrelations in a second factor analysis.[20]

3. If we are convinced that factorial nonadditivity is serious, and not removable even when factors are assumed to be correlated, we might reformulate the additive factor model explicitly to take into account known regional differences in indicators and factors. Such a procedure should be used sparingly, of course, and only for "significant" differences among regional factor analyses; otherwise the number of new parameters needed to explain existing data regularities would be at least doubled. Residual differences in factor loadings, such as those in Table I, in effect summarize the magnitude and direction of such nonadditivities.[21]

4. More ambitiously, using Tukey's residual factor analysis procedure (see footnote 14), one might try explicitly to take the contextual variables into account before factor analyzing the data. This procedure is especially attractive if we can identify ahead of time the contextual variables (such as sex, culture, level of development) seriously affecting conceptual universality.

5. Alternatively, one might try deductively or inductively to discover those "regional" or "contextual" boundaries within or across which conceptual nonadditivities do not occur. In UN terms, these would be ideological groupings of states collectively sharing common interpretations of particular regional or outside-world events. Perhaps "Communist," "developed-Western," and "underdeveloped" regions would be one such plausible set of distinctions.

[20] See Thurstone; and R. B. Cattell, *Factor Analysis* (New York 1952).

[21] It is possible formally to summarize such a procedure in a single equation. Using the notation of equation (1), nonadditive factor loadings $b_{jk(r)}$, where r indicates the region of data being discussed, can be defined by

$$b_{jk}(r) = a_{jk} + \text{resid}_{jk}(r) \qquad (1').$$

For each value of r, the $\text{resid}_{jk}(r)$ terms are the significant or large entries in the matrix of residual factor loadings. This way of thinking is basically nonadditive in that it denies the possibility of additively breaking a variety of indicators into a smaller set of conceptual variables without further breaking the data down into smaller subpopulations. It should also be mentioned that other, more radical departures from additive models are possible, such as Guttman's smallest space analysis and Gibson's latent profile analysis. See, Louis Guttman, "A General Nonmetric Technique for Finding the Smallest Euclidean Space for a Configuration of Points," *Psychometrika* (forthcoming); and W. A. Gibson, "Three Multivariate Models: Factor Analysis, Latent Structure Analysis, and Latent Profile Analysis," *Psychometrika*, XXIV (September 1959), 229-52.

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Even from a scientific point of view there are many worlds to discover. Surely parsimony need not forbid us from recognizing and trying to explain why and how such worlds differ among and within themselves.

III. Nonadditive Explanatory Relationships

Regarding the background conditions of international integration suggested by Karl Deutsch and his coauthors in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, it is quite legitimate for Hoffmann to ask whether "quantities measured independently can be added or combined meaningfully."[22] In asking "What is the formula of combination?" Philip Jacob and Henry Teune have put the problem rather succinctly: "We need to know not only that a particular condition or factor *has* some influence upon political behavior, but *how much* influence it has, in what combination it functions with other determinants of interaction, and in what sequence of circumstances it must occur to be influential."[23]

We shall here content ourselves with the problem of nonadditive combinations of explanatory variables.[24] This problem is of some generality because additive multiple correlation and regression techniques are widely used in estimating relations among previously conceptualized variables.[25] After illustrating a specific technique for detecting nonadditive explanatory relationships—covariance analysis—we shall discuss several more general multiplicative theory-building procedures.

[22] See footnote 2. In *Political Community* (Princeton 1957), Deutsch *et al.* are quite explicit on how their background conditions combine. They distinguish among conditions that have been *always* or *probably* present in successful integrations (certainly no dismemberment of international reality); they rank integration methods in the order of apparent decisiveness; and they pay particular attention to disintegrating conditions likely to produce system changes.

[23] "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," in Deutsch, Jacob, Teune, Toscano, and Wheaton, *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia 1964), 3.

[24] Relevant literature on nonadditive explanations and the equivalent concept of statistical interaction includes Lazarsfeld, "The Algebra of Dichotomous Systems" in Herbert Solomon, ed., *Item Analysis and Prediction* (Stanford 1961); Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York 1960), chap. 20, "Covariance Analysis"; Blalock, "Theory Building and the Statistical Concept of Interaction," *American Sociological Review*, xxx (June 1965), 374-80; F. J. Anscombe and John W. Tukey, "The Examination and Analysis of Residuals," *Technometrics*, v (May 1963), 141-60; and James S. Coleman, *An Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York 1964), esp. chap. 6.

[25] Phillips Cutright's "National Political Development: Social and Economic Correlates" in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith, *Politics and Social Life* (Boston 1963), 569-82, has been an influential example of this approach. Another example is Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," *World Politics*, xvi (April 1964), 442-54.

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TESTING FOR NONADDITIVITY WITH COVARIANCE TECHNIQUES

Of the variety of available statistical procedures for testing whether explanatory variables add or combine meaningfully, covariance analysis is perhaps the easiest to explain. The basic problem of covariance analysis is similar to the variable constants problem in factor analyses of different sets of data: *covariance analysis tests whether regression relations between two or more variables change when the effects of other (regional or contextual) variables are taken into account.*

Our specific example will again concern United Nations voting alignments. We shall be particularly interested to discover if there is some ordering of UN regional groupings in their ability effectively to depolarize the general tendency for Big Three trade links (X_{TWUUF}) to be correlated with supranationalist voting (Y_{SUP}). We should also expect that UN groups would be characterized by quite considerable differences in their Big Three trading figures and supranationalism voting positions.

For 101 nations, a regression equation of the form

$$Y_{SUP} = -1.04 + 0.0247X_{TWUUF} \qquad (2)$$

has an associated positive correlation coefficient of $r = 0.55$, indicating that equation (2) explains $(0.55)^2$, or about 30%, of the variance in Y. Even though the Western Big Three have not always agreed in supporting UN supranationalism, some form of economic dependence on the West thus helps to explain why other states tend to support the moderately supranationalist American and British positions.

To see the extent to which the regional political groupings affect the impact of trading relationships indicated by equation (2), we calculated separate regression equations for some six distinct regional groupings. As indicated in Table II,[26] the slopes (denoted by *b*'s) and correlation coefficients for these relationships show striking deviations from the universal values in equation (2). In particular, Arab supranationalist voting is largely polarized by Western trade links ($b = 0.0254, r = 0.87$) at an even higher rate than the universal one ($b = 0.0247, r = 0.55$). Other regional categories of states have more effectively negated the apparent impact of differences among themselves in Big Three trade. Within the Soviet bloc ($r = -0.24$) and the Old European group ($r = -0.20$), the higher traders with the

[26] The supranationalism and caucusing group variables have been operationalized in a slightly different manner from those reported in Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly." Western Big Three trade as a percentage of a nation's total is measured according to the same specifications. See Alker and Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly*, for more details.

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West are *less* likely to support supranationalist positions. (Soviet bloc differences on supranationalism are so small, however, in the UN context that they cannot be considered completely reliable.) In sum, among themselves Old Europeans and Soviet bloc nations have apparently *reversed* the universally perceived positive relation between Big Three trade and supranationalist voting, while Arabs and Latin Americans *reveal* among themselves trade/voting ties much like those characterizing the worldwide pattern.

TABLE II. THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL VARIABLES ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TRADE WITH THE WESTERN BIG THREE AND UN SUPRANATIONALISM*

Regional Category	*Average Supra-nationalism Score***	*Regression Equations in Order of Increasing Slope*	*Correlation Coefficient*
Arabs (N = 10)	+ 0.01	$Y_{SUP} = -0.96 + 0.0254X_{TWUUF}$	(r = 0.87)
Latin America (N = 19)	+ 0.31	$Y_{SUP} = -0.63 + 0.0183X_{TWUUF}$	(r = 0.40)
Asia (N = 16)	+ 0.41	$Y_{SUP} = 0.42 - 0.0007X_{TWUUF}$	(r = −0.02)
Africa (N = 22)	+ 0.40	$Y_{SUP} = 0.49 - 0.0012X_{TWUUF}$	(r = −0.06)
Soviet Bloc (N = 10)	−2.55	$Y_{SUP} = -2.54 - 0.0026X_{TWUUF}$	(r = −0.24)
Old Europeans (N = 24)	+ 0.17	$Y_{SUP} = 0.44 - 0.0063X_{TWUUF}$	(r = −0.20)

* The United States, Yugoslavia, Israel, Turkey, Western Europe, and members or ex-members of the Old Commonwealth states are included in the Old European category. Regional categories have been exclusively and exhaustively defined as required in the analysis of covariance.

** These estimated supranationalism scores have an average value of 0.0 and a standard deviation of approximately unity.

Another striking result concerns the marked differences in between-group averages on their supranationalism voting scores. See in Table II how, on the average, Latins, Asians, and Africans rather positively supported several UN supranational initiatives at the sixteenth session while the Soviet bloc was in a rather isolated minority opposing them. Note, however, that the effects of these quasi-caucusing-group variables are more likely to appear more adequate explanations to diplomats treating the groups as conscious and partially autonomous agents reflecting and mediating outside influences than to international relations theorists for whom their reality is a matter of debate.

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THE EXTENT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERACTION

The next step in covariance analysis is to compare the explanatory power gained by assuming regional constant terms (Y-intercepts) and slopes (*b*'s) to differ from those of the universal linear additive regression hypothesis. Table III gives the additional sum of squared deviations in Y (the variance, without an N in the denominator) explained by introducing these various regional contingencies. We note first that *allowing different caucusing-group Y-intercepts more than doubles the explanatory power of the regression model.* These intercept figures correspond in most cases to the previously discussed differences in average supranationalism scores; they would be identical if X_{TWUUF} data had regional means of 0.0.

TABLE III. AN ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TEST FOR NONADDITIVITY (N = 101)*

Sum of Squared Deviations (SS) in Y		*Degrees of Freedom*	*Ratio of Variance Estimates if Nonadditivity Is Assumed To Be Only a Sampling Phenomenon*
SS explained by one universal regression	30.1	1	
SS explained by allowing parallel regional regressions	44.2	5	
Nonadditive SS explained by allowing regional slopes to vary	3.2	5	$F = \frac{3.2/5}{23.6/89} = 2.41$
Remaining unexplained SS after nonadditivity has been assumed	23.6	89	Prob ($F > 2.41$) is < 0.05
Total SS in Y about its mean	101.0	100	

* This analysis of variance test assumes random samples of data, no measurement error, and bivariate normal frequency distributions in each regional category. Since at least the random sample and the normality assumptions are *not* exactly true, the significance level of 0.05 is quite "hypothetical." One of the original 101 degrees of freedom is "used up" by each new parameter being estimated or used. Table format is adapted from Blalock, *Social Statistics*, chap. 20.

Testing for the impact of regional depolarization capabilities on the regression slope between voting and trade, we can discover the extent to which Hoffmann or some other "contextualist" might be correct about the existence of a nonadditive relationship. Specifically, *differ-*

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ences in regional slopes increase the amount of explained variance in Y by something more than three percent. Statisticians would refer to this depolarization phenomenon as an interaction effect. Using conventional statistical procedures in a case where their basic assumptions are only partly true, we can even go further and say that the observed differences among regional slopes are "significant" at the 0.05 level. But in "how much" terms, the nonadditive depolarization, or "slopes effect," accounts for only about five percent of the rather high (76%) total explanatory power of a more comprehensive hypothesis relating trading interrelationships to supranationalist voting in the United Nations as a function of intergroup supranationalism differences and intragroup trade depolarization capabilities. In line with the earlier reference to the variable constants problem in factor analysis, we might call this new finding a "variable slopes and intercepts hypothesis."

FORMULATING NONADDITIVE EXPLANATORY HYPOTHESES

It is possible to formalize the results of the foregoing analysis in a nonadditive, multiplicative fashion. In equation (3), the d_r represent regional deviations from the universal Y-intercept (a_U): $d_r = a_r - a_U$; a multiplicative "slope effect" is indicated by a coefficient S_r ($= b_r/b_U$).

$$Y_i(r) = \underbrace{(a_U + d_r)}_{\text{intercept effect}} + \underbrace{S_r \cdot b_U \cdot X_i}_{\text{slope effect}} \qquad (3)$$

Equation (3), which is logically equivalent to the equations of Table II, makes clear how contingent "intercept effects" destroy the universality of the simple linear additive model in equation (2). Because the *variable* $S_r \cdot b_U$ term *multiplies* X, we have here a fundamentally nonadditive explanatory model. Equation (3) may also be called a "mixed" additive and multiplicative explanatory model for supranationalist voting. It stands in between the purely additive explanatory model of regression analysis and a purely multiplicative one often used in statistical analysis.[27]

[27] For a discussion of mixed and purely multiplicative explanatory models geared to comparative and international politics, see Alker and Russett, "Multifactor Explanations of Social Change," in the *World Handbook*. Blalock's "Theory Building and the Statistical Concept of Interaction" is especially exciting because it derives "mixed" models in a deductive manner by multiplying variables that are themselves linear combinations of prior influences.

For qualitative contextual generalizations similarly susceptible to logical and mathematical formalization see Karl W. Deutsch and Richard Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., *Interna-*

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Purely multiplicative models represent symbolically and compactly the extreme case of contingent relationships so often mentioned in verbalized international relations theory, differences that cannot be taken into account by simple, universal additive regression equations. Equation (4) will serve as a hypothetical example. For each country *i*, let Y_i be supranationalist voting, X_i be economic ties to the Western Big Three, W_i be the polarization effectiveness of these inducements, and V_i be a measure of the efficiency of a nation's policy-to-voting communications system. Also let *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* be constants and e_i the "error" term of our explanatory model:

$$Y_i = a \cdot V_i^b \cdot W_i^c \cdot X_i^d \cdot e_i \qquad (4).$$

Then equation (4) says that the effect of X on Y depends on the magnitudes of both W^c and V^b. High polarizability (W) and voting communications (V) both multiplicatively intensify the effect of economic ties with the West. High policy-trade polarizability (W^c) also requires significant trade (X^d) and voting communication (V^b) before being effectively translated into votes.[28]

It should be clear that such modeling procedures as those above go a long way toward representing satisfactorily the contextual and contingent effects of one or several explanatory variables on the relationships between other explanatory variables and the dependent variable. They help decrease the likelihood that mathematically formulated theory will also severely dismember international reality.

IV. Causal Systems and Cumulative Knowledge

Some of the more serious criticisms of causal or scientific thinking about international relations were reviewed in Part I of this article. They include the problem of inadequate experimental methods in the social sciences, the impossibility of ever really distinguishing causal from spurious correlations, the difficulty of establishing and joining together such laws to form systematic, deductive, and cumulative theories of international relations.

---

tional Behavior (New York 1965), 130-87; and James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative Politics and International Relations* (Evanston, forthcoming).

[28] Taking logarithms of both sides of equation (4) shows us that coefficients *b*, *c*, and *d* are *elasticity* coefficients indicating the percentage rate of change in supranationalist voting (Y) associated with percentage changes in V, W, and X respectively:

$$\log Y_i = \log a + b \log V_i + c \log W_i + d \log X_i + \log e_i \qquad (5).$$

Note that equation (5) is linear and additive, and may be subjected to ordinary least-square regression estimation procedures!

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When we consider simultaneously the problems of concept formation, contingent relationships, and causal interdependencies, theorizing about international relations becomes a difficult business. Certainly it is hard to decompose international reality into more or less closely connected parts and wholes. Citing the North Atlantic area study, for example, Hoffmann urges us not to make the mistake of discussing the

> . . . effects of foreign economic aid without taking into account the political and social conditions which largely determine what the effects of such aid on the recipients will be. Or else we will treat historical complexes as if they were daisies to strip. We will generalize for instance about the role of a certain background condition for national or regional integration without remembering that this factor's effect in different instances of integration cannot be easily separated from the effects of other background conditions which operate in conjunction with the factor which we arbitrarily try to isolate. We should certainly not assume that the nature of the international system fully determines the conduct of its components, but we should not analyze the latter apart from the former.[29]

If possible, Hoffmann wants us to choose theories somewhere between those that assume complete interdetermination of variables and those composed completely of additive laws in which no hierarchy of causal variables is established. Such is also the counsel of several statisticians and philosophers of science.[30]

CAUSAL INFERENCES VIA CONFLUENCE ANALYSIS

No statistically oriented social scientist has proposed a definitive procedure for modeling complex causally interdependent international systems, but a number of related approaches appear to be promising. We shall group the discussion of procedures developed by Jan Tinbergen, Herman Wold, Herbert Simon, Hubert Blalock, and others under the general term of "confluence analysis" proposed by Ragnar

[29] Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory*, 177.

[30] For example, Ernest Nagel, "Wholes, Sums, and Organic Unities," in Daniel Lerner, ed., *Parts and Wholes* (Glencoe 1963), 135-55, makes the following relevant remarks: ". . . It is often claimed that a functional whole cannot be properly analyzed from an 'additive point of view'; that is, the characteristic modes of functioning of its constituents must be studied *in situ*, and the structure of activities of the whole cannot be inferred from properties displayed by its constituents in isolation from the whole. . . . [The] mere fact that a system is a structure of dynamically interrelated parts does not suffice, by itself, to prove that the laws of such a system cannot be reduced to some theory developed initially for certain assumed constituents of the system."

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Frisch in his pioneering study of systems of linear additive regression equations.[31]

Confluence analysis asks the crucial question of whether the (causal) explanatory variables in one or several different additive regression equations are really independent of each other:

> Suppose that we have three statistical variates X_1, X_2, X_3 . . . and that we know for *a priori* reasons that there exists not only one but *two* [or more] independent linear equations [among] them. . . . In this situation any attempt at determining from the available data [one] regression equation involving three variates would be sheer nonsense. . . .
>
> When several [causally dependent] variates are included in the analysis, the situation becomes of course much more complex. We may here encounter a whole hierarchy where some of the variates may [form a meaningful regression equation and others do not]. The study of this hierarchy is what I call confluence analysis.[32]

As the quotation above suggests, Frisch and others have identified a number of crucial problems in cumulative theory-building about complex interrelationships: how causally to identify the "independent" and the dependent variables in a regression equation, how to distinguish "real" from "spurious" regression equations, and how to establish causal hierarchies among the variables in systems (i.e., sets) of regression equations. These questions are remarkably similar to the criticisms of "systems scientism" cited from Crick and Hoffmann early in this article; fortunately, a number of relevant confluence analysis techniques have been developed for answering them.

CAUSAL INTERPRETATION OF REGRESSION EQUATIONS

Let us suppose that the variable on the left of a linear regression such as equations (2) and (5) is *unilaterally causally dependent* on the independent variable(s) to the right of the equal sign. This would mean that if we could manipulate the independent variable(s), e.g., trade, our actions would produce changes in the dependent variable,

[31] Relevant book-length treatments of the causal inference problem include Frisch, *Statistical Confluence Analysis*; Tinbergen, *Statistical Testing of Business Cycle Theories II: Business Cycles in the United States of America 1919-32* (Geneva 1939); R. D. MacIver, *Social Causation* (Boston 1944); Albert Ando, Franklin M. Fisher, and Herbert A. Simon, *Essays on the Structure of Social Science Models* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963); Blalock, *Causal Inferences*; and Herman Wold, ed., *Econometric Model Building: Essays on the Causal Chain Approach* (Amsterdam 1964).

[32] Frisch, 5-6; see also pp. 48, 86-87, and 121f. for the use of causal language.

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e.g., supranationalist voting, but not vice versa. To say that a positive regression coefficient indicates that Western trade *causally increases* UN supranationalist voting is enormously more significant than the merely correlational statement that "trade *is positively related* to voting." Associated with the causal regression equation is the possibility of decisive intervention.

As Wold points out, the only way to be sure that one variable *is* causally dependent on another is somehow to know that all other possible "influences" on the dependent variable have been controlled for—as in the physical laboratory where pressure can be fixed in relating gaseous volume changes to temperature changes. For human subjects the effects of independent variables other than the one being investigated can also be "controlled" for (with a high probability) by randomly assigning individuals to groups receiving different experimental treatments. Thus we can say, with Blalock, that *X is a direct cause of Y if changes in X produce changes in the average value of Y even when all other influences on Y are controlled for.*

This notion of manipulative or productive significance associated with independent variables on the right side of a *single causal regression* equation insures that undetected hierarchies of relationships—the confluence problem—do not occur. If several of the independent variables in a multiple regression equation depended on each other, it would not be possible to change one of them while holding constant the others. Even laboratory procedures will show the near impossibility of reliably estimating the separate contributions of highly correlated independent variables.

More generally, *on the basis of nonexperimentally gathered real-world data we might like to talk causally about systems of several regression equations.* Obviously, such systems should attempt to represent hierarchies of causal interdependencies by including at least one equation for each causally dependent variable. Such equation systems should also have enough distinct equations that their unknown regression coefficients can be uniquely "identified" from a body of data. Statistical literature on the identifiability problem is concerned precisely with those conditions under which such equations can be clearly and nonviolently disentangled from one another. Related discussions of "overidentified" causal models dwell heavily on extracting additional deductions from the models which can be used in conjunction with nonexperimental data to validate or falsify the models being used.[33]

[33] Identifiability criteria are readably discussed in Stefan Valavanis, *Econometrics*

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CAUSAL HIERARCHIES AND RECURSIVE SYSTEMS

Both Hoffmann and Frisch set as goals the discovery of hierarchical patterns of causal interdependence. Any system of causal regression equations in which each "dependent" variable does not influence its respective "independent" variables via any other equation of the system is known as a "recursive" set of equations. An aesthetically pleasing and behaviorally significant property of recursive systems is that the equations can always be reordered so as to exhibit triangular sets of non-zero regression cofficients. These coefficients reveal a natural hierarchy or pyramid of causal relationships.

Consider, for example, the four unordered "causal equations" of Table IV. Each equation tells respectively what X_1, X_2, X_3, and X_4 depend on. The u's are random terms summarizing influence not specifically taken into account; a, b, c, and d are unspecified but non-zero regression coefficients. Notice how misleading a single regression of X_1, X_2, and X_3 on X_4 would be because of the various causal links connecting X_1, X_2, and X_3 and the variety of direct and indirect causal links between these variables and X_4. Interpreting the causal significance of these variables on the basis of a single regression equation would clearly be a dismemberment of reality.

Rearranging the above equations and interchanging subscripts 1 and 3, it is possible to change the unordered causal equations into an ordered set of equations having the previously mentioned triangular array of coefficients characteristic of all recursive systems. Starting with the lowest of the four equations, each dependent variable depends only on variables previously introduced. Variable X_4 depends on X_2, X_3 depends on X_1 and X_2, X_2 depends on X_1. X_1 is "self-generated"; it depends only on prior variables not explicitly included in the analysis which are summarized in the randomly varying term u_1.

(New York 1959), chap. 6, which should be read in conjunction with Koopman's early article on the identification problem cited therein. This problem is a very real one in *nonrecursive* causal systems involving simultaneous "feedback" and various logical interdependencies. In such interdependent or reciprocal systems, not to be further discussed here, each equation cannot be given an explicit hierarchical causal position, nor can its coefficients be estimated without knowledge of all other causal relations. For comparisons of the recursive and nonrecursive modeling approaches see Wold, "Ends and Means in Econometric Model Building," in Ulf Grenander, ed., *Probability and Statistics* (New York 1959), 355-434; and Alker, "Causal Inference in Political Analysis," in Joseph Bernd, ed., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, 2nd Series (Dallas, forthcoming). In technical language the possibility that any systematic theory of reality is hopelessly underidentified (e.g., contains too few distinct equations and too many unknowns) corresponds quite closely to the Crick-Hoffmann view, shared by many humanists, that everything depends on everything else.

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Starting now with the highest equation of the coefficient pyramid, it is also possible uniquely to determine a causal ordering among variables X_1 through X_4. Assume that some nonexperimental phenomena have determined the random terms; then X_1 is known, giving causal class I. Substituting the new values of X_1 into the remaining equations allows X_2 and its defining equations to be identified as the sole members of causal class II. Similarly, after substitution, *both* X_3 and X_4 become known, putting them and their defining equations in causal class III. A causal hierarchy has thus been established for the equations of a recursive system.

TABLE IV. A CAUSAL ORDERING IMPLICIT IN A SYSTEM OF RECURSIVE EQUATIONS*

Unordered Causal Equations

$$\begin{aligned} X_1 + cX_2 + bX_3 &= u_1 \\ X_2 + aX_3 &= u_2 \\ X_3 &= u_3 \\ dX_2 + X_4 &= u_4 \end{aligned}$$

Nonhierarchical Arrow Diagram



*Ordered Causal Equations***

$$\begin{aligned} X_1 &= u_1 \\ aX_1 + X_2 &= u_2 \\ bX_1 + cX_2 + X_3 &= u_3 \\ dX_2 + X_4 &= u_4 \end{aligned}$$

Hierarchical Arrow Diagram



* General rules for causal reordering may be found in Herbert Simon, "Causal Ordering and Identifiability" in Ando, Fisher, and Simon, chap. 2.

** Ordered causal equations have been obtained by interchanging subscripts 1 and 3. The "coefficient triangle" has been boxed; three distinct causally ordered classes of variables have been circled and indicated by roman numerals I, II, and III.

TESTING THE VALIDITY OF CAUSAL SYSTEMS

One might easily suspect that the Achilles' heel of theory-building procedures based on putting together multiple equation systems is the problem of validity. Fortunately, however, for recursive causal systems there are a number of procedures for distinguishing real from spurious relationships. From such specific models as those in Table IV, we can logically derive predictions that may be used empirically either to corroborate or to falsify the particular model being tested.

The regression equation model in Table IV contains many unspecified terms and coefficients, even though the same coefficients are supposed to hold for each individual or nation being analyzed. Specifying exactly some of these missing coefficients would radically increase the number of predictions made by the model. But even when such

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terms are unknown, several testable logical inferences can be drawn from the model if several additional assumptions are made.

Simplifying assumptions are of two sorts: first, random influences on each dependent variable (the *u*'s) are assumed uncorrelated with each other—in mathematical terms, $r(u_i, u_j)=0$ for all pairs of distinct *u*'s. This assumption most emphatically does not rule out such influences; it says that such "external" influences do not simultaneously affect two or more of the modeled variables.[34] The second kind of assumption requires the lack of all coefficients outside the coefficient triangle, as well as the absence of some coefficients within it. The former requirement restricts our attention to unilateral causal models; the latter blank spaces allow for specific model deductions.

Mathematically, it is possible to show that in recursive systems of equations for which the preceding assumptions have been made, *every missing coefficient within the triangle means that the corresponding partial slope and correlation coefficient* (*e.g.*, $b_{ij.kl}$ *and* $r_{ij.kl}$) *are zero.* This result holds only when we control for all causally equivalent or prior variables. It follows logically from the structure of recursive systems; the apparent but spurious correlation between two variables not "really" associated with each other will be removed when the additive effects of variables causally prior to both the variables have been removed. Making these additional assumptions means in effect that our equation system is overidentified—it has more equations that there are unknown *u*'s and *a* coefficients. Therefore when these assumptions are valid, we can derive from the model in Table IV the expectation that

$$b_{14.23} = r_{14.23} = 0$$
$$b_{34.12} = r_{34.12} = 0 \qquad (6).$$

[34] Much more detailed discussions of partially isolable subsystems in which even the above assumptions are not precisely correct are contained in Ando and others, *Essays on the Structure of Social Science Models*, and in Wold, "Ends and Means." In a brilliant article drawing on this research, "The Architecture of Complexity," *General Systems*, x (1965), 63-76, Herbert Simon argues that in complex systems made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way, "the whole is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole. In the face of complexity, an in-principle reductionist may be at the same time a pragmatic holist" (pp. 63-64).

He goes on to argue that near-decomposability of many systemic interdependencies into hierarchical orderings of systems and subsystems means that we need not despair about never being able to unravel the web of causes involved. As a generalization of the notion of near-decomposability he suggests an "empty world hypothesis"—that "most things are only weakly connected with most other things; for a tolerable description of reality only a tiny fraction of all possible interactions needs to be taken into account" (p. 73).

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If in reality such partials do not approximately disappear, then at least some of the *a priori* theoretical and random-term assumptions need to be reexamined.

CHOOSING AMONG CAUSAL THEORIES: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

We shall briefly indicate how the confluence analysis approach to the spurious correlation problem can be applied to nonexperimental cross-national data. Again our specific examples will concern national policy positions in the United Nations.

Model 1 in Table V illustrates how one might formalize a completely interdependent nonrecursive system of four variables, X_1, X_2, X_3, and X_4, as a set of simultaneous equations. The model is an extreme case of confluent relationships; not one but *four* linear equations relate each of the variables concerned. Because the equations all look alike, their coefficients cannot be uniquely identified even from thousands of empirical observations. The validity of such a holistic model could be tested only if specific coefficients were *a priori* known; otherwise the model would remain "underidentified," hopelessly nondecomposable, and truly ineffable.

In a four-equation model for a universe of 101 nations, 404 values of the *u*'s and 12 *a* coefficients are unknown, but in order to estimate these unknowns we have only 404 equations (for individual nations). In equation-counting terms, assuming each equation to be independent of each other equation, it is clear that at least six more theoretical assumptions must be made before we have as many equations as there are unknowns. Only then shall we get determinate results. Six additional equations result from the *a priori* assumptions that the residual or random *u* terms are uncorrelated. Other equations, such as the statement that some *a* coefficients are of negligible magnitude, must be found in an *a priori* theoretical fashion.

Two plausible, recursive causal models for explaining 1961 UN East-West voting positions by recent U.S. aid (1957-1961), U.S. military alliances, and percentage trade with the Western Big Three (TWUUF) are analyzed in Table V. Each represents a drastic *a priori* pruning operation on the regression coefficients—Model 2 by assuming that aid, trade, and alliances independently and additively affect voting, Model 3 by assuming that alliances have a nonadditive influence on voting (through trade) as well as a direct one.[35] Notice how this

[35] The plausibility of both models derives from my previous paper "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly"—alliances in particular were found to be of decisive importance. Relating Soviet aid, trade, and alliances to UN voting in a single

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latter model posits a partial interdependence of variables and a partial hierarchy of causes quite similar to the properties of the model in Table IV. American aid and alliances are primary causes; Big Three trade is hierarchically of a lower causal order. Last come East-West voting positions.

The predictions for each model, derived most simply from our *a priori* assumptions and the causal triangle prediction rule given above, are given in Table V. Quite plausibly, we find that the independent multiple-cause model requires that the independent variables be uncorrelated with each other, while the partial interdependence model, in which trade is hierarchically intermediate in a causal sequence, implies that only two of these correlations should be zero. Comparing predictions with results, and allowing for some measurement error, we are led to conclude that the pure independent causation model used in my earlier research and more or less explicitly in many places throughout the literature of comparative and international politics, should be rejected in favor of a partially interdependent one, or some other model giving equally valid results. Model 3, which represents a very modest improvement over Model 2, has not been rejected; like all empirical theories it can be disproved if the original *a priori* assumptions are shown to be incorrect. It contains several regression equations and allows for both the direct and the indirect impact of the alliance variable.[36]

The real significance of this finding lies in its generalizability. *Surely one can hypothesize that the coefficients in any statistical investigation of international behavior making additivity assumptions have "realistic" or "causal" significance. Until and unless some attempt has been made to verify the pattern of causal interdependence among the variables involved, however, these hypotheses must remain largely conjectural.*

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regression equation, as I did in that article, is clearly inappropriate from the point of view of confluence analysis because of their high intercorrelations (which violate the predictions of Model 2).

[36] Once causal interrelations have been made plausible, the relative importance of the actual coefficients in each equation of such a recursive model can be estimated by multiple regression techniques, or derived from a more fundamental theory about national behavior. Using this approach would be a good example of how statistical models (like the linear additive ones of factor and regression analysis) use a small number of statistical degrees of freedom to estimate or measure how environmental influences and human actions underlie voting behavior.

Even more flexibility would be allowed if multiplicative interaction terms among trade and alliances were introduced. The resulting nonrecursive equations could still be used, however, to derive the predictions that r_{13} and r_{12} should be zero if the model and related assumptions are correct.

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TABLE V. CAUSAL MODELS FOR EXPLAINING EAST-WEST VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS*

MODEL 1. Complete interdependence (indeterminate when *a* coefficients are not *a priori* known).

Arrow Model



Linear Mechanisms (causal laws)

$$X_1 + a_{12}X_2 + a_{13}X_3 + a_{14}X_4 = u_1$$
$$a_{21}X_1 + X_2 + a_{23}X_3 + a_{24}X_4 = u_2$$
$$a_{31}X_1 + a_{32}X_2 + X_3 + a_{34}X_4 = u_3$$
$$a_{41}X_1 + a_{42}X_2 + a_{43}X_3 + X_4 = u_4$$

MODEL 2. Independent multiple causation (the simplest additive case).**

Arrow Model



Linear Mechanisms (causal laws)

$$X_1 = u_1$$
$$X_2 = u_2$$
$$X_3 = u_3$$
$$a_{41}X_1 + a_{42}X_2 + a_{43}X_3 + X_4 = u_4$$

Deductions

$$r_{12} = 0$$
$$r_{23} = 0$$
$$r_{13} = 0$$

Results

$$r_{12} = -0.02$$
$$r_{23} = 0.20$$
$$r_{13} = 0.12$$

MODEL 3. Multiple causation with partial interdependence.

Arrow Model



Linear Mechanisms (causal laws)

$$X_1 = u_1$$
$$X_2 + a_{23}X_3 = u_2$$
$$X_3 = u_3$$
$$a_{41}X_1 + a_{42}X_2 + a_{43}X_3 + X_4 = u_4$$

Deductions

$$r_{13} = 0$$
$$r_{12} = 0$$

Results

$$r_{13} = 0.12$$
$$r_{12} = -0.02$$

---

* Data on the explanatory variables have been made available by Bruce Russett and the Yale Political Data Program. They were previously analyzed in Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict."

** In this model variables 2 and 3 should be renumbered before the causal triangle rule is applied.

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V. Conclusions

This article has ranged over a variety of problems raised by recent attacks on mathematically stated international relations theory. A number of such criticisms have concerned the impossibility of formalizing complex international relationships, which are variously thought to be greater or less than the sum of their parts. More specifically these criticisms have concerned each stage of the theory-building process: the aggregation of data and the selection of appropriate descriptive concepts and indicators, the specification of contextually valid explanatory relationships, and the accumulation of such relationships into testable systems of interrelated causal laws. Often all of these problems arise in a single piece of research.

On closer analysis, a number of frequently used statistical procedures—in particular, factor analysis and regression analysis—were found to rely more or less explicitly on the very additivity assumptions for which quantitative research in international relations has been so thoroughly criticized.

Rather than cast off these methods as totally inappropriate, however, I have suggested a number of specific statistical procedures for dealing with each of the main problems discussed: each method takes into account the various nonadditivities involved. Thus, as to the aggregation of nonhomogeneous sets of data, regional factor analysis in each data subset is mentioned as a way of testing which concepts and indicators are universally and regionally interchangeable. Regarding the serious problem of contextual effects of one explanatory variable on the impact of another, appropriately mixed or totally multiplicative equations are proposed, as well as an analysis of variance and covariance procedure for determining when such interaction terms ought to be included. For the large numbers of problems associated with disentangling but not dismembering international relations and shaping them into causal propositions that can be put back together again in some kind of scientific theory, a set of procedures grouped under the label "confluence analysis" is also proposed.

The existence of many of these remedial procedures within the statistical literature for many years before most of the criticisms of Part I were made testifies to the lack of communication between interdisciplinary students of international behavior and older, more traditional scholars in the field. The fact that with rare exceptions[37] none of the

[37] Economists and simulation specialists have been the most imaginative quantitative researchers on nonadditivities in international relations. See for example "Confluence

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behavioral analysts have addressed themselves either to the nonadditivity problems or to equivalent remedial procedures also indicates certain insensitivities. Another implication is that, among the mathematical sciences, statistics in particular is an appropriate, reality-oriented, quantitative discipline for dealing with many of the key international relations theory-building problems identified by behaviorists and nonbehaviorists alike.

More generally, it should be noted that in the interest of comprehensibility statistical procedures do tend to reduce nonadditive realities to additive ones. Thus regional or residual factor models are additive within certain subuniverses; so are logarithmic versions of multiplicative explanatory relationships and the component equations of the confluent systems discussed above. Used carefully, such procedures increase the explanatory power of our theories without escaping from or dismembering international reality. Such models may flexibly blend parsimony, realism, interpretability, and generality.

More metaphysically, investigations of various verbal and quantitative theories of international relations leave one observer with the belief, voiced earlier by Jessie Bernard, that international reality is almost always nonadditive in one or several statistical senses of the terms.[38]

Analyses" by Richard Stone, Tinbergen, and Wold; also Harold Guetzkow, "Structured Programs and Their Relation to Free Activity Within the Inter-Nation Simulation," in Guetzkow, Alger, Brody, Noel, and Snyder, *Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching* (Englewood Cliffs 1963), 103-49.

[38] True international behavior seen from a sociological perspective may be thought of as that interaction which remains after national characteristics have been taken into account. Karl Deutsch and I. R. Savage, for example, have measured international proximities in transactional terms essentially using the idea of statistical interaction. For a readable review and extension of their approach see Leo Goodman, "A Short Computer Program for the Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Behavioral Science*, IX (April 1964), 176-86. In more subjective and rationalistic terms Bernard might have noted the "superadditivity" postulate of "essential" bargaining games: such games assume that one adds more to the value of a coalition by joining it than by staying outside. In this regard see the papers by L. S. Shapley discussed in R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York 1957), chaps. 6, 11.

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ON THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL OF INHERITED BOUNDARIES IN AFRICA

By RAVI L. KAPIL*

THE consequences that flow from the collapse of empires have never been easily predicted. Seldom, however, has the demise of an imperial system been accompanied by as many systematic analyses and projections as has the current period of decolonization. Much of the recent discussion concerning the newer members of the international system has made reference to their so-called artificial political boundaries.[1] It has been predicted, among other things, that the political boundaries of Asia and Africa, by virtue of their presumed artificiality, harbor the seeds of "many a troublesome irredenta in the future."[2] Frequent references are made, in the growing literature on nation-building and political modernization, to the "natural" or "unnatural" qualities of these boundaries, and the absence of careful general studies of this topic has been noted.[3] This article proposes to examine the dominant characteristics of African political boundaries and the circumstances under which disputes over their location have so far been generated, and to deduce some general propositions about their conflict potential. The thrust of the argument to be presented is that there is a low conflict potential in contemporary African boundaries and that earlier predictions of instability are not likely to be borne out.

I

The conflict-generating potential of political boundaries stems largely from their characteristics as fine lines of political division which have

* I am indebted to the Joint Committee on African Studies of the Social Science Research Council for a research grant in the Somali Republic in 1963-64, where many of my ideas on this topic were germinated. I also wish to thank Judge Haji Noor Mohamed of the Supreme Court of the Somali Republic for his advice, and my colleague, George Jenkins, for his critical comments on an earlier version of this article. The vagaries that remain are, of course, all mine.

[1] See, for example, the resolutions on boundaries adopted at the Pan-African Congress, Manchester, 1945; the All African People's Conference, Accra, 1958; and the Tunis Conference, 1960, reproduced in the appendix to Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism* (New York 1962).

[2] Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston 1960), 105.

[3] Karl W. Deutsch, "Some Problems in the Study of Nation-Building," in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, *Nation-Building* (New York 1963), 1-16; also Rupert Emerson, "Nation Building in Africa," in Deutsch and Foltz; James S. Coleman, "The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 366-68; Fred von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs 1964), 33-38.

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to be located in natural and sociocultural zones of transition.[4] Boundaries demarcate sharp discontinuities in political jurisdictions; except where land reaches the sea, such sharp breaks do not occur either in topography and vegetation or in the natural distribution of social, economic, linguistic, or cultural traits of human populations. Boundaries are also the lines that designate the abrupt limits of political jurisdictions and the lines where separate political jurisdictions come into sharp contact. All of these important functions of political boundaries occur in a natural and sociocultural environment in which sharp lines of division, limitation, and contact are absent. Thus, a boundary by its very nature is alien to the life of the zone it bisects. The usual effect of locating a boundary on an on-going interaction system is to create relative discontinuities where none had existed. Conflict potential is, therefore, related to the degree of disruptive impact a boundary has on its environment.

Boundaries exist in both a physical and a sociocultural milieu. In the analysis of social conflict, however, the relationship of the boundary to the latter environment is more relevant. Only two broad categories of relationship are possible with this environment: those of coincidence with or superimposition across socially valued continuities in the milieu. The customary classification of this relationship has sought to distinguish among antecedent, consequent, and superimposed boundaries.[5] Antecedent boundaries exist wherever political jurisdictions have been formally allocated before human settlement has taken place or, at least, before major sociocultural features, such as industrial growth, markets, or regions of circulation and movement, have had time to develop. Consequent boundaries are those delimited after such features have already emerged, which coincide with social, economic, cultural, or linguistic discontinuities. In contrast, superimposed boundaries are those that do not coincide with such discontinuities. It should be readily apparent that under this schema conflict potential inheres to its greatest degree in superimposed boundaries. Antecedent or consequent boundaries are not likely to be as productive of conflict because their disruptive impact is low and the boundary itself helps shape emergent discontinuities.

[4] See S. Whittemore Boggs, *International Boundaries: A Study in Boundary Functions and Problems* (New York 1940), 6ff., which still remains the best thorough study of political boundaries. Also Stephen B. Boggs, "Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Time and Place," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, XLIX (September 1959), 241-55.

[5] This classification is based on the typology advanced originally by Richard Hartshorne in his "Suggestions on the Terminology of Political Boundaries," *Mitteilungen des Vereins der Geographen an der Universitaet Leipzig*, Fascicule 14/15 (1936), 180-92.

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Superimposed boundaries generate conflict by creating a disjunction between the interactions of the sociocultural system on the one hand and the political system on the other. An ideal model of burgeoning conflict might develop as follows: First, boundary controls, which are contingent upon the extension of administrative machinery to the outer limits of the political unit, have to be instituted. If the controls operate as barriers, then the boundary can be said to be alive and a recognizable feature of the environment. Thereafter, it becomes apparent that the delimitation of political jurisdictions does not coincide with discontinuities in the sociocultural milieu. If the interaction system that is now being disrupted is held to be so deeply imbedded as to be incapable of reorientation, then the interests adversely affected by the new role of the boundary have two alternatives open to them. Either they can urge a regression, on the part of the political authorities, to the previous state of administrative laxity or they can call for a rearrangement in the juridical status of territory—so that the limits of political systems do coincide with discontinuities in the sociocultural environment.

The governments on either side of the boundary have a number of alternatives open to them in this situation. They may ignore the interests of the populations in the frontier zone and proceed with the enforcement of the state objectives that resulted in the boundaries' becoming barriers. In this case, the result of government policy is to create, forcibly and painfully, new discontinuities where none had existed before and to reorient the interaction system away from, instead of across, the political boundary. Conversely, the governments could ignore their own interest in instituting boundary controls and permit the continuance of a high degree of permeability in the boundary. If neither of these alternatives is open, then conflicts over the location of the boundary will result. Either one or both governments would then attempt to have the distribution of political jurisdictions coincide with discontinuities in the environment.

If the foregoing is a valid approximation of the process by which boundary conflicts may be generated, then the problem is one of determining the general nature of African political boundaries and the factors that shape the attitudes of the new governments toward their jurisdictional limits.

II

It would appear, at first sight, that there is a substantial conflict potential inherent in the political boundaries of Africa. With rare ex-

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ceptions, the states in this regional system exercise hegemony over units of territory that have been politically differentiated by other states—their former European sovereigns. For most African governments the spatial dimensions and political boundaries of the new state constitute a major portion of the political legacy bequeathed by the receding colonial order. Because these boundaries have been inherited, they have been judged as artificial or, in some vague, undefined sense, as "unnatural."[6] The attribution of an "artificial" or "unnatural" quality to existing political limits has long been a part of the rhetoric of territorial revisionism.[7] Continued use of these categories in systematic analysis, however, contributes to the perpetuation of an incorrect conceptualization of political boundaries. All territorial political units have always been the product of social and political action and it is "man and not nature that determines the location [of political boundaries]."[8] There is nothing inherently natural or authentic about the political boundaries of any state.

A more accurate conception of bequeathed boundaries in Africa would treat them as exogenous or "ahistorical" entities—that is to say, boundaries are ahistorical in relation to the indigenous political history of the societies they circumscribe. The common and distinguishing characteristic of most political boundaries in Africa is that their present location does not represent the territorial culmination of locally generated political processes. What they do reflect are the cost-gain calculations utilized by European foreign ministries during the period of the partition. Predictions of boundary conflict have been based, in part, on the implicit assumption that foreign policy considerations of six European governments in the nineteenth century could not provide a stable basis for territorial allocation in the postindependence period, when there is a host of new actors responsive, presumably, to different sets of demands, pressures, and calculations.

Apart from their exogenous character, the inherited boundaries of Africa are of relatively recent origin and thus do not even possess the sanctity that derives from age. The majority of African boundaries were delimited between 1884 and 1904 and the definitive partition was completed by 1920.[9] The speed with which the partition took place

[6] Resolution No. 2, All African People's Conference, Accra, December 13, 1958.

[7] See, for example, Norman Hill, *Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations* (New York 1945), 22-142, which analyzes in some detail the nature of territorial claims advanced at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919.

[8] Richard Hartshorne, "A Survey of the Boundary Problems of Europe," in Charles C. Colby, ed., *Geographic Aspects of International Relations* (Chicago 1938), 164.

[9] These delimitation treaties are compiled in Edward Herstlet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3 vols. (London 1909).

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required that boundaries be easily defined and quickly agreed upon. Delimitation agreements were negotiated before detailed knowledge of terrains and peoples in the interior of the continent was available. Consequently, the vast majority of the boundaries were defined in terms of astronomical or mathematical criteria or by reference to gross physical features. It is estimated by K. M. Barbour that at the time of the transfer of power in the late 1950's, approximately forty-four percent of the boundary mileage in Africa was defined according to parallels and meridians, thirty percent by straight lines, arcs of circles, and so on, and the balance of twenty-six percent by reference to topographical features such as rivers, streams, watersheds, mountains, and valleys.[10]

Though the boundaries were defined and delimited with considerable rapidity and ease, the next step in the territorial apportionment of the continent, that of demarcation on the ground and the establishment of administration at the line of limit, was delayed considerably. This can be seen, for example, with reference to the boundaries of Ethiopia. The British Somaliland-Ethiopia boundary was delimited in 1897 and the Kenya-Ethiopia boundary in 1907. The demarcation of the former took place between 1933 and 1935 and of the latter in 1947.[11] It is obvious that in the absence of demarcation and, more important, of administration, any boundary will remain simply a mute symbol of legal title on maps and documents, possessing no relevance to the life of the zone it bisects. The barrier effect of boundaries, from which stem their potentially disruptive consequences, depends on the degree to which controls are exercised at the line of division. Because of the time gap between the formal delimitation of jurisdictional limits and the taking effect of the political-administrative consequences of this jurisdiction, most of the inherited boundaries of Africa can be said to have been operationally nonexistent for the major portion of their history. In many areas of the interior the partition was an "empty and theoretical expansion" which was not followed by the trader and the official until much later.[12]

The manner in which the partition was effected is responsible in large measure for the current speculation about the relationship of

[10] "Calculated very approximately" by Barbour, in "A Geographical Analysis of Boundaries in Inter-Tropical Africa," in K. M. Barbour and R. M. Prothero, *Essays in African Populations* (London 1961), 305.

[11] According to one calculation, approximately 25,000 miles of African boundaries still have to be demarcated; see Robert D. Hodgson and Elvyn A. Stoneman, *The Changing Map of Africa* (Princeton 1963), 66-67.

[12] Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians* (New York 1961), 472.

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African boundaries to their sociocultural environment. Since these boundaries were obviously drawn through an inhabited environment the general and unexamined assumption has been that they could not by their very nature coincide with the distribution of indigenous interaction systems and homogeneous cultural groups. Whether a majority of the international boundaries of Africa are in fact superimposed or are just possibly consequent cannot be definitively determined by using current information. The *prima facie* evidence seems to indicate that a substantial number of ethnic groups were divided by the boundaries. One estimate, which Barbour arrived at by superimposing a political map upon a tribal map, had at least "187 tribal territories" being bisected by boundaries in tropical Africa. In advancing this figure Barbour has, however, emphasized its unreliability by underlining the conceptual confusion surrounding terms such as "tribes" or "tribal territories" and the inadequacy of demographic data for the frontier zones.[13] Until more specific information about the frontier populations is available—for example, whether these are tightly knit communities or vaguely associated groups with few transactions between them—it is not going to be possible to assert either the superimposed or consequent character of African boundaries.

We do know from historical studies done on specific negotiations of the partition period that boundary negotiators were not totally unmindful of the distribution or territorial integrity of the indigenous populations. This was particularly true for those segments of the colonial boundaries, located near the coast, which traversed an environment with which the Europeans were familiar to a degree. Since many colonial territorial claims were based on prior agreements with local chiefs, subsequent delimitation agreements were often drafted in accordance with them.[14] This ensured a degree of conformance between the new jurisdictional limits and the existing distribution of political and cultural groups. Elsewhere provisions were often included to permit populations either to relocate themselves or to have

[13] Barbour, 312-13. The unreliability of this estimate stems partly from Barbour's reliance on the tribal map of Africa reproduced in George P. Murdock, *Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History* (New York 1959), which uncritically treats a variety of types of entities such as language groups, centralized chieftaincies, clans, and subclans as distinct "tribes."

[14] As seen for example in the Italo-Abyssinian Convention of 1908, which stipulated that the eastern boundary of Abyssinian jurisdiction should follow the "territorial boundaries between the tribes of the Rahanuin which remain dependent on Italy and all other tribes to its north, which remain dependent on Abyssinia" (Article 1), in Herstlet, II, 1223.

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access to water wells and grazing grounds across the new boundary.[15] Nonetheless for most areas of the continent the distribution of the local population was at best a peripheral consideration during the partition, and even if the will had been there the general ignorance of colonial officials ensured that the boundaries could not knowingly be made to coincide with any cleavages that might have existed in the cultural environment.

The implication of the foregoing discussion is that a majority of the current international boundaries of Africa can at the very least be treated as irrelevant to important aspects of their indigenous time-space milieu. Except for the boundaries of Ethiopia, none of them spatially delimit the outcomes of traditional historical processes. Neither do they, judging by the crude evidence available, display a close relationship to the observable distribution of indigenous ethnic groups. Since a society's definition of its spatial depth derives partly from systems of social interaction and partly from the remembered past, it can be readily seen that African political boundaries cannot help to define valid communities in terms of traditional political cultures. These same boundaries possess a reverse relationship to all those aspects of their environment which are traceable to the European phase of African history. Because their location antedated the establishment of colonial administration, the boundaries have helped shape the distribution of nontraditional discontinuities in the environment.[16] Thus, all of the institutions attendant on the export-oriented cash economy, as well as the interaction systems of modern secular administration and services, have developed in conformance with the colonial jurisdictional limits. Problems of superimposition and disruption do not exist with respect to the modern or nontraditional aspects of environment. It would seem to follow that if tensions are to arise in the postindependence period over the location of boundaries they are most likely to be generated by demands originating in the traditional sectors of African societies to the extent that such traditional interests find an outlet in the politics of the new states.

III

Given the dual nature of the relationship between the inherited boundaries of Africa and the traditional and modern aspects of their

[15] See, for example, the Annex to the Anglo-Abyssinian Treaty of 1897 delimiting the boundary between Abyssinia and the British Somaliland Protectorate, *ibid.*, I, 428.

[16] For a discussion of the role of political boundaries in the shaping of emergent cultural features, see Eric Fischer, "On Boundaries," *World Politics*, I (January 1948),

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environment, it is noteworthy that, so far, disputes have occurred only over eight international boundaries. This is a remarkably low incidence of boundary conflict considering that, at present, there are thirty-six independent political units on mainland Africa with seventy-three separate interstate boundaries dividing them.[17] The most serious disputes have occurred so far with regard to the boundaries of Somalia, Morocco, and the partition line between Ghana and Togo, and of these disputes the latter two are currently quiescent. Only the Somali dispute can be termed intractable, defying efforts to achieve either a mutually satisfactory solution or a resigned acceptance of the status quo by all parties.

How can the relative absence of boundary conflicts in Africa be explained? Definitive answers would require the detailed examination of thirty-six, if not more, foreign policies, with a view to uncovering local attitudes toward the inherited spatial limits of the new states. Such studies still have to be undertaken. It is possible, nonetheless, to advance tentative answers to the query raised by Karl Deutsch, "Who is likely to spend how much effort on attempts to change [the location of African boundaries]?"[18] Since boundary conflicts have been the exception and not the rule, it may be possible to infer the conditions promoting stability by specifying the factors that have led to disputes so far and by assessing their general relevance to conditions elsewhere on the continent.

Two types of territorial claims, "historic" and "ethnic," have thus far been utilized in support of boundary realignments on mainland Africa. In the past decade, Morocco has advanced territorial claims based on precolonial history to large areas under Algerian, Malian, and Mauretanian jurisdiction. Earlier, in the late 1940's, Ethiopia offered similar arguments to support her claims to all of the former Italian East Africa, including Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The ethnic claim has been the basis of the Ghana-Togo dispute and, even more clearly, of the Somali claims to large tracts of Ethiopia and Kenya. There have been no instances so far in which territorial claims have been advanced on grounds of geographical contiguity, economic necessity, rights of passage, compensation, strategic requirements, dis-

196-222; and Guido Weigand, "Effects of Boundary Changes in South Tyrol," *Geographical Review*, XL (July 1950), 364-75.

[17] This count excludes the twenty additional boundaries between independent African states and adjacent colonial territories, such as the boundaries between Guinea and Portuguese Guinea, Cameroons and Rio Muni, Morocco and Ifni, or South Africa and Swaziland.

[18] "Some Problems in the Study of Nation-Building," 14.

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covery, prescription, or accretion, all of which have at one point or another been the basis of territorial disputes between states in Europe and the Americas.[19]

Territorial claims based on historic rights have as their objective the restitution of the frontiers of the state as they are held to have existed at an earlier period of its history. The diplomatic assault on the inherited boundaries mounted by the Moroccan state after 1957 has been aimed at reuniting all territories formerly under the suzerainty of the kingdom. Thus, Morocco has laid claims to 419,000 square miles of Mauretanian territory, approximately 150,000 square miles under Mali sovereignty, and another 350,000 square miles of the Algerian department of Saoura. The claim has been supported by the contention that from the era of the Almoravid dynasty in the eleventh century until 1912 when the French protectorate was established, the hegemony of the Moroccan kingdom extended from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Senegal River.[20] With the resumption of sovereignty in 1956, the argument has proceeded, it is the duty and the responsibility of the Moroccan state to reclaim the lost Saharan territories. Similarly, during the negotiations over the disposal of the former Italian colonies, between 1945 and 1948, the Ethiopian government argued from history its claims to Eritrea and Somaliland. It was maintained that prior to the nineteenth-century partition of the Horn region, Ethiopian jurisdiction, dating back to the first century and the period of the Axum empire, had extended from the Shoan plateau to the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.[21]

The nature and the validity of the historical evidence produced to justify such claims is irrelevant to our present purposes. What is relevant is the contribution of indigenous history toward shaping perspectives on the inherited boundaries. In both the Moroccan and the Ethiopian cases, precolonial history has been drawn upon to support a drive for territorial reapportionment in the postcolonial period with the objective of reestablishing the ancient imperium. Neither government has been able to point to any substantial outpouring of

[19] See Hill, *passim*.

[20] Anthony M. Reyner, "Morocco's International Boundaries," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, I (September 1963), 313-26; also Arab Information Center, *The Problem of Mauretania* (New York 1961); The Delegation of Mauretania to the United Nations, *The Islamic Republic of Mauretania and the Kingdom of Morocco* (New York, n.d.); and I. William Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, III (August 1965), 155-73.

[21] Mesfim Wolde Marian, "The Background of the Ethiopian-Somalian Boundary Dispute," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, II (July 1964), 189-219; also the Ethiopian memorandum supporting the claim before the General Assembly of the United Nations, reproduced as United Nations Document A/C.I/8 (October 20, 1948).

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local support for its territorial claims. In these instances the inherited boundaries have been viewed as being superimposed across the limits of a valid political community, and history has been used to lend legitimacy to the the cause of territorial revisionism.

It is noteworthy that the historic argument for boundary rectification has so far been used only by the two African territorial political units that happen to be monarchies with state traditions antedating the colonial period. The contemporary Moroccan and Ethiopian states can claim, despite the brief interregnums of colonial status, the legitimacy that derives from simple persistence through time as identifiable political entities. Though the role of secular institutions and symbols is much greater in Morocco than in Ethiopia, in both political systems traditionally recruited leadership plays a far more significant role in decision-making than it does elsewhere in Africa. The ready availability of a structured dynastic history has enabled the leadership to use traditional symbols to support secular domestic and external policies.[22]

No other contemporary African state is similarly situated. In some states, such as Ghana and Mali, attempts have been made to establish putative relationships with the pre-European Sudanic states of the same name. But this effort has been concerned primarily with creating a national and cultural consciousness, boosting local pride, and buttressing the ideology of negritude and African personality.[23] It has not had any role in the formulation of foreign policies with respect to the inherited boundaries. The governments of the vast majority of African states do not, of course, make any claims to historic continuity with any precolonial political systems. It follows from this that there will be a low incidence of conflict over the inherited boundaries traceable to indigenous political history.

IV

The "ethnic claim" to territory would seem to present a far more serious problem, since many of the boundaries in an objective sense do cut across a substantial number of ethnic and linguistic groups. Despite the general irrelevance of African boundaries to indigenous cultural and economic discontinuities, only the inherited boundaries

[22] Douglas E. Ashford, "The Irredentist Appeal in Morocco and Mauretania," *Western Political Quarterly*, XV (December 1962), 641-51.

[23] The choice of the name "Ghana" as an "inspiration for the future" was emphasized by Nkrumah in his speech before the Gold Coast Assembly on May 18, 1956. Portions of the speech are reprinted in his *I Speak of Freedom* (New York 1961), 67-68.

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of Somalia have come under the sustained assault of ethnic irredentism. For a period in the 1950's the question of Ewe unification, with its implications for the international relations of Ghana and Togo, promised to develop into another serious boundary conflict. However, with the transfer of power to separate Ghanaian and Togolese states the push for unification has subsided. Though the continued division of the Ewe has not become a forgotten issue, the inherited boundary is now treated as an accepted fact and the problems of a fractionalized ethnic group are seen as being best served within the framework of functional unification across international boundaries.[24] Somali irredentism, on the other hand, has not tapered off in the postindependence period. No other groups straddling an inherited boundary in Africa have so far been able to exert an analogous degree of influence on other successor governments on the continent. This would seem to indicate that the conditions promoting and sustaining territorial revisionism among the Somalis are of a different order of magnitude and intensity than similar demands that may exist elsewhere. What, therefore, have been the factors creating and sustaining the Somali dispute over boundaries?

Two factors lie at the root of these difficulties. At the overt level, there can be no question that the boundaries of the colonial period were superimposed across the grazing grounds of the nomadic pastoral populations of the interior regions of the Horn of Africa. The fact of superimposition has become particularly manifest in the past fifteen years with the extension and establishment of relatively permanent civil and military administrations by the various governments at the lines where their jurisdictions come into contact. Thus the emergence of the boundaries of the Horn into meaningful features in the environment has coincided with the period of decolonization. At a less obvious level, the inherited boundaries are viewed by most Somalis, wherever located, as violating the limits of their political community as it is defined by Somali social organization. In both these respects the situation in the Horn region is unique on the African continent.

The traditional economic sector is bound to be a source of boundary conflict if its orderly operation is in any way hampered by differing po-

[24] The most complete discussion of the Ewe unification problem is James S. Coleman, "Togoland," *International Conciliation*, No. 509, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (New York, September 1956); see also Sylvanus E. Olympio, "African Problems and the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (October 1961), 50-57; and Dennis Austin, "The Ghana-Togo Frontier," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, I (June 1963), 139-45.

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litical jurisdictions. This is particularly true in those situations in which the movement of men and livestock over a designated area is an integral aspect of economic activity. It is a commonplace characteristic of most African economies that the bulk of their population is engaged in subsistence or, at the most, a limited internal exchange economy centering on local markets. The question of movement does not arise in any important manner in the case of societies based on settled agriculture. But movement is highly relevant where the indigenous economy is based on stock-herding and transhumance. In such economies periodic movement is essential to life, and if the political limits cut across this intimate tie between man and space their presence will be immediately felt.

The inherited boundaries in the Horn of Africa, particularly the boundary between Ethiopia and the northern region of the Somali Republic, were delimited with no reference to the distribution of grazing areas of the local pastoral population.[25] Even if the boundary negotiators at the time of the partition in the 1880's and 1890's had desired to follow such criteria in their delimitation, they would not have had the information to do so. Systematic surveys of these grazing areas were not begun until after World War II.[26] In this respect the boundaries are not unique. The boundaries in the Saharan area, such as those between Nigeria and Niger or Algeria and Mali, are similarly superimposed upon local transhumant regions. Conflict, particularly over the Ethiopia-Somalia boundary, has been generated to a large extent by the transformation of what had hitherto been paper boundaries into barriers impeding the free movement of men and livestock which has gone on for centuries. Such a transformation of other desert boundaries in the continent has not occurred. The Ethiopia-Somalia boundary development has been due primarily to the extension of Ethiopian administration, in the 1940's and 1950's, to the jurisdictional limits of the Empire and to the concomitant establishment of border controls and inspections, the institution of a permit system for firearms, and the application of Ethiopian nationality laws at the lines of contact. All of these are perfectly normal acts of sovereign governments. The difficulty has arisen in that these acts applied to a population whose search for grass and water made it particularly prone to reject their legitimacy. The institution of relatively stringent border controls is itself the product of a much more basic issue: the Somali

[25] Herstlet, 423-29.

[26] John A. Hunt, *A General Survey of the Somaliland Protectorate, 1944-1950* (London 1951).

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claim, on ethnic grounds, to all Somali-inhabited areas in the Horn region and the resultant Ethiopian (and Kenyan) concern with keeping ethnically heterogeneous political communities from disintegrating.

Much has been written about the Greater Somalia movement and the challenge it has posed to the territorial status quo in the Horn region.[27] The Somali government is the only African government charged by its national constitution with promoting the political unification of a particular ethnic group.[28] The political pressures that have made ethnic unification a basic state objective have pushed the Somali government into total isolation on the question of colonial boundaries. At present the Somali government is the only government on the continent which has refused to pledge adherence to resolutions adopted at OAU conferences calling upon member states to respect existing frontiers.[29] Even the adherence of the Somali government to the rhetoric of Pan-African unity is qualified by its insistence that self-determination must precede a larger union. In effect Pan-Somalia must be created before Pan-Africa can emerge.[30] Why is it that while most African governments have reversed their positions on the bequeathed boundaries—from denunciation to the affirmation of their sanctity—the Somali position has remained the same?

The Somali ethnic claim can be best understood by reference to the nature of Somali social organization and the contribution it makes to the emotional integration of a sparsely distributed population over a wide area. The dominant feature of Somali social organization is the segmentary lineage. What this means in effect is the prevalence of an agnatic principle of social organization at all levels of the society. Every Somali is a member, through his father, of an ever-widening series of lineage segments, lineages, subclans, clans that extend vertically through time and horizontally through space. Since the genealogies that accompany the system are remembered and preserved, it is possible for kin relationships between any two individuals to be established if their lineage relationships are traced far enough back in time.[31] At the highest genealogical level all Somalis belong to one or

[27] For example, Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963); A. A. Costagno, "The Somali-Kenyan Controversy," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, II (July 1964), 165-88; John Drysdale, *The Somali Dispute* (London 1964).

[28] Article 6, Clause 4; for a commentary see Mauro Stramacci, *Le Costituzioni Degli Stati Africa* (Milan 1963), 309-26.

[29] *Il Corriere della Somalia* (Mogadiscio), September 30, 1964.

[30] *The Somali Republic and African Unity*, Somali Government official publication 20681/22962 (Mogadiscio 1962). See also I. M. Lewis, "Pan Africanism and Pan Somalism," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, I (June 1963), 147-62.

[31] The most thorough discussion of this is to be found in the writings of I. M. Lewis. See his *A Pastoral Democracy* (London 1961); *The Somali Lineage System*

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another of six major clan families, which in turn claim common descent from the lineage of the Prophet Mohammed.

It is irrelevant to the present discussion whether remembered genealogies are historically valid. The political implication of the segmentary lineage and the genealogical system is that they serve to delimit the boundaries of the largest community to which the individual belongs. The system makes it possible for the individual Somali to function simultaneously at a variety of different levels of social and political identification. In this sense the genealogical system offsets the tendency toward fission and division inherent in the segmentation of lineages. Though normal day-to-day contacts of individuals would be with members of their own or closely related lineage segments, there are no structural obstacles to easy identification with a social unit composed of all individuals in the total genealogical system. Such identification is further reinforced by the fact that all Somalis, i.e., members of this genealogical system, constitute a single speech community and profess a common Islamic faith.

The boundaries bequeathed to the Somali Republic, therefore, have cut across two of the most highly valued features of traditional Somali culture. Their present location has introduced a new—and onerous—element into the lives of the pastoral nomads, a group that comprises upwards of seventy-five percent of all Somalis. The boundaries have also violated the limits of the "in-group" as defined by the local culture, and have placed approximately 900,000 members of this group under the jurisdiction of non-Moslem and non-Somali-speaking authority. Since the lineages most directly affected by the boundaries, both in terms of grazing ground and in numbers living under Ethiopian and Kenyan jurisdiction, are members of the two most numerous and influential clan-families—the Daarood and the Ishaaq—their grievances have been readily verbalized by all major political groups in the Somali Republic.

The Somali case provides us with perhaps the only instance on the African continent where the traditional attachments of kinship, language, and religion do not inhibit the simultaneous growth of identification with a secular civil polity.[32] This unique situation is the result of the high degree of cultural and ethnic homogeneity in Somalia.

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and the Total Genealogy, mimeographed (Hargeisa 1957); and "Force and Fission in a Northern Somali Clan," *American Anthropologist*, LXIII (February 1961), 94-112.

[32] See the excellent discussion of the dysfunctional role of traditional attachments in the creation of nontraditional territorial loyalties by Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York 1963), 105-57.

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Over ninety-nine percent of the inhabitants of the state, as it is presently constituted by the boundaries, are members of the genealogical system that defines the Somali "people." In view of this homogeneity, Somalia is the only African political unit to approach the model of a European nation-state. The Somali political system, consequently, does not face the problem of having to overcome pervasive divisions within the national society. Though the level of social mobilization, as measured by Deutsch's secular indices, is likely to remain low for some time to come, the political system can count upon a degree of territory-wide consensus, made possible by the traditional culture, which is unparalleled elsewhere in Africa. But there is a price attached to it. While the traditionally based consensus contributes to a relatively high degree of internal political stability in Somalia, it also forces the decision-makers in the modern polity to be highly responsive to demands originating in the traditional sectors of the culture.[33] The intensity of the boundary conflict is a reflection of this situation.

The very features that have propelled the Somalis into boundary disputes with their neighbors are those that are least likely to occur elsewhere in Africa. The usual basis of ethnic claims in the past, in Europe particularly, has been the presumed ties of language and cultural homogeneity of a given population divided by a boundary. Nowhere in Africa, except for Somalia, has the successful independence movement reflected the political goals of a homogeneous linguistic or cultural group. On the contrary, the relationship between group homogeneity and self-determination has been reversed and the task of the political leadership has been to create the nation after the transfer of power. Consequently, the postindependence period in almost all African states has been characterized by an intense concern with the problem of integrating diverse subgroups into an emerging national society, and by less concern with the question of external limits, which have been accepted as given. The cultural heterogeneity of most African states is responsible for preventing boundary issues from coming to the forefront of their domestic and foreign policies.

V

The purpose of this article has been to examine the commonly expressed belief that interstate relations in Africa, in the postindependence period, would be marked by a high incidence of conflict over jurisdictional questions in the form of boundary disputes and irre-

[33] This general problem is explored at greater length in my forthcoming study of political and administrative integration in the Somalilands.

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dentist movements. The behavior of African states in this period has, however, quite to the contrary, been characterized by a high degree of stability in the territorial distribution of authority. Boundary disputes, thus far, have been generated only by those states in which political power is exercised by a leadership that represents either an indigenous state tradition transcending the colonial period or a culturally homogeneous political community. Either of these is a highly atypical situation for Africa, where decision-making authority is generally exercised by a nontraditional leadership over culturally plural political communities. During this transitional period the major problem before this leadership has been one of creating a territory-wide consensus, following nontraditional criteria, among the culturally diverse populations under their jurisdiction. The current limits of territorial authority have become, therefore, essential reference points in the definition of a nontraditional concept of political legitimacy. Thus even if the boundaries are objectively superimposed across traditional interaction systems, the goal of political modernization requires the affirmation of their permanence.

The evolving African position on boundaries indicates that a version of the doctrine of *uti possidetis* may, in time, come to constitute the legal basis for determining territorial questions on the continent. This doctrine, used widely in settling Latin American territorial issues, established as an absolute rule that the boundaries of Latin American states should coincide with the frontiers of the Spanish colonial provinces of which they were the successors.[34] The attempts on the part of Morocco and Somalia to establish a higher legitimacy of territorial title, based on pre-European history or ethnic self-determination, have received no support from their continental neighbors. Though it is generally recognized that the inherited boundaries of Africa do inhibit a more effective and rational development of the continent's economic resources, the solution to the problem is seen in functional integration across boundaries or in the unification of existing territorial political units. In the foreseeable future, the map of Africa is unlikely to be changed by a redrawing of existing jurisdictional limits.

In summary, therefore, the following general propositions can be

[34] Article III, Clause 3, of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity calls for "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence." This had led some observers to infer an implied acceptance of an African *uti possidetis* by the members of the OAU. There has thus far been no formal acceptance of this doctrine however. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The Addis Ababa Charter," *International Conciliation*, No. 546 (January 1964), 29-30.

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advanced regarding the conflict potential of inherited boundaries in Africa:

(a) The present location of the political boundaries of Africa is a legacy of past power relations between European states. These boundaries do not therefore represent the culmination of locally generated political processes and thus are ahistorical in terms of indigenous power relations in the continent. For most of their history these boundaries have served primarily as legal symbols of colonial jurisdiction. Because there was a significant time gap between the delimitation of jurisdictional limits and the extension of administration to these limits, these boundaries have been administratively dormant for most of their past.

(b) Though political boundaries can have various types of relationships to their sociocultural environment, only one type of relationship, that of superimposition across valued continuities of interaction, promotes conflict over boundary location. Furthermore, the fact of superimposition is dependent on the degree and efficiency of administration exercised at the jurisdictional limits. It follows that the conflict potential of the political boundaries of Africa will be correlated with the degree to which they are superimposed across interaction systems and the level of disruptive administrative controls that are exercised at these limits.

(c) African boundaries possess a dual relationship to their environment. With regard to the indigenous culture they are subsequent boundaries, delimited after the gross patterns of indigenous cultural geography had already been established. Consequently, the distribution of discontinuities in the traditional culture has not been determined by the location of colonial jurisdictional limits. On the other hand they are simultaneously antecedent boundaries with regard to the secular modern aspects of their environment. As such they have channeled the distribution of nontraditional discontinuities on the continent.

(d) The disruptive effects of African political boundaries at the present time are most likely to fall on the traditional aspects of their time-space milieu. If postindependence administration transforms the boundaries into barriers, the immediate impact will be felt on indigenous interaction systems and traditionally inculcated notions of the society's spatial extent.

(e) Potential for conflict is not, however, dependent on the simple fact of superimposition of a boundary across indigenous interaction systems. It is equally important that the boundary constitute the jurisdictional limits of a culturally homogeneous political community.

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Where indigenous institutions do not retard identification with the new state, as they would in an ethnically plural political community, then attitudes toward the boundaries of groups affected by them will be more readily translated into governmental policy.

(f) It follows that the conflict potential of African political boundaries is dependent on the degree to which they coincide with the distribution of politically organized, culturally homogeneous populations. Contrary to general notions, the potential for conflict will be lowest where the boundaries are totally irrelevant to traditionally derived discontinuities. In ethnically plural political communities the major attention of the leadership will be directed toward the problems of internal integration. The conflict potential will be highest where the boundaries approach but do not completely coincide with the distribution of a homogeneous population. Since the latter situation is extremely rare on the continent, we can expect overall stability in the location of boundary lines in Africa.

(g) Over a period of time, with increasing economic modernization and social mobilization around new territorial institutions and symbols, the inherited boundaries will come to designate and to coincide with new regions of movement, circulation, interaction, and identification. The potential for conflict over their location should decline even further.

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Research Note

RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

By KENNETH W. GRUNDY

THE current scholarly interest in African political affairs contrasts sharply with the dearth of serious research and writing about contemporary African political thought. Attempts to explain this unfortunate phenomenon hinge on the realization that the rise of what might be identified as independent "African" political thought is a comparatively recent development. The accelerated tempo of sociopolitical change on the continent has, perhaps, served to discourage systematic analysis. Moreover, the very multiplicity and diversity of independent African regimes pose staggering problems for the potential student. As a result, relatively few social scientists have undertaken systematic examination of African political attitudes, ideas, and ideologies.

It is the purpose of this bibliographical research note to review some of the principal publications dealing with the ideas influencing and advanced by modern politicians in the independent black African states. This article does not purport to be a complete survey of the literature on the subject. For reasons of manageability, it is limited to those studies *primarily* devoted to the political thought of Africa's ruling elites. It does not include publications dealing only tangentially with the subject. Descriptions and comments on various aspects of African thought are scattered throughout many published works, but unless major (or identifiable) portions of these studies are specifically concerned with the subject under consideration here, they will not be mentioned. This survey will concentrate on contemporary thought, and will discuss traditional influences only insofar as they affect modern ideas and attitudes.

This article is divided into three parts. The first will cover the general treatments of political thought—those seeking to examine several facets of thought related to politics, whether it be for all of black Africa, for a region, or for a particular country. Part II will discuss the analytical literature relating to specific themes without regard for

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geographical divisions. The final section will attempt to draw some conclusions about the scholarly study of African political thought. This survey will, it is hoped, be able to point up the extent of the coverage of the subject, the areas of concentration or emphasis, and the significant gaps where further work might profitably be undertaken.

I. General Studies

What political ideas do Africans espouse? The most general description and analysis of the diverse aspects of African political ideology to be published is Charles F. Andrain's "Democracy and Socialism: Ideologies of African Leaders," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (Glencoe 1964), 155-205.[1] Andrain isolates certain structural similarities in the beliefs of African leaders. First, most of the leaders differentiate between European forms of democracy (with their apparent emphasis on institutional components) and African democracy, which attempts to express the will of the masses. In like manner, the African concept of socialism is distinguished by its humanistic overtones rather than by the economic or political orientation of European varieties. Finally, Africans adopt a long-range time perspective on the achievement of a democracy with an institutionalized opposition, economic abundance, and full independence.

In three contributions, Professor Thomas Hodgkin argues that the theoretical weapons with which nationalists make their revolutions have been largely borrowed from the metropoles. He notes an especial similarity with the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and a heavy borrowing from Marxist sources. Still, the importance of external influences must not be exaggerated, for much of contemporary ideology is derived from African tradition. See Part II, Chapter 6, "Theories and Myths," of Hodgkin's *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London 1956), and Chapter 7, "Party Objectives," in his *African Political Parties* (Harmondsworth 1961). In Hodgkin's third essay, "A Note on the Language of African Nationalism," in St. Anthony's Papers No. 10, *African Affairs: Number One*, Kenneth Kirkwood, ed. (London 1961), 22-40, he contends that there is a "common political lan-

[1] Even more comprehensive are two unpublished doctoral dissertations completed at American universities. The earlier is Kenneth W. Grundy, "Theories and Ideologies of West African Underdevelopment and Development," 2 vols. (Pennsylvania State University, 1963). It deals with the views of the leaders of six West African states—Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal. The more recent, and considerably more general in scope and coverage, is Charles F. Andrain, "Political Concepts of African Leaders" (University of California, Berkeley, 1964), the findings of which are embodied in Andrain's article.

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guage" and that "common themes recur" in Africa. In this systematic examination of what he regards as eleven separate themes, he maintains that Africa's ideas belong to a family of theories that might be labelled "revolutionary democratic theories."

An excellent article of slightly more restricted geographical compass is Immanuel Wallerstein, "Elites in French-speaking West Africa: The Social Basis of Ideas," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, III (May 1965), 1-33. Wallerstein attempts to view the different political ideas within the context of social stratifications in independent states. In order to speculate upon the values that elites will hold in the future, he suggests that we identify the sources of strain in the societies under consideration and thereby indicate what ideologies might serve the purposes of each social group.

Limited studies dealing with the ideas of "radical" Africans are William J. Foltz, "The Radical Left in French-Speaking West Africa," in William H. Lewis, *Emerging Africa* (Washington 1963), 29-42; and David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York 1963), 57-104. Foltz concentrates on the problems of defining "radical" and "left" in the African context, and then discusses the factors encouraging or inhibiting the growth of a "radical left." The Apter chapter, which ostensibly covers all "mobilization" systems, draws most of its examples from Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Apter outlines the attempts by such regimes to integrate and "politicize" social life. Such efforts require exceptional concentration of authority, and to facilitate this process new political doctrines are created which emerge as political "religions."

In the same vein, but even more geographically narrow, are three studies of political thought in Ghana. The first, Henry L. Bretton, "Current Political Thought and Practice in Ghana," *American Political Science Review*, LII (March 1958), 46-63, identifies five forces that influence Ghanaian thought. The first four are commonly mentioned by other writers: traditional, Marxist, parliamentary, and Islamic; the fifth, opportunism or expediency, is often overlooked. This force, Bretton maintains, lacks ideological content and addresses itself "solely to the attainment and retention of absolute power by any and all means." Jacques Boyon writes in "Une idéologie africaine: le Nkrumaisme," *Revue française de science politique*, XIII (March 1963), 66-87, that Nkrumaist doctrine is not so much an effort to construct *a priori* a logical and complete system of political thought as it is an effort to give form to and to justify policy after the fact. Although it

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seeks to be resolutely African in substance, it emerges Marxist in form. Kenneth W. Grundy scrutinizes "Nkrumah's Theory of Underdevelopment: An Analysis of Recurrent Themes" in *World Politics*, xv (April 1963), 438-54. In particular, he considers nine separate themes that recur in Nkrumah's writings and speeches. Among them are the preeminence of politics, imperialism as the cause of underdevelopment, and immediate political independence as a prerequisite for all forms of development. Grundy shows where and to what extent Nkrumah's views parallel or deviate from Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Two articles deal with political thought in Guinea: Georges Fischer, "Quelques aspects de la doctrine politique Guinéenne," *Civilisations*, IX, No. 4 (1959), 457-78; and Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Political Ideology of the P.D.G.," *Présence Africaine*, XII (First Quarter 1962), 30-41. Fischer notes the persistent similarities in the images of the world held by Sékou Touré, Lenin, and the Jacobins, and regards independence as "the great *leitmotiv* of this doctrine." Wallerstein admits that Guinean theory bears some resemblances to Marxism, whose rhetoric it often shares. However, by contrast, he feels that close examination reveals many basic differences from Marxist theory and some close parallels with Hobbesian concepts. Thus he sees Touré's thought as a combination of the communitarian norms of Rousseau, Leninist theory of party structure, and Hobbesian theory of sovereignty.

Unique in its application of the techniques of quantitative content analysis to the study of African ideas and the popular political lexicon is Appendix II of William J. Foltz, *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation* (New Haven and London 1965), 201-14. By scoring the editorials in two political party weekly newspapers, the Union Progressiste Sénégalais' *Unité Africaine* and the Union Soudanaise's *Essor*, Foltz calculates the frequency with which twenty-two symbols (politics, economics, people, party, independence, imperialism, and so on) were mentioned and the positive-negative relationship between these symbols. Often this study documents what has already been discussed in an impressionistic fashion elsewhere, but it still is a useful model for the application of content analysis, a device that could profitably be employed in comparative studies of ideas in developing countries. Further discussion of the ideas of the leaders of Mali and Senegal can be found in the purely descriptive chapter "Political Ideology and Perceptions," in Frank Gregory Snyder, *One-Party Government in Mali: Transition Toward Control* (New Haven and London 1965); Kenneth W. Grundy, "Marxism-Leninism and African

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Underdevelopment: The Mali Approach," *International Journal*, XVII (Summer 1962), 300-304; and Walter A. E. Skurnik, "Léopold Sédar Senghor and African Socialism," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, III (October 1965), 349-69.

What are the derivations or sources of African political thought? Thomas Hodgkin, in two articles, deals with two basic wellsprings of African thought. Their titles are self-explanatory: "Islam and National Movements in West Africa," *Journal of African History*, III, No. 2 (1962), 323-27; and "The Relevance of 'Western' Ideas for the New African States," in J. Roland Pennock, ed., *Self-Government in Modernizing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs 1964), 50-80. Both of these carefully constructed essays explore the many ramifications of each subject. Among Islamic influences, reformist and empire-building tendencies, relationships with the Maghrib, and the adaptability of Islamic institutions are included. In the second essay Hodgkin notes that "Western" ideas should include all aspects of European social and political thought—liberal democratic, revolutionary, Marxist, and fascist. Even though many of these ideas have a common European origin, they are not the special preserve of "the West" and thus the label "Western" may be misleading. George Shepperson's articles, "Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism," *Journal of African History*, I, No. 2 (1960), 299-312; and "External Factors in the Development of African Nationalism with Particular Reference to British Central Africa," *Phylon* (Atlanta), XXII (Fall 1961), 207-25, also deal with an all-too-neglected facet of "Western" sources of thought. The first, in particular, traces the influence of men such as Edward Blyden, Martin R. Delaney, W. E. B. DuBois, William Ellis, Marcus Garvey, James Weldon Johnson, George Alexander McGuire, Thurgood Marshall, George Padmore, and Albert Thorne, in addition to identifying the first-hand impact of American Negroes on African leaders who studied in the United States.

A few studies concentrate on the roots of the political thought of individual countries. For example, James S. Coleman's seminal study, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1958), contains numerous insights into the content and derivations of the various ideas of Nigeria's leaders. Part III, "The Rise of the Nigerian Nationalist Movement," which includes "The Beginnings of Nationalist Thought and Activity" (Chapter 8), is especially valuable. The philosophical roots of Senegalese thought are examined in S. Kachama-Nkoy, "De Karl Marx à Pierre Teilhard de Chardin dans

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la pensée de L. S. Senghor et Mamadou Dia," *Civilisations*, XIII, Nos. 1-2 (1963), 98-117; and in Senghor's own *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin et la politique africaine* (Dakar 1962).

II. Specific Themes

Except for these few contributions of a general nature, most of the analytical literature on African political thought is considerably more limited topically. By far the heaviest concentration is devoted to a few specific themes, and even this is of uneven quality.

African Socialism. Judged by volume, the most frequently discussed subject in the analytical literature is African economics, particularly socialism. Three books, an entire issue of *Africa Report*, and several articles have been devoted to the subject. *Marxisme, Communisme, et Socialisme Africain* by René Milon (Paris 1961) is a Marxist critique of Ivan I. Potekhin's booklet *Afrika smotrit v budushcheye* [*Africa Looks Ahead*], published in Moscow in 1960. Milon attempts to show that Africa must inevitably pass through the capitalist stage of development, and he employs Marx's fundamental thesis to sustain his argument.

The Potekhin booklet has been abridged and translated into English and appears as a supplement to *Mizan Newsletter* (London), III (April 1961). Although this work is not entirely concerned with African socialism, the late doyen of Soviet Africanists does argue that African societies can bypass capitalism and move directly into socialism of the "scientific" variety, and that any effort to deny the relevance to Africa of the ideas of Marx and Lenin is bound to obfuscate social realities. He criticizes what he calls "state capitalism," maintaining that enterprises controlled by a bourgeois state are capitalist and therefore are collective property of the ruling capitalist classes. While the development of state capitalism creates preconditions for the transition from capitalism to socialism, it is still capitalism.

Former Labour M. P. Fenner Brockway describes the clash between European intellectuals and African socialists in his book *African Socialism* (London 1964). The result of this clash, he contends, is the emergence of four trends of socialist theory: (1) Marxism-Leninism; (2) African Marxism; (3) African pragmatic socialism; and (4) African democratic socialism. Differences between African and European socialism result from the development of each from different origins: the European from the agrarian and industrial revolutions,

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and the African from a tightly ordered family society within the community. Brockway feels that Africans will not lean toward communism in their present search for ideology, and that their interfamily traditions will preclude the evils of Stalinism or Nazism.

The latest volume in its field, also entitled *African Socialism* (Stanford 1964), is edited by William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., and is a symposium of eleven studies. The first portion of the book contains essays by a sociologist, an economist, an anthropologist, a British socialist, a Soviet Africanist, and a political scientist. Four studies follow analyzing the actual operation of socialism in Ghana (Colin Legum), Guinea and Senegal (Charles F. Andrain), Mali (Kenneth W. Grundy), and Tanganyika (Fred G. Burke). Each author attempts to clarify the theoretical as well as the practical ramifications of socialism in its different settings. The final section consists of relevant statements about socialism in Africa by African statesmen and ideologues (including a never-before-published piece by the late George Padmore).

William H. Friedland, the sociologist, discusses four "basic social trends" relevant to African socialism: (1) the idea of the social obligation to work; (2) the conversion of trade unions from "consumptionist" to "productionist" associations; (3) the African emphasis on "classless" society; and (4) the view of society as "focal-institutional" rather than pluralistic. Economist Chandler Morse compares the actual degree of economic socialism in Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, and Tanganyika, and the obstacles to the eventual achievement of socialism. He concludes that African policies seem more concerned with promoting economic development than with promoting socialism. In exploring the thesis that traditional African societies are "cooperative," "collective," "communalist," or "socialist," anthropologist Igor Kopytoff concludes that these are myths not in accord with traditional reality. However, he argues that the myths nonetheless serve certain sociopolitical functions for the modernizing elites. Margaret Roberts' "A Socialist Looks at African Socialism" is largely a plea for understanding and a discussion of the hopes and dangers inherent in pragmatic socialism. Potekhin's "On African Socialism: A Soviet View," is reprinted (with some editorial changes to eliminate polemical rhetoric) from an article originally published in *International Affairs* (Moscow), IX (January 1963), 71-79. As in his *Africa Looks Ahead*, he contends that some African states do not inevitably have to pass through all stages of historical development—that Africans can achieve socialism without first being capitalistic. He also excoriates advocates of "African social-

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ism" for their unwillingness to accept the "scientific" theory of socialism, i.e., Marxism-Leninism. Thus, he feels, they propagate "false socialist theories," such as democratic socialism. Pragmatic development is anathema to Potekhin. At the Dakar Colloquium of December 1962, African theoreticians and politicians sought to define and explain a doctrine of African socialism. Political scientist Aristide R. Zolberg analyzes the statements and results of that colloquium (many of the statements are reprinted in the special issue of *Africa Report* mentioned below) to conclude that a "genuine consensus" emerged in spite of verbosity and lack of precision. In their effort to develop economically, African politicians have reached a doctrinal agreement in such nebulous terms that Zolberg wonders whether their approach to the problems of development can properly be called "socialist." But this question is irrelevant, he feels, because nationalism, Pan-Africanism, and socialism "are woven together to create an overall African ideology of modernization."

The special issue of *Africa Report*, VIII (May 1963), contains three short articles and a collection of quotations drawn from the Dakar Colloquium and elsewhere. Ruth Schachter Morgenthau regards African socialism as a "Declaration of Ideological Independence" (pp. 3-6). It is, she feels, an instrument of "decolonization" setting forth the ideals of Africa's leaders. "How Socialist *Are* African Economies?" asks economist Walter H. Drew (pp. 11-14). He concludes (much as Chandler Morse does in the Friedland and Rosberg collection) that "if the measure of socialism is the extent to which the state controls the production and disposition of goods and services, Africa is probably less socialist than the United States." Thus "African socialism" and "decolonization" ought to be read as governmental slogans justifying "pragmatic but increasingly regulatory economic development policies and should not be assumed to have any necessary connection with rigorous, classical socialism." The third article, by William H. Friedland, has since been expanded and updated in Friedland and Rosberg, *African Socialism*.

In "Political Power and Economic Theory in 'Radical' West Africa," *Orbis*, VIII (Summer 1964), 405-24, Kenneth W. Grundy concentrates on the political derivations and ramifications of concepts such as anticommunism, anticapitalism, neocolonialism, socialism, autarky, and economic planning. From his analysis he concludes that the politico-economic ideas of the leaders of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali are an expression and reflection of their own socioeconomic status, and that their ideas tend to solidify their own claims to legitimate rule.

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Bernard Charles, "Le socialisme africain: mythes et réalités," *Revue française de science politique*, XV (October 1965), 856-84, points up the imprecision and diversity of socialist theory in Africa and the paradoxes this poses. For example, African socialism is at once an affirmation of Marxist, traditional African, and Western values, and yet a denial of them. African socialism is thus presented as an ideological orientation rather than a true doctrine. Its proponents intuitively strive for certain fundamental objectives without really being sure of what socialism means in making policy choices.

Ideology can provide a powerful impetus to economic development. But it has its dangers, too, for it can harden thought and restrict the search for alternatives, as is the case with socialist ideology in Africa today. This is the burden of Elliot J. Berg's article, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXVIII (November 1964), 549-73. Berg feels that socialism is the wrong ideology, in the wrong place, at the wrong time.

Two excellent discussions in French should be mentioned briefly. J.-Y. Calvez, in "Socialismes africains," *Revue de l'action populaire* (Paris), CLIX (June 1962), 657-72, sees a fundamental fluidity in African socialist doctrines, which divides them into two general categories, the Senghor-Dia school of thought and the Mali-Guinea school, each with identifiable characteristics. A lengthy, two-part analysis of Senegalese thought appears in L. Hamon, "La voie africaine du socialisme selon la pensée socialiste sénégalaise," *Penant* (Paris), LXXIII, Part I (January-March 1963), 13-30, and Part II (April-May 1963), 168-81.

Communism and Marxism. Numerous studies have been undertaken assaying the degree of Russian or Chinese Communist penetration into Africa, but their primary emphasis has been on the diplomatic and political impact of the Communist states. Few of the studies have concentrated on the ideological similarities and contrasts although most give brief coverage to this question. Those that discuss ideology focus on current or past Russian or Chinese Communist doctrine rather than on present African ideology. Of the studies primarily concerned with the policy aspects of Communist involvement in Africa, the collection edited by Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford 1963), particularly the essay by Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Union: Political Activity" (pp. 7-48), gives more than brief mention to ideology. Moreover, the profuse and care-

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ful documentation included provides helpful guidelines for further research into the subject.

Three somewhat dated articles do attempt to concentrate on the ideological issues: Walter Z. Laqueur, "Communism and Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII (April 1962), 156-69; Fritz Schatten, "Africa: Nationalism and Communism," *Survey* (London), No. 42 (June 1962), 148-59, reprinted in Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, eds., *Polycentrism: The New Factor in International Communism* (New York 1962), 235-46; and P. Alexandre, "Marxism and African Cultural Traditions," also in *Polycentrism*, 173-96. All seem to stress the fundamental differences between "orthodox" Marxism-Leninism, be it the Chinese or the Russian version, and what they variously label "Afro-Communism," radical nationalism, or "Afro-Marxism."

Two related studies concerned with facets of Communist doctrine as they apply to African political thought are Kenneth W. Grundy, "The 'Class Struggle' in Africa: An Examination of Conflicting Theories," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, II (October 1964), 379-93; and Grundy, "African Explanations of Underdevelopment," *Review of Politics*, XXVIII (January 1966), 62-75. Rather than passing judgment on the relevance of the theory of class struggle to Africa, the first piece contrasts current African comments about it with present Russian Communist views, particularly those of Professor Potekhin. Grundy concludes that with few exceptions (Nkrumah, Awolowo, and others) Africa's political elites either ignore the subject or deny its relevance for Africa. In general, they maintain that there are no classes in Africa, only what some euphemistically designate "strata," which, they contend, are not antagonistic toward each other. The second article is an examination of Africans' own views on their backward status, and a comparison of these views with those of Marxist-Leninist thinkers and also with those currently in vogue in Western capitals. Rejecting most official Western explanations as rationalizations for colonialism, Africa's leaders accept the essentials of Lenin's thesis on imperialism—that underdevelopment arises from colonialism. Only a small number see a direct causal relationship between "monopoly capitalism" and modern colonialism. Even fewer accept the orthodox Leninist account that attributes the genesis of colonialism to the inevitable internal pressure from the interests of "finance capital."

The African Personality and Negritude. Is there such a thing as a distinctive African personality and distinctive African patterns of

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thought? Those who have tried to analyze African ways of doing things invariably answer these questions positively. The roots of the "African personality" are examined in several studies, the most comprehensive being W. E. Abraham's *The Mind of Africa* (Chicago 1962). The author, a Ghanaian professor of philosophy, tries to demonstrate the existence of a distinctive African personality, complete with cosmology, psychic organization, and total outlook, using as his paradigm the Akan society of Ghana. He regards this as the foundation for Africa's acceptance of political patterns of one-party rule, socialist construction, and political militancy. One should also consult Robert W. July, "Nineteenth-Century Negritude: Edward W. Blyden," *Journal of African History*, v, No. 1 (1964), 73-86; and St. Clair Drake, "Pan-Africanism, Negritude, and the African Personality," *Boston University Graduate Journal*, x (1961), 38-51. To these should be added the prolific writings and speeches of Senegalese President Léopold Sédar Senghor, and several papers read to the Third Annual Conference of the American Society of African Culture, held at the University of Pennsylvania in 1960. The papers were published in *Pan-Africanism Reconsidered*, edited by the American Society of African Culture (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962), and include William T. Fontaine, "Philosophical Aspects of Contemporary African Social Thought" (pp. 244-54); George E. Carter, "Traditional African Social Thought" (pp. 255-66); Joseph Ki-Zerbo, "African Personality and the New African Society" (pp. 267-82); Samuel W. Allen, "Negritude: Agreement and Disagreement" (pp. 310-23); and Alioune Diop, "Remarks on African Personality and Negritude" (pp. 337-45).

The political and social implications of the African personality are discussed in the following: Melville J. Herskovits, *The Human Factor in Changing Africa* (New York 1962), especially Chapter 14, "Rediscovery and Integration: The Search for Values"; Ezekiel Mphahlele, *The African Image* (New York 1962); Robert A. Lystad, "Basic African Values," in William H. Lewis, ed., *New Forces in Africa* (Washington 1962), 10-24; "The Ethos of Negro Africa: An Inspissated Consciousness," *Round Table* (December 1960), 7-14; Abiola Irele, "Négritude or Black Cultural Nationalism," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, III (October 1965), 321-48; and most brilliantly in Ali A. Mazrui, "On the Concept 'We Are All Africans,'" *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (March 1963), 88-97, in which the author examines both the "unity of conflict" and the "racial" unity in tropical Africa.

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Pan-Africanism. Closely related to the theme of the African personality is Pan-Africanism. Next to African socialism, this subject has aroused the most interest among students of African ideology. However, much of the research and writing about Pan-Africanism applies primarily to its associational features—current practical attempts to institutionalize the movement for African unity. The works to be discussed here concentrate only on the ideological components of Pan-Africanism.

The two most comprehensive treatments of the subject are Philippe Decraene's "Le Pan-Africanisme," in the series *Que sais-je?*, No. 847 (Paris 1959); and Colin Legum's *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (New York 1962). Both discuss the roots of the concept and its theoretical relationship to other ideas, and both outline the origins and growth of various movements for African unity. The latter study reprints a number of relevant statements and documents.

Although this bibliographical article is concerned with current research of a scholarly nature, the dated but provocative philippic by George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?: The Coming Struggle for Africa* (London 1956), should not be ignored. The late Marxian adviser to Kwame Nkrumah forcefully presents the thesis that Pan-Africanism offers the best ideological alternative to communism on one side and tribalism on the other. Pan-Africanism, he argues, looks above the narrow confines of class, race, tribe, and religion, and seeks first the federation of regional self-governing countries and, ultimately, their amalgamation into a United States of Africa. Since this book can be classified either as a primary source, because of the author's association with Nkrumah, or as an analytical piece, it is included in this survey of interpretive literature.

The volume of the American Society of African Culture entitled *Pan-Africanism Reconsidered* (cited in the preceding section) is regrettably misnamed. It consists, in large measure, of brief statements, addresses, and comments by prominent African scholars and American Africanists. There are a few formal papers included; the most pertinent to the study of Pan-Africanism as an ideological phenomenon are Rayford W. Logan, "The Historical Aspects of Pan-Africanism, 1900-1945" (pp. 37-52); and David E. Apter and James S. Coleman, "Pan-Africanism or Nationalism in Africa" (pp. 81-115); and the comments that follow each piece.

In some respects the most unique and useful contribution to the study of African ideology is Joseph S. Nye, Jr.'s *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). Nye studies specif-

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ically why efforts to form an East African Federation failed in 1963 despite announced intentions to achieve this end by the heads of government of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. The difficult subject he sets out to explore is the relationship of the ideology of Pan-Africanism to actual policy in East Africa. Chapter 1 carefully discusses the relationship of the seemingly paradoxical concepts of nationalism and Pan-Africanism, and Chapter 2 describes the myriad of ideas bound up in the doctrine of Pan-Africanism. Then Nye tackles the social, economic, and political problems of integration in the region, after which he concludes that ideology is a major variable in the integration of Africa. If an ideology appears to weaken one's interests, and yet is such that its popularity is incontestable, then it may undergo reinterpretation or even revision rather than being discarded. Borrowing from Max Weber, he suggests that if particular decisions cannot be traced directly to ideological dictates, ideology at least provides the vocabulary and helps to shape the "world images" which, "like switchmen," will determine the tracks along which action will be "pushed by the dynamic of interests."

The sources of Pan-African thought are also discussed in Charles F. Andrain, "The Pan-African Movement: The Search for Organization and Community," *Phylon*, XXIII (Spring 1962), 5-17; Dorothy Nelkin, "Socialist Sources of Pan-African Ideology," in Friedland and Rosberg, *African Socialism*, 63-79; George Shepperson, "Pan-Africanism and 'Pan-Africanism': Some Historical Notes," *Phylon*, XXIII (Winter 1962), 346-58; and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Pan-Africanism as Protest," in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York and London 1962), 137-51. Classified as more theoretical than historical because they discuss the relationship of the concept to ideas of self-determination, territorial integrity, and competing ideologies are Vernon McKay, "The Concept of Pan-Africanism," *Race Relations Journal*, XXVII, No. 3 (1960), 112-26; and Rupert Emerson, "Pan-Africanism," *International Organization*, XVI (Spring 1962), 275-90.

International Relations. The theory of Pan-Africanism does, of course, deeply affect the foreign affairs of the states of Africa. Other facets of international relations are also strongly affected by political ideology.

Precisely what the role of ideology is in the foreign policies of Africa's states is the subject of a chapter by I. William Zartman in Vernon McKay's *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy* (New York 1966). Entitled "National Interest and

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Ideology as Determinants of African Diplomacy," this paper, like Nye's book discussed above, is not a study of acts but of reasons for acting. However, its scope is general rather than specific. Zartman sees two basic kinds of foreign policies—those based on interest and those based on ideology. The former accept their environment and seek to achieve a place within the state system. The ideological policies seek to create a new environment because they feel insecure within the extant system. Ideology, Zartman feels, is "idealistic, activist, combative, revisionist, visionary, purist, maladaptive, and deductive"; whereas national interest is "realistic, modest, constructive, status quo, evaluative, compromising, adaptive, and inductive." This dichotomy is of course artificial—two extremes of a range of foreign policy criteria. His final pages deal with the gigantic gray area where the bulk of Africa's policies fall. Perceptively Zartman concludes, "The process of using ideology as power until the substantive elements of national power can be built up, and the process of decreeing equality on the basis of ideological rationalizations until states equal in sovereignty become more nearly equal in power are both inventive responses to the powerlessness of new states. . . . In sum, when the frustrations of insecurity reach a more 'normal' level where they can be lived with, African decision-makers can think more in terms of their interests and less in terms of idealist, revisionist ideologies. Obviously, Africa is not yet at this point."

Subjects such as neutralism and nonalignment have been frequently discussed in general, especially as they affect the underdeveloped world, but little work has concentrated specifically on African aspects of these issues. Two such studies, however, are Edward W. Blyden III, "The Idea of African 'Neutralism' and 'Non-Alignment': An Exploratory Survey," in Kurt London, ed., *New Nations in a Divided World: The International Relations of the Afro-Asian States* (New York 1963), 146-60; and Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," in Laurence W. Martin, ed., *Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs* (New York 1962), 93-120.

Four articles explore African attitudes toward various phases of world affairs. Their titles are self-explanatory: Robert C. Good, "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Postcolonial Politics," in Martin, *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, 34-63; Ali A. Mazrui, "African Attitudes to the European Economic Community," *International Affairs* (London), XXXVIII (January 1963), 24-36; Mazrui, "The United Nations and Some African Political Attitudes," *International Organization*, XVIII (Summer

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1964), 499-520; and Kenneth J. Twitchett, "The Racial Issue at the United Nations: A Study of the African States' Reaction to the American–Belgian Congo Rescue Operation of November, 1964," *International Relations*, II, No. 12 (1965), 830-46.

III. Conclusions

One can see from the foregoing discussion that the range of topics and the techniques employed to study them are broad. But if one thinks of tropical Africa as a region with well over two dozen sovereign states, one can also see that the coverage is uneven, often repetitious, and in many cases superficial or nonexistent.

Among specific topics, certain fields have been well plowed—African socialism and Pan-Africanism especially. Although it cannot be said that a definitive scholarly analysis of either of these ideologies has yet appeared, a good deal has been written on each and the coverage is fairly complete when considered in its entirety. A number of other concepts and ideologies—communism, the African personality, negritude, and neutralism—have also been briefly examined. But here the coverage is so sketchy that it merely whets the appetite of scholar and reader alike. It should also be noted that there are some subjects of extreme ideological importance which have not been examined systematically at all. For example, no studies have appeared on African theories of the state. The ideology of single-party rule has been discussed only tangentially. Various conceptions of ultimate political aspirations have not been analyzed. The same could be said of theories of civil liberty and political freedom in Africa. Considering the vastness of the field, the seven chapters and articles mentioned here on African ideas about international relations hardly scratch the surface. With such critical subjects crying out for attention there is wide latitude for potential scholars of African attitudes and ideas.

Political thought in some regions and countries has been well studied and in others has been completely neglected. A rough count of the studies included in this survey indicates the following geographical breakdown:

Africa or tropical Africa	51	Guinea	3
West Africa	8	Nigeria	1
Senegal	6	Tanganyika	1
Ghana	5	British Central Africa	1
Mali	4	East Africa	1

If one also considers the examples and illustrations used in the general

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African treatments included in this essay, the uneven geographical distribution is compounded. Almost all are drawn from the countries mentioned in this listing. One particularly glaring gap is the lack of analysis of the political thought of Jomo Kenyatta. Nothing has been done, either, on political thought in the states of French-speaking Equatorial Africa. Again, there seems to be a wide range of choices for the interested student.

Methodologically, most of the research and writing has employed traditional descriptive and analytical techniques. The bulk of it has concentrated on the ideas of the politically relevant and articulate elites—on either current ideological expressions or their derivations. This overemphasis on description and the history of ideas, with a corresponding neglect of value theory, is somewhat analogous to the "Great Books" approach to political theory so incisively criticized in its Western context by Andrew Hacker.[2] Few behavioral studies of African thought have been undertaken. Because the research problems are staggering, linguistic studies, attitudinal research, and content analysis have gone virtually untapped in African studies. Of these methods, content analysis seems to offer the fewest problems for contemporary African research.

When we ask ourselves "What do we really know about African political thought?" a candid summary answer would have to be "Not very much." The really pertinent questions about political ideologies have rarely been explored. How relevant are the ideas expressed by Africa's leaders and to what extent are they applicable to Africa's need for political and social development? Do the often-repeated themes really reflect the views of Africa's masses? What effect do political ideologies have on public policies on the continent? When these questions are posed, the answers rendered are usually impressionistic. Objective and systematic observations on the actual relationship of ideology to policy are hard to find.

Although the inclusion of over eighty articles, chapters, and books in this survey might suggest the existence of a sizable body of material, in fact the systematic study of political ideologies in Africa is a relatively neglected field. Topically, geographically, and methodologically much needs to be done, although in some cases almost insuperable obstacles confront the student. Nonetheless, a comprehension of the ideas, attitudes, theories, and ideologies of the continent may conceivably help us to order and to understand better the complicated events and phenomena in Africa.

[2] See "*Capital* and Carbuncles: The 'Great Books' Reappraised," *American Political Science Review*, XLVIII (September 1954), 775-86.

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Review Articles

THE STUDY OF ELITES
Who's Who, When, and How

By DANKWART A. RUSTOW*

T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, New York, Basic Books, 1965, 154 pp. $4.50.

Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1965, xxvi, 483 pp. $12.50.

Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, editors, *World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements*, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1965, xi, 478 pp. $15.00.

Dwaine Marvick, editor, *Political Decision-Makers*, International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research, Vol. 2, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, 347 pp. $7.95.

James H. Meisel, editor, *Pareto and Mosca*, Makers of Modern Social Science, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1965, 184 pp. $2.45 (paper).

Marshall R. Singer, *The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon*, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1964, xix, 203 pp. $7.50.

I

THE study of politics is the study of influence and the influential. . . . The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get. . . . Those who get the most are *elite*; the rest are *mass*."[1] Thus, three decades ago, Harold Lasswell tersely presented the reader with some cardinal tenets of his credo as a social scientist. More recently Lasswell in two separate essays (Marvick, 264-87; Lasswell and Lerner, 3-96) has surveyed the progress of a branch of research that he has done so much to foster. "Contemporary studies of elite phenomena in politics," he finds, "are enormously diversified in conception and procedure. The field has abounding vigor, despite, or because of, its conspicuous lack of elegant intellectual unity" (Marvick, 264). Despite or because? Lasswell takes little time to consider the problems of method encountered in past research. Instead, with characteristic verve, he launches into an exploration of the political and scholarly future.

* I am grateful to Annette Baker Fox and William T. R. Fox of Columbia University and to Joseph Goldsen of The RAND Corporation for critical comments on an earlier draft.

[1] Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York 1936), 13.

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Four of the books here reviewed illustrate the variety of concept and theme in recent elite research; by implication they raise some of the broader questions of method that confront the comparative study of politics. Marvick includes four accounts of leadership recruitment and political careers in Western Europe and the United States. Lasswell and Lerner present investigations of Soviet Russian, Fascist Italian, Nazi German, and Kuomintang and Communist Chinese leaders.[2] An essay by Edward Shils (Marvick, 29-56) deals with the political role of Indian intellectuals; and Frey and Singer pursue the research into two other Asian countries, Turkey and Ceylon, where parliamentary institutions have grown somewhat painfully amid rapid cultural and social change. Marvick concludes with two reviews, one by a political scientist (Lucian W. Pye) and one by a psychoanalyst (Daryl DeBell), of Erikson's *Young Man Luther*, with its suggestive hypothesis about the parallel crises of identity in founders of new creeds and in their mass following. [3]

The remaining volumes place the study of elites in its context of social philosophy. Meisel's selection of critical writings on Pareto and Mosca, together with a thoughtful introduction (pp. 1-44), takes us back to a time when elite theory still did have its theoretical unity—and its empirical innocence. (In passing one notes that, whereas the other editors freshly assembled their materials, Meisel's anthology of previously published writings achieves a greater degree of coherence than does either of the other collective volumes.) Bottomore combines a critical examination of earlier elite theories with the sketch of a social theory into which the contemporary study of elites might be fitted.

II

Readers of the volume *World Revolutionary Elites* will encounter Lasswell in all his familiar and endearing poses. There is Lasswell in pontifical robes giving his most casual opinions the resonance of true authority: "By this time the recognition is widespread. . . . By this time most scientific observers realize . . ." (p. 4). There is Lasswell the

[2] The Italian study appeared in the *American Political Science Review* in 1936; the Russian, German, and Chinese ones are Nos. 2, 3, and 8 of the Hoover Institution Studies, Series B: Elite Studies (Stanford 1951-1955). Lasswell's essay "The World Revolution of Our Time" (pp. 29-96) is an adaptation of No. 1 in the parallel Series A: General Studies (1951). Series B, No. 1, Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (1951), No. 4, Maxwell E. Knight, *The German Executive: 1890-1933* (1952), and No. 5, Ithiel de Sola Pool and others, *Satellite Generals* (1955), are not reprinted in the present Lasswell and Lerner volume.

[3] Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (New York 1958).

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superrevolutionary, ready to patronize Marx himself (pp. 71, 73), yet more likely in the end to *épater le bourgeois* than to expropriate him. There is Lasswell the visceral activist whose "verbalization may be broken off at any time and discharged into action," who "slams into action with glandular accelerators" as he "swings toward commitment" (pp. 90f.). Seizing next the wand of science fiction, Lasswell takes us to "the threshold of the era of astropolitics," warns that the " 'paralysis bomb' and its derivatives can make large-scale coercion truly obsolete," and promises not to "overlook the abolition of death by the technique of detecting worn-out molecules and making suitable replacements" (p. 95). And, ready to bow for his exit, here is Lasswell in the costume of a humanitarian Mephistopheles reassuring us that the "policy sciences" of the future will "aid in forestalling" worse, indeed altogether "unspeakable contingencies" (p. 96).

In his bibliographical footnotes in the same volume and in his contribution to the Marvick volume, Lasswell compounds the impression of variety. As in 1936 he still equates the study of elites with the study of politics and still defines the elite as the "influential." But he adds that "any single definition for such a key term . . . is inadequate" (p. 4); and his greater liberality of concept now enables him to claim as students of elites authors across the continents and through the centuries—from Ibn Khaldun to Karl Wittfogel, from Milovan Djilas to C. Wright Mills, and from James Burnham to Robert Redfield.

Behind the versatility of phrase and the copious notes, the reader discerns Lasswell's lifelong desire to formulate the basic concepts of an empirical social science that can serve as a reliable instrument of control. Among some of the contributors to Marvick's *Political Decision-Makers* and Lasswell and Lerner's *World Revolutionary Elites* this aspiration leads to a search for the social atom, for the irreducible unit upon which a mechanistic, quantitative, and predictive science of politics can be built. It is this same impulse that has launched the phrases "decision-making" and "decision-maker" as fashionable synonyms for politics and the politician. If only all political decisions could be identified, tallied, and fed into a computer—then at long last political scientists might rival the physicists in precision, efficacy, and prestige! The goal is exhilarating enough that the difficulties are often ignored. A critic addicted to plain common sense might object that statesmen must not only make but also delay or bypass decisions.[4]

[4] For a further critique of "the illusion of decision-making," see Renzo Sereno, *The Rulers* (New York 1962), 82-88.

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(While pacifists demand to know whether we would rather be red or dead, responsible diplomats have done their best to avoid the need for such a choice.) He might insist that knowledge of such decisions as *are* made must depend on information about the motives of rulers and the alternatives before them, and that such knowledge comes at the end rather than the beginning of laborious research. He might even point out that the politician has no monopoly on decisions, that the private citizen, too, must decide what trade to learn, whom to take for a wife, which suit to wear in the morning, and where to drive the car on a weekend.

Lasswell, unlike many a lesser scholar, is aware of the difficulties inherent in the behaviorist vision—but his remedies are not always persuasive. The last objection, for instance, he removes by a simple act of definition. "Decision-makers" form a "power elite" (p. 12) because "decisions" (as distinct from mere "choices") create situations where "severe coercive measures are actually employed or expected to be employed with success against the challengers of the result" (p. 10). Here we come upon a hard, Hobbesian strand in Lasswell's thought. Lasswell's dedication to humane and democratic values combines with an avid sensitivity to the dangers of manipulation and coercion in modern society—and it is of course in a world of universal selfishness, cunning, and coercion that the notion of a deterministic social science becomes most nearly plausible. Lasswell's man, like Hobbes's, is out to "get" things, indeed to "get the most of what there is to get" ("a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death") and, together with his fellows, he must be kept in check by "severe coercive measures" (a "power able to overawe them all"). The chief difference is that what was once the state of nature now is represented as a condition of civil society. Where Hobbes was confident that a properly constituted authority would redirect men's restless desire toward peaceful arts and industry, Lasswell grimly sees the war of each against all continuing beneath a thin veneer of civilization. And whereas life in Hobbes' state of nature, mercifully, was "poore, nasty, brutish, and *short*," Lasswell, by abolishing death, undertakes to prolong the misery.[5]

The political scientist familiar with the Lasswellian, or behaviorist, rationale for elite study will do well to glance briefly at the work of historians who have employed a similar technique—the social group profile composed of individual careers—though with different preconceptions. There is, for example, Sir Lewis Namier, who shares

[5] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chaps. 11, 13.

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Pareto's and Lasswell's misanthropy, though not their passion for bold hypothesis, as he contemplates British members of parliament who are to him like so many ants.[6] There is Nikolaus von Preradovich, whose feat of sheer "data gathering" on the Austrian and Prussian elites in the nineteenth century is unmatched among behavorial scientists.[7] And there is Sir Ronald Syme, whose work is the more instructive for being sustained by a clear sense of purpose. In his major work *The Roman Revolution*, Syme adopts the "prosopographic" method: he painstakingly assembles available information (and disciplined inference) on the family connections, training, public careers, and private fortunes of office-holders in the time of transition from Roman Republic to Roman Empire. "The period," he explains, "witnessed a violent transference of power and property; and the Principate of Augustus should be regarded as the consolidation of the revolutionary process. Emphasis is laid, however, not upon the personality and acts of Augustus, but upon his adherents and partisans. The composition of the oligarchy of government therefore emerges as the dominant theme of political history, as the binding link between the Republic and the Empire: it is something real and tangible, whatever may be the name or theory of the constitution."[8] More recently, Syme has in a series of lectures extended his Roman perspective to the political leadership of the Spanish and British colonial empires in America—without abandoning his skepticism. "In all ages of history," he insists, "it is desirable to get away from generalizations and study individuals and families."[9]

Syme's warning reveals his purpose only by indirection—much as did Ranke's famous (and essentially hollow) injunction to study history *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*. Their attitude is characteristic of periods of scholarly transition. Both are wary of the misleading

[6] "Here is an ant-heap, with the human ants hurrying in long files along their various paths; their joint achievement does not concern us, nor the changes which supervene in their community, only the pathetically intent, seemingly self-conscious running of individuals along beaten tracks" (*The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, preface to the first edition, quoted here from the second [London 1961], xi).

[7] *Die Führungsschichten in Österreich und Preussen (1804-1918)* (Wiesbaden 1955). The book presents, in only 189 pages, detailed information for nine key years during the period 1804-1918 on the regional and social origins of all ambassadors, provincial governors, members of parliament, ministers of interior, foreign affairs, and war, as well as holders of the highest decorations. One of the author's conclusions: "Austria did not lose the Prusso-Austrian War of 1866 but the German-French War of 1870; for, after the founding of the Empire by Bismarck, naturally far fewer Reich Germans went to Austria, since they now enjoyed, to a more tangible extent, the advantages of a large state in their country of origin" (p. 66, my translation).

[8] *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939), vii.

[9] *Colonial Elites: Rome, Spain, and the Americas* (London 1958), 52.

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and dogmatic abstractions of a previous generation of historians: while abjuring generalities, both are eager to explore new, and equally general, concepts. As Ranke replaced a Hegelian, metaphysical world history with a series of parallel national histories, so Syme's work makes the transition from history conceived as the deeds of leaders or as the principles of constitutions to history conceived as the rise and fall of social classes. And like Ranke and any other good historian, Syme does formulate generalizations of his own—the one underlying his conspectus of *Colonial Elites* being that "the strength and vitality of an empire is frequently due to the new aristocracy from the periphery."[10]

Neither elite studies nor any other method is likely to bring us closer to the deceptive ideal of behaviorism, of politics as a branch of mechanics. But individuals, families, and social groups *are* "real and tangible." They can offer a concrete island of refuge to a scholar who has seen old abstractions founder and who needs time and fresh materials to build a more seaworthy set of abstractions. In the field of comparative politics today, and particularly in research on the totalitarian and the so-called "developing" countries, elite studies hold great promise for a number of reasons. First and foremost, scholars in comparative politics have been turning away from the institutional-legal approach of a previous generation without having developed any new concept of equal scope or validity. Second, all the totalitarian and most of the "developing" countries are indeed oligarchies, being typically ruled by cohesive elites drawn from a party or a military establishment (cf. Bottomore, 63-84). In both types of country, there is an evident discrepancy between this reality of oligarchy and the liberal and democratic tenor of the constitutions; hence the institutional approach is even less fruitful when transferred from Western to non-Western countries. Finally, politics throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America is in rapid flux; hence, while constitutions and other formal arrangements would project a false image of stability, individuals and groups can be seen as a "binding link" from regime to regime.

The leading claim today to the heritage of the institutional-legal approach, of course, is that advanced on behalf of functionalism—whether based on the notion of "decision-making" or on one of the sets of functions proposed by scholars like Talcott Parsons or Gabriel Almond. But I doubt whether the functionalist claim can be sustained. This is not because of the vagueness or banality that is said to be in-

[10] *Ibid.*, 4.

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herent in the search for universal social functions,[11] nor because of the static or conservative bias said to be implicit in the related notion of equilibrium, nor yet because of the danger of confusing correlation and causation.[12] All these difficulties, I think, can be remedied or avoided within a functional scheme. But there are two other difficulties that are more commonplace—and hence all the more serious. First, scholars of varying semantic tastes will not readily agree on the functions that a political system is thought to perform; there tend to be as many functional vocabularies as there are functionalists—and cumulative scholarship becomes impossible. Second, the researchers will find it difficult to fit empirical data into the analytic categories, however these may have been labelled and defined. Many decisions, for example, are made by Asian and African rulers—but the scholar is rarely privy to them. Similarly, articulation and aggregation may perhaps be accepted as basic political functions—but where does articulation of diverse interests stop and aggregation into a common policy begin? Once this line is drawn, how is articulation to be recorded or measured—by column inches of newsprint and volume of circulation? by attendance at outdoor rallies? or by its effect on the rulers? In short, it is difficult to agree what functions to look for and even more difficult to recognize a function when we see it. Hence, instead of fostering exact comparative studies, a functional scheme will at best permit broad intuitive characterizations of political systems.[13]

In contrast to the precision and uniformity that are the elusive aim of the functional schemes, the very flexibility and looseness of the technique of elite study is one of its chief recommendations in the present state of our knowledge (or rather, ignorance) about Asian, African, and Latin American politics. A concept that appeals to men as different as Gaetano Mosca and Lewis Namier, as Ronald Syme and Harold Lasswell, shows promise of permitting cumulative efforts by scholars working in many different locales among the eighty or more "developing" countries. Hence it is *because* of its diversity that the field may be expected to display "abounding vigor." Of course, the field of elite studies, too, has its scholarly requirements—and these

[11] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Political Power and Social Theory* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 101f., 131.

[12] For these lines of criticism see, *ibid.*, 136-38; W. G. Runciman, *Social Science and Political Theory* (Cambridge 1963), 113ff., 120ff.; and Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York 1964), 301 and *passim*.

[13] For one such set of characterizations see Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), which includes a chapter by the present writer on the Near East.

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are at once simple but far from easy. The student may start out by just immersing himself in the empirical data—but there must be enough information to permit such immersion, and the information must be accurate. Having done this, he must then construct some seaworthy hypotheses that will keep him from drowning. Only after his return to terra firma ought he to confront his readers.

III

The empirical studies presented in four of the six volumes here reviewed follow a consistent pattern. Each of them draws a quantitative group portrait of members of parliament, of cabinet ministers, or of party officials. The number of political leaders considered varies widely. In Lasswell and Lerner's *World Revolutionary Elites*, George K. Schueller concentrates on the 27 men who sat in the Soviet Politburo from 1917 to 1949; Robert C. North (with Ithiel de Sola Pool) compares 287 Kuomintang Central Executive Committee members (1924-1945) with 86 members of the Chinese Communist Politburo or Central Committee (1921-1945); Lerner (with Pool and Schueller) examines 538 out of some 1600 biographies in the Nazi *Führerlexikon* of 1934; and Lasswell (with Renzo Sereno) tabulates data on 539 Fascist officials of about the same time. Similarly, Singer in his book deals with 537 Ceylonese legislators (1924-1960). By contrast, Frey reports on 2210 Turkish deputies (1920-1957)—a larger group than is considered by the other five studies taken together—and Mattei Dogan (Marvick, 57-90) deals with as many as 2786 deputies of the French Third Republic (including 427 ministers) and 1112 deputies of the Fourth.

Judging by this sample, there seems to be a positive correlation between an author's assiduity and his methodological sophistication. The contributors to the Lasswell-Lerner volume illustrate some of the pitfalls. Schueller wisely goes little beyond reporting some elementary data on his twenty-seven Politburo members—though it is hard to tell what he adds to the knowledge that can be obtained from standard histories—whereas North repeatedly yields to the temptation to calculate percentages to the first decimal when his entire "population" is only forty-two or forty-four. Lasswell's Italian study includes data on "skills," some of which are rather whimsically defined. "Skill in ceremony," for instance, "includes persons who are masters of etiquette, e.g., aristocrats or retired army officers and high officials . . ." (p. 182). The circularity here is evident: persons are said to have moved into certain posts because of their skills, but these skills in turn

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are inferred from their careers. On the strength of what data the Fascist officials have been grouped into "proletariat," "lesser bourgeoisie," and "plutocracy" the reader is never told (pp. 181f.). Lerner's study of the Nazi elite digests more information than the companion studies and employs a greater variety of statistical techniques—yet his results are hardly more convincing. There are some minor inconsistencies: the total sample is said to include 577 persons, of whom 39 turn out to be double listings (pp. 195, 303). Wavering between two definitions of "propagandist," he now includes 128 of them and now 100 (which of course reduces the total further); and although he emphasizes that the differences between these two groups are "*in all cases* small and in the same direction" (p. 302), he does not say how small or in what direction.

More significant is the manner in which Lerner sets out to prove his central thesis that the Nazis were "marginal men." As a hypothesis the statement is plausible enough.[14] One recalls that Hitler was born on the Austrian side of the border, that Alfred Rosenberg was from the Baltic, that Goebbels had a clubfoot—and in view of their performance one is more than ready to believe that the Nazis were borderline humans in a variety of ways. And indeed Lerner finds that of his random sample from the *Führerlexikon* 56.5 percent are "marginal men," and of the sample of Nazi administrators (or "core Nazis," as he also calls them) no fewer than 82.1 percent (p. 288). But a closer look shows that Lerner used a list of no fewer than twenty-six characteristics of marginality (under thirteen headings) and was prepared to convict his suspects on any *one* of the counts (pp. 304f.). His statistics thus prove no more than that one-half to four-fifths of various Nazi groups were *either* Catholics, *or* did not complete their higher education, *or* married before twenty-one or after thirty-five, *or* were sons of peasants or artisans, *or* served as enlisted men before 1918—to name just a few of the categories. If the reader wonders what proportion of German adult males in 1934 satisfied one or another of Lerner's generous criteria, he will have to do his own supplementary research. It will not take him long, however, to deduce that (by virtue of their religion alone) an even half of today's West German population are definitely "marginal"—and that the percentage of "marginal" Christian Democratic members in the Bundestag today probably exceeds that of Lerner's Nazis.

[14] Lerner fails to mention that the hypothesis was formulated a decade earlier by Sigmund Neumann who suggested that "the modern dictator is a *marginal man* of a marginal group" (*Permanent Revolution*, 2nd ed. [New York 1965], 62). Neumann's study first appeared in 1942, Lerner's in 1951.

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Lerner, aside from his German investigation, has undertaken to sum up the empirical studies of the various authoritarian or totalitarian groups. ". . . Our elite studies," he finds, "[have] shown the mythologies created by the revolutionary elites to be seriously misleading in important respects. The Bolshevik elite was not proletarian; nor was the Nazi elite composed of sturdy German peasants." And, "Again, the impression created by propaganda—that the Kuomintang was led by a landlord clique, while the Chinese Communist Party was a movement of the masses—turned out to be inaccurate and misleading. Our data showed that 'a major portion of the elite of both movements came from quite similar high social strata and responded to similar Western and native influences during their years of growth and education'" (pp. 463, 465). These conclusions are sound enough, though perhaps not as startling as Lerner suggests. For even the Bolsheviks did not claim that Marx and Lenin were factory workers, nor the Nazis that Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels were blond peasants; rather their claims were that the party was the *vanguard* of the proletariat or that it would restore *future* German generations to Aryan strength in *Blut und Boden*. The findings of the Lasswell-Lerner volume, therefore, show rather clearly that a study of social backgrounds can furnish clues for a study of political performance, but that the first cannot substitute for the second.

The two other M.I.T. studies carry the research into "developing" countries. Singer's book supplies some information on legislators and cabinet ministers in Ceylon during the late colonial and postcolonial periods. He shows that since independence (1948), and especially since S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's dramatic election victory in 1956, the level of education and the average wealth of political leaders have somewhat declined, and the proportion of lawyers and (small and middling) landowners has gone up. Ceylon, like most "developing" countries, has few biographical handbooks and Singer's naively inquisitive questionnaire (Was the legislator ever "detained or imprisoned?" "Where does he stand with regard to ayurvedic medicine?" "List in order of preference the three things about Ceylon of which he is most proud"—pp. 151-54) elicited few responses. He therefore resorted to the expedient of relying on a single, anonymous informant, said to be "thoroughly knowledgeable about Ceylonese elites," and of having him fill in questionnaires for "more than five hundred" Ceylonese politicians (pp. 51-52). Apparently neither Singer nor his informant could obtain precise information on age; nor does the study correlate socioeconomic characteristics with party membership. The conclusion "that the emerg-

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ing elite in Ceylon is a synthesis of the traditional thesis and the Western antithesis" (p. 144) is neither very original nor closely derived from his empirical data, nor yet does it do justice to the intense ethnic, political, and cultural struggle that has been fought in Ceylon over the last decade. The combination of haphazard research and trivial conclusion is perhaps not entirely accidental.

Frey was luckier than Singer. He was able to use official directories covering most Turkish parliaments and containing information on each deputy's place of birth, education, knowledge of foreign languages, occupation, and family status. (The Turkish government, with its methodical habits of record keeping, has required deputies since the early Atatürk period to supply this information so as to facilitate rational committee assignments.) But Frey has several further assets that Singer and other students of elites might well envy: in a decade of research on Turkey he has acquired an intimate knowledge of the language, social structure, history, and literature of the country; his use of statistical technique shows great versatility and perception; and he writes in a lucid style equally free from jargon and false flamboyance. Even more important, Frey formulates his hypotheses unequivocally and, in welcome contrast to Lerner, shows consistent regard for the canons of evidence. Some recent books on the politics of Asia, Africa, or Latin America are praised by area experts as solid contributions but shrugged off by the generalist as shallow and descriptive; others are admired for their theoretical brilliance and condemned for their inaccuracy. Frey's is one of the rare works that will satisfy both groups of critics.

Frey's analysis appropriately begins with a chapter called "Education: The Hallmark of the Elite" (pp. 29-72). He finds that "the basic bifurcation in Turkish society between the educated elite and uneducated masses . . . provided Mustafa Kemal with a rather convenient 'halfway house' in the reshaping of the country. He could, to a large extent, forget about the submerged masses and concentrate on solidifying his hold over the dominant intellectual group. . . . Put another way, . . . he *exploited* the educational bifurcation in the society instead of deploring it, as other leaders have often done" (p. 41). During the single-party period, the leaders tended to name candidates who had (in this order of preference) achieved a high level of education, served in high government posts, or held positions of local power in their home provinces (p. 156). As a result, "in a society in which about three fifths of the male population . . . could *not read and write*, at least three fifths of the [members of parliament],

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on the other hand, were *university*-educated" (p. 43). Party competition since the late 1940's, however, set in motion certain "capillary" processes (p. 282). As a result, the "lawyer and the merchant" have replaced "the soldier and the bureaucrat" in parliament and cabinet, and "the deputies have changed from being primarily a national elite group, oriented toward the tutelary development of the country, to being primarily an assemblage of local politicians, oriented toward more immediate local and political advantages" (pp. 195f.). Although the level of education has not much declined, the old bifurcation is under vigorous attack. But Frey reminds us that the Turkish crises of 1960-61 occurred at a level of political development that most other modernizing countries have not yet reached (p. 4).

IV

The student of political elites typically seeks to establish a correlation between political power and social status. He therefore must do three things: identify each of the two correlates and demonstrate a connection between them. Moreover, to make his results meaningful, he will do well to compare them with parallel findings for other times and places.

1. If he selects his politicians according to their formal office, he is back to some of the problems of the institutional-legal approach. Should he compare British cabinet members to the Soviet Council of Ministers or the Politburo—or to some other, more elusive, group? Are the parliamentarians of the French Third and Fourth Republics comparable to those of the Fifth? Or (to take an example from one of the studies here reviewed) did the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, which grew from 24 members in 1924 to 223 in 1945, really remain the same body? Hence does it make sense to make summary calculations for the entire period, assigning the same weight to each member (Lasswell and Lerner, 385, 403, 414)? And were any of these successive Kuomintang committees comparable to the six- or seven-man Politburo or the forty-four-man Central Committee of their Communist rivals?

If instead the student searches for some functional criterion by which to identify the "real" power holders, he is likely to open "a veritable Pandora's box of arbitrary decisions" (Singer, 52). There is also the danger of circularity: to study politics beneath the facade he wants to examine the real leaders, but to do so he must already know enough about the real process to identify them.[15]

[15] Cf. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York 1956), 366f.

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In practice, most researchers take the safer, institutional course. Frey, moreover, is careful to demonstrate, and not just to assume, the power of his group—and for the period before 1960 this argument is fairly convincing (pp. 6-15). Beyond this, he uses consolidated ratings by nine experts to establish the relative power of officials within the assembly.[16] Lerner comes closest to a functional selection, made in this case by the compilers of the *Führerlexikon*—an elegant solution wherever a source of that type is available.

2. The social characteristics to be examined are usually limited by available information. It is easier to ascertain a politician's age, birthplace, and previous occupation than his wealth or the occupation of his father. Any figures given for the legislators should always be compared with the corresponding figures for the country as a whole—a rule that Frey consistently observes in his Turkish study and Lerner conspicuously disregards in his calculus of Nazi "marginality." To insure comparability with other countries, the researcher should abstract from peculiarities of the local culture and follow, wherever possible, the classifications of earlier elite studies. For example, Dogan may be justified in lumping together French officers and priests (Marvick, 67)—two groups that rarely sit in parliament, that often derive from the same social stratum, and that sometimes hold the same opinions—yet for the sake of comparison with Turkey, Ceylon, or even Germany one wishes he had not. Similarly, Frey, who is more interested in a politician's training than in his class origin, does not distinguish between factory workers and industrialists, or bank clerks and bank directors; for the sake of comparison with most other studies, one wishes he had.

3. Frey rightly warns that "to leap from some knowledge of the social backgrounds of national politicians to inferences about the power structure of the society is quite dangerous. Even to proceed from such knowledge to judgments about the political behavior of these same politicians can be treacherous . . ." (p. 157). And Bendix and Lipset, in an earlier review of elite studies, criticized those who overlooked the dangers. "To know who the power wielding individ-

[16] Frey describes fully the ingenious calculations by which he converted these ratings into numerical indices of power for each deputy (pp. 225-46, 443-47). He then tabulates such traits as age, education, and regional origin separately for "top leaders," "middle leaders," and "backbenchers" (pp. 264-68). It turns out that the first two groups deviate from the assembly as a whole in the same direction as (though slightly less than) cabinet members (see diagrams, pp. 279f.)—who of course could be much more easily identified. One wonders, therefore, whether the enormous additional effort that went into these calculations really paid off in additional knowledge obtained.

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uals are is thought to be sufficient; it is a secondary matter to inquire into how they use their power. That they will do so in their own interest is [considered] self-evident, and the nature of that interest is inferred from the status which they occupy." Such a set of assumptions, they rightly conclude, can easily "explain away the very facts of political life."[17]

A striking demonstration that neither social background nor training determines political action is provided by the career of the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, which is only briefly touched upon in Singer's book. Son of a wealthy planter family of the coast, brought up as a Christian and in the English language, he completed his studies at Oxford where he was chairman of the English-Speaking Union. Learning Sinhalese on his return to Ceylon and converting to Buddhism, he won his spectacular election victory of 1956 on the slogan of "Sinhala Only" (that is, the promise to make Sinhalese the sole official language in preference to English and Tamil). His chief supporters were Buddhist small farmers of the hill country; his bitterest enemies the Anglicized planter families. Nor is his case unique: the spokesmen of the Third Estate in 1789 included the Abbé Sieyès and the Marquis de Condorcet; most early Socialist leaders were of middle-class origin; border nationals have often been the most vocal nationalists; Lloyd George did not rule Britain in the interest of Welshmen, nor Churchill of Anglo-Americans—the examples could be multiplied *ad libitum*. Before we can hope to generalize about the influence of social background on the motives and actions of individual leaders, we need many more psychological studies on the model of Erikson's *Young Man Luther*.

Meanwhile, there are a number of ways in which the correlation between politicians and their social background can be made meaningful. First, one can try to salvage the postulate of class interest by applying it not to individuals but to large numbers. A Sieyès or a Condorcet, it may be argued, will perhaps join the bourgeoisie and make quite a stir when he does, but an entire parliament of marquises and abbots is likely to make short shrift of bourgeois interests. The statement in this form certainly is more plausible; yet it is a presumption at best, and the Bendix-Lipset injunction still stands—that the facts of politics must be studied in their own right and not just inferred from the politicians' social background.

Second, it is well to remember that the connection between poli-

[17] Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Political Sociology," *Current Sociology*, VI, No. 3 (1957), 85, as cited in Marvick, 14.

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tics and society is a two-way street. The social composition of parliament may affect the decisions of that body, but even more surely political decisions affect the social composition of a parliament. Dogan found in his study of France that the "Republic of the Dukes" of the 1870's, after half a century of universal suffrage, made way for the "reign of the lower middle class" (Marvick, 73). And Frey contrasts the effect of the "semi-co-optative" process of recruitment during the Kemalist period with the effects of party competition in the 1950's. But here again one must beware of simplistic assumptions. Donald R. Matthews found that in stratified societies such as Britain there is indeed "a tendency to look to one's own class for political leadership" but that in a more mobile society such as the United States voters do not hesitate to choose representatives from a higher class.[18] In Turkey, during the competition between the nationalist movement of Kemal in Anatolia and the Sultan's imperial government in Istanbul (1919-1922), each side tended to give a maximum number of high government posts to those groups from which it received *least* support—the nationalists to civil servants, and the Sultan to military officers—the motive being both camouflage and courtship.[19]

Third, it is possible to shift the emphasis from the social or class origins of politicians to their education, training, and other formative experiences. This, by and large, is the approach favored by Frey, although he pleads for further studies of the process of "political socialization in the broadest sense," and meanwhile expresses himself with commendable caution: "While unacceptable as direct evidence, speculations about the distribution of power based on inferences from social background analysis may nevertheless be useful if viewed as hypotheses or suggestions demanding more explicit confirmation" (p. 157).

Fourth, comparisons over time and among countries can greatly help in the formulation of such suggestions and hypotheses. This may be illustrated by the accompanying table, which I have compiled mostly from the works here reviewed. (I have added some Scandinavian data from two older studies that deserve to be more widely known.) It shows graphically that whereas a majority of Kuomintang and Chinese Communist leaders have been professional, lifelong party organizers, or else military men, elective parliaments in Europe and

[18] *United States Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill 1960), 45, n. 39. Cf. Matthews' earlier study *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City 1954).

[19] See Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics*, XI (July 1959), 527ff.

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Asia are drawn from a wide range of professions. The effects of party competition that Frey observed in Turkey after 1950 recur in Ceylon after 1956: merchants and landowners replace government officials. (Singer reports no data that might show whether local influence also has increased.) In both countries the changes in social composition that have occurred are more pronounced in the cabinet than in the parliament. Yet Turkey also has had a marked influx of physicians and engineers—a group less numerous in the Ceylonese parliament and entirely unrepresented in recent cabinets.[20] It would be interesting to trace the effects of this difference on each country's economic policy.

Finally, a comparative study can establish what traits are common to the parliamentary profession as such, and for what reasons. Frey, noting a prevalence of lawyers in recent Turkish parliaments comparable to that in the United States, France, and several Commonwealth countries surmises "that a Western, multi-party parliamentary democracy gives special sway to persons adept in verbal presentation, superior in their comprehension of the formal and legal intricacies of government, facile at interpersonal relations, . . . and with the stamina and ability to attend to a plethora of organizational and administrative details and duties" (p. 396). The hypothesis is plausible enough; yet the Swedish data suggest a different explanation. In Swedish politics, lawyers are extremely rare. On the other hand, all public officials and employees—from the permanent undersecretary to the municipal street-car conductor, and including teachers in schools and universities—are eligible to run for public office; if elected they are entitled to leaves of absence during the legislative sessions without loss of seniority or pension rights. It is obvious that only a nation with a meticulous sense of role separation can operate such regulations without politicizing its civil service. But since these rules are deeply entrenched in Sweden, and since, next to Australia and New Zealand, Sweden has the highest ratio of government employment in the non-Communist world,[21] political parties can draw on nominees from a vast reservoir of civil servants, university professors, school teachers, and the like. In countries where public employees are barred from active politics, lawyers fill the vacuum—not perhaps because they are

[20] In fact, the Ceylonese figures in my consolidated table refer only to physicians, since Singer did not list engineers. It is not clear whether he found no engineers at all in Ceylonese cabinets and parliaments, or whether he included them in other categories such as "public service" or "business" (p. 171).

[21] Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964), 70f.

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Occupations of Political Elites (in %)

	TURKEY				CEYLON				CHINA			GERMANY	FRANCE			SWEDEN			
	Parliament		Cabinet		Parliament		Cabinet		KMT C.E.C.		C.P. Cen. Comm.	Nazi Leaders	Cabinet	Parliament		Parliament		Cabinet	
OCCUPATION*	*1920*	*1954*	*1920-23*	*1954-57*	*1924*	*1964*	*1924-31*	*1964-65*	*1924*	*1945*	*1945*	*1934*	*1898-1940*	*1898-1940*	*1940-58*	*1867*	*1933*	*1809-44*	*1920-34*
Government, Party	23	9	20	18	37	14	52	14	61	51	46	34			7	15	12	64	49
Education, Journalism	7	12	9	9	6	18	9	14	8	9	4		38	31	21	11	16	2	13
Medicine, Engineering	5	17	9	24	1	9	4	–	..	..	..	35			11	1	–	–	0
Law	13	27	17	33	35	26	22	27	..	..	..		37	25	13	–	0	–	1
Business	13	19	3	12	8	12	4	9	..	..	..	19	14	31	16	16	9	2	8
Agriculture	6	10	6	3	6	26	4	32	..	..	..	5			12	52	40	2	8
Labor	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11	1	3	9	12	–	20	–	2
Military	15	4	29	–	–	–	–	–	26	38	39	3	8	4	2	2	1	30	17
Religion	17	1	9	–	3	–	4	–	..	..	..	–	..	..		3	2	–	–
Other	2	1	–	–	1	5	–	1	4	2	–	4	–	–	7	–	–	–	–
N =	361	537	35	33	86	110	23	22	23	220	44	159	427	2786	1112	190	230	44	287

* Occupational groupings have been standardized and simplified. – means none; .. means none or included in another category; 0 means less than ½%. Percentages have been rounded and therefore may not add to 100. Figures for the Kuomintang have been recalculated to eliminate unknowns. In bicameral systems, "Parliament" refers to the lower chambers.

Sources: Frey, 181, 283; Singer, 171; Lasswell and Lerner, 384f. (China), and 200 (Germany); Marvick, 67, 73 (France); [Uppsala, Universitetet, Seminariet för Statskunskap], *Studier över den Svenska Riksdagens Sociala Sammansättning* (Uppsala 1936), 221; [*idem*], *De Nordiska Ländernas Statsråd* (Uppsala 1935), 22f. (The last two works are vols. 7 and 4 respectively in the series "Skrifter Utgivna av Statsvetenskapliga Föreningen i Uppsala.")

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adept at law-making, but rather because a law practice that can be dropped or resumed almost at will offers a refuge from the uncertainties of periodic election.

Whatever the particular correlations he wishes to establish, the student of elites will do well to classify his politicians into commonsense groupings—men in their thirties, university graduates, natives of Kwangtung, up-country Sinhalese, journalists, West Pointers, noblemen, and the like. He should use categories, in other words, that (a) correspond to some group consciousness among the subjects themselves or that (b) he himself can precisely define. Above all, he should beware of giving to his officeholders a spurious unity by applying to them some vague and ill-defined label. The difficulty of Lerner's fuzzy concept of "marginal men" has already been noted. Somewhat similarly, Edward Shils has asserted that "the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries have created the political life of their countries; they have been its instigators, its leaders, and its executants" (Marvick, 30). And Lasswell finds, even more sweepingly, that the world is in the midst of a "permanent revolution of modernizing intellectuals" (Lasswell and Lerner, 80). Soberly examined, these propositions turn out to be a pretentious way of saying that to enter politics these days, especially in underdeveloped countries, it is most helpful to have received a higher education. For if the intellectuals are defined in some strict sense (e.g., "journalists, lawyers, and educators"—Shils in Marvick, 31), then a great many underdeveloped countries are *not* ruled by intellectuals; and if the term is broadened to include all college graduates, then the statement will remain true whether power is seized by army officers, by civil servants, or by professional party organizers.[22] And in that case, of course, the intellectuals will be found to dominate not just politics but nearly all urban careers, at least in the more developed societies. In New York these days even department stores prefer salesgirls with college degrees.

Although it is difficult to conceive of "the intellectuals" as rulers in Asia or as leaders of a revolution throughout the world, such statements as Shils' or Lasswell's derive a certain plausibility from the

[22] Bottomore finds that Western intellectuals today do not fully qualify as a ruling elite "because they lack any distinctive group organization or ideology" (p. 71); yet the same may be said of the intellectuals of developing countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America. Political competition still is largely confined to the urban educated groups, but that competition is sharp; and ideological tenets like nationalism, social justice, and economic progress are invoked by everyone. Lasswell himself concedes that "intellectuals . . . are not fully conscious of a distinct identity" (Lasswell and Lerner, 87) but does not seem to realize how precarious that makes his construct of the intellectuals as a revolutionary elite.

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echoes they convey of the theories of Marx, Pareto, and others. It is time that we turned to a brief examination of these elite theories which preceded by several generations the more empirical elite studies.

V

It is not really surprising that European sociologists should have started talking of the ruling class, of the political elite, and of perennial oligarchy in the second half of the nineteenth century when the phenomenon of a closed, hereditary oligarchy was disappearing from the European scene. Where oligarchy remained unshaken—in eighteenth-century Britain, or Venice, or Switzerland—no ingenious theory or laborious research was required to find out from what class the rulers were drawn. The revolutions of 1789 and 1848, and the conservative response to them, changed the picture thoroughly. The proclamation of popular sovereignty now sharply posed the question of who among the people really did the ruling. During the slow and painful European transition to democracy between the French Revolution and the First World War, Marx, Pareto, and others elevated to the status of universal principle what were valid enough observations of their immediate surroundings. England before 1832, where landed magnates freely trafficked in parliamentary seats and where the Hobbeses and the Burkes were in the pay of the Devonshires and the Rockinghams, lent support to Marx's notions of the economic base of power and of philosophy as part of the intellectual superstructure. Southern Italy in Mosca's youth was a setting designed to "display parliamentary institutions to their maximum discredit" (H. Stuart Hughes in Meisel, 150). And German Social Democracy under Bebel and Kautsky—a party that relied on the "powerful authority of the middle-class State" to protect it "from the consequences of its own 'revolutionary' speeches"[23]—amply illustrated Michels' view of the "oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy."

Elite theory thus grew as the lengthening shadow of democracy. Theorists, from Marx and Pareto to Michels and C. Wright Mills, measured existing political and social reality against the democratic ideal and found a vast disparity. They differed more in their therapy than in their diagnoses (cf. Bottomore, 30): Marx contended that the disparity could and should be remedied, Michels that it should but could not, Pareto that it neither could nor should. The fourth position—that it could be remedied but should not—of course, had

[23] This is the judgment of Arthur Rosenberg, *A History of Bolshevism* (London 1934), 66.

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been that of the original defenders of the *ancien régime*. From 1789 onward, indeed, these doctrines evolved in logical sequence.[24] French aristocratic exiles cried in anguish that the majority (or rather *la canaille*) had seized power and that this would be the end of religion and culture. Later conservatives like Taine and Burckhardt took courage: the majority had seized power but did not know how to use it—here was the minority's chance to preserve the cultural tradition. Marx outflanked the heirs of the bourgeois revolution on the Left and accused them of having restored minority rule in more brutal and less hypocritical form; but the proletarian revolution, he promised, would do away with minorities and indeed with rule itself. To Pareto, Mosca, and Michels this seemed so much nonsense: minorities have always ruled, they protested (in tones of satisfaction, regret, or dismay), and always will.

A crucial turn along this road separates Marx from later elite theorists. Bottomore reminds us that Pareto and Mosca were arguing not only against the egalitarian pretensions of existing regimes but also against the Marxian promise of future equality. (Max Weber, it has been observed, "became a sociologist in a long and intense dialogue with the ghost of Karl Marx."[25] The same is true of his contemporaries, such as Pareto, Mosca, Durkheim, Veblen, and Toennies.) Marx had stated the correlation between "political decision-makers" and their "social background" with precision: The owners are the rulers, the workers are the subjects. When technology makes one means of production obsolete, the owners of the more up-to-date means of production will overthrow the old ruling class. This process will continue, with politics limping one step behind economics, until technology enables the workers to assume collective ownership and thereby to abolish the distinction between owner and worker, between ruler and subject. The ruling class changes, but it always has a clear, economically defined identity: landowners under one system, capitalists under the next, and proletarians in the transition to the final stage. To Marx's clear-cut theory there corresponded a clear-cut moral attitude. The bourgeois are condemned as exploiters, and scorned as obsolescent exploiters. The proletarians are hailed as the wave of the future which will wash away exploitation once and for all.

Into this simple, forceful doctrine, Pareto, Mosca, and Michels introduced two significant changes. They applied the theory to all

[24] On the importance of Taine and Tocqueville as precursors of elite theory see Sereno's subtle and urbane study *The Rulers*, 8-17.

[25] In the words of Albert Salomon, "German Sociology," in Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., *Twentieth Century Sociology* (New York 1945), 596.

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societies, past and future, and they admitted a number of other bases of power in addition (or in preference) to the economic base. Bottomore rightly considers that this attempt to avoid Marx's empirical errors deprived the doctrine of much of its clarity and suggestiveness (pp. 26, 32).[26] The theory did not become more accurate—only harder to disprove. The ambiguities are fully apparent in a paragraph in which Mosca states his central thesis:

> Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies—from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first . . . with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism.[27]

It is this doctrine which Michels was to call the "iron law of oligarchy"—with evident allusion to Lassalle's "iron law of wages"—and which Lasswell, paraphrasing James Bryce, was to restate succinctly: "Government is always government by the few, whether in the name of the few, the one, or the many."[28]

Generalizations intended to apply to all societies at all times, it has been suggested, are likely to be either trivial or false.[29] Mosca in the span of just two sentences covers both possibilities. He starts with the distinction between rulers and ruled, which the observer may of

[26] The above account follows, in part, both Bottomore and the similar critique in Runciman, 64-86.

[27] Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, ed. Arthur Livingston (New York 1939), 50.

[28] Lasswell, Lerner, and Rothwell, 7. For similar formulations see Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, 168, and *Power and Personality* (New York 1948), 109. Bryce had written that "in all . . . organized bodies of men . . . direction and decisions rest in the hands of a small percentage, less and less in proportion to the larger size of the body, till in a great population it becomes an infinitesimally small proportion of the whole number. This is and always has been true of all forms of government, though in different degrees" (quoted *ibid.* from *Modern Democracies* [New York 1921], chap. 75).

[29] Barrington Moore, vii, 101f.

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course draw in a number of ways. And indeed it is not difficult to think of a definition by which the rulers will always turn out to be the less numerous group. On this score, incidentally, the rulers find themselves in good company with the performers of other specialized functions. There are in most societies fewer bakers than eaters of bread, fewer teachers than students, and fewer clergymen than communicants. But this is not to say that rulers and ruled each constitute a *class* in the usual sense of that word. And just as in most societies the bakers do not eat all the bread nor the parsons maintain a monopoly on piety, so it does not follow that the rulers have a monopoly of power nor that they perform all political functions. These propositions, as Lasswell has rightly observed, are likeliest to hold true in "regimes that are ascendant by the overt use of force" (Marvick, 265)—that is, in freshly conquered societies.

A meaningful elite theory must show that the rulers have some group identity derived from sources other than their political function—from prior group consciousness, from descent, from schooling, from appointment by previous rulers, from economic interest, or the like. But too often an author assumes what he ought to prove, and ends up with a tautology instead of a theory. As Lasswell and Kaplan have said of Pareto's central tenet: " 'Every people is governed by an elite, by a chosen element in the population'; what is said, in effect, is that every people is ruled by—rulers."[30] Another danger is a simple ambiguity of definition—leaving it open whether the rulers themselves are a class (or elite) or whether they are merely the spokesmen or instruments of such a class[31]—and this in turn opens the door to what Robert Dahl has called "an infinite regress of explanations." "If the overt leaders . . . do not . . . constitute a ruling elite, then the theory can be saved by arguing that behind the overt leaders there is a set of covert leaders who do. If subsequent evidence shows that this covert group does not make a ruling elite, then the theory can

[30] Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950), 202. The quotation is from Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and Society* (New York 1935), 246. Cf. Bottomore, 26: "When we ask, who has power in a particular society, the reply is, those who have power"; and the comment by Carl J. Friedrich in Meisel, 177.

[31] Lasswell, for example, defines the elite alternatively (1) as those who wield influence or make decisions (see the quotation at the opening of this review) and (2) "as the collectivity from which active decision makers are drawn . . ." (Lasswell and Lerner, 12). The other empirical studies, by implication, accept the first definition. The second echoes the *Communist Manifesto* in which contemporary rulers are called a "committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." Cf. Friedrich in Meisel, 177.

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be saved by arguing that behind the first covert group there is another, and so on."[32]

A far subtler line of reasoning is adopted by Robert Michels, whose major work amounts to a brilliantly fallacious argument *a fortiori*. Whereas Pareto had inconclusively piled up evidence of aristocracy from here, there, and everywhere, Michels concentrates on the hierarchic, self-perpetuating tendencies among the leaders of European Socialist parties. If even the Socialists, the avowed champions of equality, are hopelessly addicted to oligarchic practices—so Michels' argument runs in essence—what may one expect of bourgeois or conservative parties that do not even pretend to be egalitarian? Michels might have discovered his error if he had pursued his own insight that "organization is the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong."[33] This formula would have helped him understand why the conservative and aristocratic defenders of the old European order generally organized much later and much more loosely than the challengers on the Left. A few years before Michels' book first appeared, a Swedish conservative leader took a visitor on a tour of the country homes of his parliamentary friends. "Now you see—here they all live in their estates and mansions like so many princes," he exclaimed with an audible sigh; "it's no use trying to keep discipline in a party such as this."[34] Michels, that is to say, could have supplemented his evidence of the "oligarchical tendencies of democracy" with converse evidence of the egalitarian tendencies of aristocracy—and upon that double paradox built a more accurate and more comprehensive conception of politics.

Subtle or crude, the fallacies of the elite theorist serve to protect a moral position that is ambivalent and hence inherently vulnerable. Mosca, for example, is rightly outraged at the coercion and crude exploitation that he depicts. But, supposing such to be characteristic of all societies, he retreats from indignation to cynicism. The same attitudes, in varying mixtures, have often been noted in other writers. One of Pareto's critics speaks of his "psychology of the disappointed lover" and finds him, in his later years, "brimful with contempt for the human race" (Werner Stark, in Meisel, 47, 48). Robert Dahl, in

[32] "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, LII (June 1958), 463.

[33] *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York, n.d.), 21. This edition by Dover Publications is a reprint of the English translation of 1915 based on the first German edition of 1911.

[34] Patrik Reuterswärd, quoted in Rustow, *The Politics of Compromise* (Princeton 1955), 167.

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his critique of Mills, observes that the ruling elite model "is simple, compelling, dramatic, 'realistic.' It gives one standing as an inside-dopester. For individuals with a strong strain of frustrated idealism, it has just the right touch of hard-boiled cynicism."[35] Lasswell's characteristic combination of hardheaded realism in assessing the effects of manipulation and coercion in modern society with an almost utopian faith in the possibilities of its rational reconstruction may perhaps be regarded as a special form of the elite theorist's ambivalence. Lasswell has shrewdly exposed some of the fallacies of his precursors; but it is surely significant that he no longer commits himself to any one definition of the elite concept (Lasswell and Lerner, 4) and that he has not, in three decades, found time to relate his propositions about elites very closely to any empirical research. Surprisingly, for example, one of the three Hoover Institution Elite Studies of 1951-1955 that is *not* reprinted in the current volume by Lasswell and Lerner is the one that was intended to introduce the hypotheses and justify the research design of the earlier series.[36]

James Meisel has aptly characterized Mosca's and Pareto's original impulse. "The counterrevolutionary radical will often be a revolutionist *manqué*. . . . Counterrevolution knows the sadness of the morning after" (p. 4). Or as Lasswell himself has said (of historians like Spengler and Toynbee), "Holding himself responsible for every discrepancy between fact and aspiration, man turns against himself as the author of his own betrayal" (Lasswell and Lerner, 30). The elite theorist typically starts out as an egalitarian of more than usual sensitivity and perception and he turns into a relentless critic of democracy because he takes its ideals more seriously and sees its defects more sharply. For this reason no purely logical critique of the elite model is fully adequate: the fallacies and the cynicism stem from a true sense of indignation, from a genuine moral sentiment. Equality is the most widely proclaimed political ideal of the modern age; yet it is the one most imperfectly achieved. Modern organization, in particular, is an ambiguous instrument that is likely to erect new structures of unequal power as it dismantles old ones.[37] Americans, who have espoused the egalitarian creed more ardently and developed organization more highly than have most other societies, are the more readily conscious of that tension. Hence the wide appeal among them of recent books on *The Taste Makers, The Hidden Persuaders*, or *The Power Elite*.

[35] P. 463. [36] Lasswell, Lerner, and Rothwell (cited, n. 2).

[37] The relationship of modernization to equality is considered further in my forthcoming study of political modernization.

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The basic fallacy of this recent genre of writing has been laid bare by H. Stuart Hughes who, in 1954, explained why Mosca's concept of the "political class" no longer applies to "a country like the United States, with a standard of living unparalleled in history and the majority of the population assimilated in habits and attitudes to a vast middle class. . . . It is too rigid to embrace realities of our current society. In a situation in which the locus of political influence is almost impossible to establish, in which authority is diffused among a wide variety of mutually interacting pressure and 'veto' groups, it is idle to speak of a clearly defined political class. In practice the rule of minorities still obtains; but their influence is exerted in so shifting and amorphous a fashion that it cannot be described any longer in terms of a specific ruling group" (Meisel, 160). Two years later, Mills published his *Power Elite*, whose recurrent stridency contrasts with Hughes's sober evaluation.[38]

VI

Bottomore finds Marx's ruling class theorem empirically inadequate in the light both of subsequent and of contemporary evidence; but, as we noted, he prefers it to later, vaguer formulations because of its "greater fertility and suggestiveness and . . . its value in the construction of theories." To separate fruitful theory from empirical error he is ready to surrender "the Marxist view of the concept" of the ruling class "as a description of a real phenomenon which is to be observed in all societies in the same general form, and to regard it instead as an 'ideal type,' in the sense which Max Weber gave to this term" (p. 32). Although he considers the possibility that universal suffrage would move society away from the Marxian model, he doubts that in Europe outside of Scandinavia this has occurred to any great extent. His chief evidence is data on income distribution in Britain, although surprisingly he does not consider whether the continuing inequalities are hereditary or whether there has been circulation among the wealthy (pp. 34f.). Elsewhere he criticizes the definition of democracy as competition among a plurality of elites, which in one form or another has been proposed by Mannheim, Schumpeter, Aron, and (he might have added) Lasswell,[39] and which is probably

[38] By implication, however, Mills concedes from the start that his quarrel is with the power of organization rather than with a specific ruling minority (p. 11).

[39] Following his statement of the iron law of oligarchy (see above, p. 710 and n. 28), Lasswell continues: "But this fact does not settle the question of the degree of democracy. . . . The key question turns on accountability." At the conclusion of his essay in the Marvick volume he asks "how elite studies will affect elites, recog-

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espoused by the majority of Western intellectuals today. Bottomore's objection is that their attempt at reconciling elite theory with democracy yields too much democratic ground to the elitist. His conclusion on this point deserves to be quoted more fully: "The preservation, and especially the development and improvement, of a democratic system of government does not depend primarily upon fostering the competition between small elite groups whose activities are carried on in realms far removed from the observation or control of ordinary citizens, but upon creating and establishing the conditions in which a large majority of citizens, if not all citizens, can take part in deciding those social issues which vitally affect their individual lives—at work, in the local community, and in the nation—and in which the distinction between elites and masses is reduced to the smallest possible degree" (pp. 119f.). Here a student of Asian or Latin American politics might object that Bottomore underrates the importance of political competition in bringing about other democratic developments. I should judge, for example, that Turkey, Ceylon, and India (to consider only three countries mentioned earlier in these pages) have on balance made more progress toward popular education, social equality, and informed civic participation during periods of elite competition than under the tutelary regimes of Atatürk or of the British Raj. But these, of course, are matters for empirical investigation; and in planning further research on the development of democracy, both in the West and in the late-modernizing countries, it will be well to bear in mind Bottomore's basic assumption. ". . . In the conception of democracy as government *by* the people which prevailed during most of the nineteenth century," he reminds us, "democracy was conceived as a continuing process in which political rights, the power to influence decisions on social policy, were progressively extended to groups in the population which had formerly been deprived of them. . . . It was regarded as a movement towards an ideal condition of society in which men would be fully self-governing, which might never be completely achieved, but which democrats ought to strive for" (p. 110).

From Marx to Michels, three generations of social scientists formulated comprehensive statements about ruling classes, oligarchies, and political elites. These theories were suffused with strong sentiments

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nizing this as a special case of how science, and especially social science, affects society"; and emphasizes his own answer: "*To the extent that procedures and results are public and competitive, democratic tendencies are favored, since they foster simultaneous improvement of insight and understanding*" (p. 281).

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of moral indignation and social protest but were sustained by inadequate evidence or were cast in ambiguous formulations. More recently, C. Wright Mills has resumed the earlier critique with renewed fervor. Meanwhile, Harold Lasswell's pleas for the accumulation of precise empirical data presaged a new departure.

Such data over the past thirty years have been assembled in great profusion—mostly on legislators and cabinet members in elective systems, but also on party officials in dictatorships of the Communist or Fascist type. Today, research on the social background of political elites holds particular promise in the study of Asian, African, and Latin American politics, where the institutional approach tends to mislead and the functionalist approach to confuse. The scarcity of biographical data would seem to be the only serious limitation on the possibilities of such research. Most recent students of elites, however, have lacked the intellectual breadth and sophistication of Michels or Lasswell, let alone of Marx. Theories with little factual support therefore have been replaced by masses of facts with little theoretical structure. It is by now obvious that elites are a vast subject; that quantification of social data about them is a technique of potential precision and versatility; but that neither subject nor technique will add to our knowledge except as we ask significant questions of one and manage to answer them by the other. Among recent works, Frey's analysis of two generations of Turkish legislators shows a unique awareness of these methodological problems and opportunities—of the variety of data that may be assembled about elites, of the many statistical relations that may be calculated, and of the cautious inferences that may be drawn from such material. His book thus may well serve as a model for future elite studies in democracies or dictatorships, in Western or non-Western countries.

Careful empirical research alone, nonetheless, cannot answer the fundamental questions that provided the original impulse for the early theories about elites and the later research into their social composition. Bottomore's work has the merit of shifting the argument back to a philosophic plane where questions of epistemology, of ethics, and of empirical fact may fruitfully be considered together. At such a level, the fallacies can be resolved, the cynical poses can be relinquished, and the emotional ardor can be harnessed to programs of reliable research and of effective political action. Bottomore also reminds us that the study of the rulers' social background is only a supplement, not a substitute, for the study of their performance in office—and (we may add) of the effect of that performance on the

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recruitment of future rulers. If this context of interaction between social and political forces is kept in mind, research on elites can contribute to a future comparative theory of political and social change. Bottomore, in sum, has identified more clearly than has any other recent writer the problems that students of elites must resolve before they can combine the theoretical sweep of a Marx or a Pareto with the conceptual clarity and empirical accuracy that sound scholarship demands.

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PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION

By JOHN M. MONTIAS

Michael Kaser, *Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies,* London, Oxford University Press, 1965, 215 pp. £1 15*s*., $4.90.

HERE at last is the first book-length study of Comecon in English. We are beholden to Dr. Michael Kaser of Oxford University for a scholarly, meticulous, up-to-date work, covering the history, the organization, and the practical operation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and including a record of the most recent discussions, as they have transpired in East European publications. The book is the culmination of more than a decade of research on the Soviet bloc carried out by the author as a staff member of the Economic Commission for Europe's Research and Planning Division. This experience, combined with a versatile language background, enabled him to trace the evolution of Comecon and the progress made toward integration from the viewpoint of each individual member of the organization, including East Germany and Hungary, whose attitudes on problems of specialization are less well known than those of, say, the Soviet Union or Rumania. Dr. Kaser also took the felicitous decision to delve into the political background of intra-Comecon conflicts—particularly in the wake of the Sino-Soviet rift—which the reports of the E.C.E., for obvious reasons, must gloss over. His numerous formal and informal contacts with East European officials helped to round out the information from published sources.

With all this preparation and background, Kaser was equipped to write a penetrating analysis of the integration problems of the planned economies. Unfortunately, from my point of view, he chose to concentrate his efforts on the collation of facts rather than on their elucidation. I do not mean that the search for deeper causes is entirely lacking. The book does contain a number of interesting events recorded in the author's account, but they are too often submerged in a welter of details.

One such speculation, at the beginning of the book, ties in with a theme that runs like a leitmotiv throughout the study—the necessity of establishing a rational price system in each country to foster integration in the socialist bloc as a whole. Kaser argues that Nikolai Voznesensky, chairman of the Soviet State Planning Commission in 1949, urged the introduction of an operational price mechanism in

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the Soviet Union and wished to give greater scope to the "law of value"—essentially the influence of prices on producers' and consumers' decisions—in Soviet planning practice. "The implications for Comecon of the Voznesensky approach," Kaser writes, "were trade arrangements based on the analysis of comparative costs and permitting the evaluation of multilateral exchanges" (p. 72). After Voznesensky's dismissal and Suslov's attack on the "fetishism of the law of value," it is fair to assume that "value-guided choice in international planning became equally impolitic." The domestic measures taken in the Soviet Union in 1950, which, in Kaser's opinion, reversed the Voznesensky trend toward greater utilization of the law of value in domestic planning "implied reliance on mandatory, and the renunciation of the permissive, instruments" for Comecon planning (p. 33).

Kaser's hypothesis merits careful consideration but, insofar as it bears on affairs in the bloc as a whole, it leaves me unconvinced. First, one might question whether Voznesensky's reforms, actual or intended, were as far-reaching as Kaser supposes. Could his thinking on the law of value have been radically different from that which prevailed in the rigidly orthodox climate of 1948-1949? Did he intend by his price reform to do more than eliminate the bulk of subsidies in heavy industry and repair the most striking anomalies of the price system? If his ambition, as I suppose, was merely to link producer goods' prices to "socially necessary costs"—i.e., average unit costs in the industry according to the standard Soviet interpretation of the term—then, whatever might have been the advantages of such a reform for domestic planning, it would not have supplied a reliable instrument for measuring comparative costs on an international scale. To achieve the latter aim, prices would have to have been formed on a free market; or reasonable approximations to these prices would have to have been computed by mathematical programing methods or, possibly, by patterning the prices of domestic materials and semifabricates after the structure of world-market prices. In any event, it would not have been sufficient to adapt Soviet prices to the requirements for conducting international trade on an efficient basis; the Peoples' Democracies of Eastern Europe would have had to follow suit. But this was just at the time (1949) when these countries were aligning their economic systems with the rigidly centralized Soviet model, and the planners were concentrating all their efforts on the development of physical planning methods. The satellites could, of course, have been induced to change step in accord with the new Soviet notions, although

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this might have caused at least frictional maladjustments in a period of intensive economic development.

Finally, if I may touch on a point of doctrine not directly related to Comecon, I wonder whether Kaser's interpretation of Stalin's views on the law of value is not somewhat one-sided. Stalin's statements on the subject in *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, published in 1952, do not spell out a clear refutation of Voznesensky's views. In his economic testament, Stalin laid down the somewhat ambiguous principle that the "law of value influences but does not govern" the allocation of resources in the producer-goods sector of the Soviet economy. This phrase was immediately taken up in Eastern Europe, *even before Stalin's death*, by Oskar Lange, Henryk Fiszel, and other writers, as a license for discussing the "influence" in question, which had formerly been denied or ignored. (The first Polish reform of producers' prices, which made a systematic attempt to link prices to costs, antedates Stalin's demise by three months; there was no general reform of prices in 1954 as Kaser implies on page 55.)

Kaser's speculations on the relation of efficient prices to international trade are open to other, more serious, contentions. Although I cannot quote any statement in his book to this effect, I formed the impression on several occasions that, in Kaser's view, the absence of a price system providing a reliable measure of opportunity costs was, to a smaller or to a greater degree, responsible for Comecon problems and particularly for the crisis of 1963-1964 (cf. p. 5). Whether or not this is a fair representation of Kaser's thinking—if it is not, I hope he will pardon me for arguing *als ob*—the issue is important enough to warrant discussion. I agree with Kaser that material-balances planning creates a definite bias toward autarky and I agree also with his carefully worded conclusion that "if the problems of comparability of prices and costs [were] successfully solved, . . . decentralization [would] bring an optimal program within easier reach than by the grand decision of a supranational authority" (p. 170); but I am convinced that the autarkic tendencies on the part of the less developed countries of Comecon, manifested in their reluctance to enter into specialization agreements—and in their frequent violation of these agreements when they have subscribed to them—stemmed from quite other causes. Even the existence of a price system accurately reflecting relative scarcities at each moment in time would hardly have counteracted the protectionist forces at work in the last decade. Essentially, relative costs are either irrelevant when a nation is bent on industrialization along a wide front for extraeconomic reasons—e.g., to enhance

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its prestige, to strengthen its independent military power, or to increase the relative importance of the urban proletariat in a predominantly agrarian country—or they are relevant mainly in a dynamic perspective and involve estimates of future changes in factor productivity, which present prices will not reflect. When the Rumanians claim that, in the long run, they can produce a wide assortment of machines at a reasonable cost, despite the absence of an old industrial tradition, they are projecting forward the productivity trends of the past, according to more or less objective methods. A normally functioning market, in the absence of competitive "futures" prices for all capital goods, cannot be expected to perform this evaluation. In the most decentralized, market-embedded world, the controversy between the developed members of Comecon and the Rumanians would be metamorphosed into a dispute within the directorate of a Socialist International Bank as to whether the Rumanians could repay an interest-bearing loan extended for the development of their machine-building industry.

But we need not look so far ahead. The ultraprotectionist policies of the underdeveloped market economies of Eastern Europe in the 1930's and the systematic (and inefficient) import-substitution policy of Yugoslavia—the most decentralized socialist economy—today leave no room for the belief that there is any simple correlation between the willingness of an economy to open itself to world trade and the extent of devolution of its decision-making authority. (Note as another counterexample the case of Hungary, which, at the time Kaser was writing, was one of the most centrally managed economies of Eastern Europe, yet was deeply, and increasingly, immersed in world trade, its exports alone amounting to a third of national income, according to an official estimate.)

These considerations bring me to the central point of my review—the source of the difficulties that Comecon has experienced in recent years and the prospects for future integration in the socialist commonwealth. While Kaser on occasion touches on the heart of the problem, the differences in the level of development achieved by the Comecon members, I believe he underestimates its significance. He writes, for instance, that "Comecon forms a homogeneous group of moderately developed economies. . . . The per capita national income of Bulgaria and Rumania is about half that of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic with two others (Hungary and Poland) midway between" (p. 159). Behind this relative homogeneity, however, there persist great disparities in level and structure that have a more im-

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portant bearing on trade than does the synthetic figure of national income. In 1958, when the divergences in Comecon first became apparent, per capita industrial production in Bulgaria was estimated at thirty percent and in Rumania at thirty-seven percent of Czechoslovakia's level, which was roughly at par with East Germany's.[1] At that time some sixty to sixty-five percent of the population in these two Balkan countries was still engaged in agriculture as compared to about twenty percent in East Germany and thirty percent in Czechoslovakia. The comparative advantage of Czechoslovakia and East Germany in manufactures and of Rumania and Bulgaria in foodstuffs and raw materials must have been extremely pronounced. Nevertheless, these less industrialized countries insisted not only on developing their own heavy industry but in wrenching their foreign trade away from its "natural channels" to achieve a trade structure similar to that of their richer partners, including a high share of machinery and equipment in their total exports.

The contradictions that these policies engendered first emerged after Stalin's death in 1953. Before that, the industrializing nations of Eastern Europe, including Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, had no choice but to import a large volume of machinery, especially from Czechoslovakia, to equip their new factories, which, as it happens, frequently duplicated capacities already existing in the more developed socialist economies. They had to open their economies to trade in the short run to become more self-sufficient in the long run. As early as October 1957, a highly placed Czech economist, Vladimir Kaigl, identified the origins and proximate causes of the post-1953 recession in Czechoslovakia's trade with Poland, Rumania, Albania, and Hungary as follows:

> In 1951 all the European Popular Democracies raised substantially the targets in their production plans. The rates of growth of heavy industry and of capital construction were significantly accelerated. It became all the more important to establish the right proportions within the socialist camp as a whole. But in the meantime the socialist nations continued to plan, to a large extent, in isolation. This led to the creation of certain disproportions in their economic development—disproportions between industry and agriculture; between raw materials, fuels, and power resources, on the one hand, and processing industries, especially machine-build-

[1] J. Novozámsky, *Vyrovnavání ekonomické urovně zemí RHVP* [The Equalization of the Economic Levels of the Countries of CMEA] (Prague 1964), 23.

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ing, on the other; between heavy and light industry; and as a result of all this between the fund of consumer goods and the purchasing power of the population. When measures were taken in 1953 in the European socialist countries aimed at removing these disproportions and at securing a faster rate of increase of the level of living of the population, a number of errors were committed. Thus in certain countries some people came out against industrialization, and justified their view by propounding the false theory that the production of consumer goods should grow faster than the production of producer goods under socialism. In connection with this some countries cancelled a number of orders for machinery and equipment, which had been placed in other countries. Moreover, the liquidation of disproportions was undertaken by way of large capital investments in agriculture and light industry and by increasing the output of these industries; this was done without the indispensable coordination of plans among countries.[2]

In the quotation above, we should distinguish between what might be called in Marxist terminology the antagonistic and the nonantagonistic contradictions in this historical development. It should have been possible, with even a minimum of good will, to coordinate the investments in agriculture of Rumania or Poland with a change in the profile of Czechoslovakia's machinery output (e.g., from trucks to tractors). What was far more serious was that when these less developed countries reduced the level of their investments in machinery and equipment, they carefully protected their own machine-building industries and let the brunt of the adjustment fall on their erstwhile suppliers. Czechoslovakia and East Germany, which were also intent on pursuing a New Course, needed to import more foodstuffs and textile raw materials to raise the depressed living standards of their populations—just at a time when their markets for machinery and equipment were partially cut off. (Kaigl does not mention that certain long-term contracts for the delivery of agricultural products to Czechoslovakia were also broken by Rumania and possibly by other suppliers in 1953-1954.) The situation was aggravated by the decision taken by several of the less developed countries, including Rumania and Poland, to foist their own machine products on Czechoslovakia and East Germany in payment for at least a part of the orders for equip-

[2] "Bratskoe sotrudnichestvo v mirovom sotsialisticheskim lagere" [Brotherly Cooperation in the World Socialist Camp], *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 10 (October 1957), 35-36.

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ment they intended to place from then on in these more developed countries.

It was not without significance that the most serious disturbance in the bloc in the wake of Stalin's death erupted in the most industrially mature countries, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, which could not readily satisfy the long pent-up aspirations of their large urban populations.

A quotation from another article by Kaigl, published in 1958, testifies to the political significance of the pre-1956 conflicts:

> All this [the unsatisfactory progress of specialization among socialist countries] played into the hands of the bourgeois nationalists in individual countries who wished to bar the way along this path (the only correct path that could be taken), and enabled them to magnify shortcomings and distort them into the mendacious proposition about the exploitation of certain socialist countries by others. It also helped their efforts to misuse the correct tendencies to develop trade between socialist and capitalist countries in order to subvert the principles of the socialist international division of labor . . . and to bring the popular democracies once again under the domination of imperialism. Along with political and ideological factors, economic shortcomings, in internal as well as in external relations, helped to launch the wave of bourgeois nationalism and revisionism that occurred in connection with the events of the fall of 1956.[3]

There was one way out of the impasse reached between 1953 and 1956: a resumption in all the Comecon economies of the high rates of capital accumulation achieved before 1953, which would revive the trade in machinery and equipment among the Peoples' Democracies.[4] Indeed, several Czech economists, including Kaigl in the first article cited, soon began to press for higher investment rates throughout the bloc. From 1958 on, a more or less simultaneous upsurge in investments did occur in all the Popular Democracies, with the favorable consequence that the Czechs had foreseen and looked forward to: Czechoslovakia's sales of equipment to Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary greatly increased. Thus, for several years, much

[3] "Spolupráce se zeměmi socialistického tábora" [Cooperation with Countries of the Socialist Camp], *Nová mysl*, No. 7 (1958), p. 559.

[4] The Soviet Union continued to import machine products from Eastern Europe in increasing volume after 1953, but larger Soviet purchases were barely sufficient to offset the absolute decline in Czechoslovakia's sales to its traditional European partners and could not absorb her *increasing* output of machinery products.

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as in the pre-1953 period, the latent conflicts of interest between the more and the less developed members of Comecon were mitigated if they were not fully averted.

The circumstances of the revival in machinery trade, however, were somewhat different from those that had prevailed in the 1940's and early 1950's. The moderate successes achieved by Comecon in promoting specialization *within* branches of industry did help to eliminate or, rather, to forestall unnecessary parallelism. At the same time, the great expansion of machinery output in the less industrialized nations, coupled with efforts on their part to export a large share of their new production in the socialist market, made the situation less favorable for the traditional suppliers of these products than it had been a decade earlier.

Without an understanding of the developments I have described, it is not possible to judge either the accomplishments of Comecon in expanding trade after 1956 or the prospects for future growth. Kaser claims, for example, that "the expansion of commerce within Comecon can fairly be attributed to the existence of the agency itself, since governments from the very first chose its Sessions to negotiate long-term trade agreements and, from as early as its Fourth Session (1954), discussed production specialization" (p. 118). I do not understand precisely why discussions and negotiations should have the virtue of expanding trade, but I am not concerned with Kaser's reasoning. My substantive objection is that the forces making for a high or a low volume of trade in the socialist common market are to be sought mainly in the rates of growth and the investment policies of its members, rather than in the recommendations of an institution made up of economically sovereign nations. It so happens that conditions for a high volume of trade were excellent in the late 1950's and early 1960's when Comecon's organizational activity was at its highest. This does not necessarily mean that the trade expansion was due to Comecon's efforts. (I do not rule out the possibility that the key decision to step up investment rates was made at a Comecon-sponsored meeting, perhaps that of May 1958, which was attended by all the First Party Secretaries; even if this were the case, it would still be wrong to attribute the weighty consequences of this coordinated decision to the initiatives deployed by Comecon to deepen the "socialist international division of labor.")

Kaser, consistent with his organizational view of the integration process, predicts that "the trade of Comecon members can hardly fail to improve upon its recent expansion" (p. 120). This improvement,

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judging by the context, will be reflected in their increased "trade dependence," presumably in higher ratios of imports and exports to national income. My forecast, based on a totally different conception of the underlying forces at work, is much less sanguine. I believe that we are now entering a period resembling the 1953-1956 slowdown in trade, *pari passu* with the deceleration of the investment programs of the less developed economies of Comecon. Even in the last two years, the market for machinery products in the bloc has shown definite signs of weakness. If present trends continue, as in the post-Stalin period, trade among the Peoples' Democracies will decline relatively, perhaps absolutely. (This depends largely on whether trade in durable consumer goods can absorb some of the slack created by the unfavorable *Konjunktur* for machine products.) Whether or not total trade dependence will rise, stagnate, or fall in Czechoslovakia and East Germany will depend largely on the Soviet demand for East European products, as well as on the Soviet Union's willingness to supply increasing amounts of raw materials for her partners' consumption. If the Soviet Union's investments decline or even begin to increase at a slower rate than does the output of domestic machine products competing with Czech and East German supplies, there may be a contraction even in this outlet, which has so far proved to be the most reliable for the developed socialist nations. Finally, the potential crisis in Comecon's trade will be accentuated if technical progress in Czechoslovakia and East Germany continues to lag behind Western achievements, since purchasers of machinery and equipment in the bloc, including the Soviet Union, will increasingly turn to American and Western European sources of supply to obtain the most advanced technology, which they feel they require.

One might argue with some justice that all this discussion is tangential to Kaser's book, which, after all, is not about socialist trade but mainly about the origins and the evolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. If this was the limited purpose Kaser had in mind in writing his book, he has succeeded admirably. At the very least, the work will serve as an indispensable background for any one wishing to undertake a more broadly gauged study of East European integration.

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A NEW BIOGRAPHY OF SCHUMACHER

By KLAUS EPSTEIN

Lewis J. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965, 390 pp. $8.95.

I

PROFESSOR Edinger has chosen a fortunate moment to publish his biography of the German Socialist leader Kurt Schumacher (1895-1952). In the last years of his life Schumacher was easily the most controversial politician in West Germany, and there could, therefore, be no dispassionate agreement on his historic stature at the time of his death or for some time thereafter. Today, however—only fourteen years later—most of the issues that he so bitterly contested (such as the socioeconomic structure of German society, the Bonn Republic's alignment with the West, the German rearmament within NATO) have all been settled, probably irrevocably, in a manner contrary to Schumacher's intentions. Since his erstwhile followers have with good grace accepted the verdict of the majority of the German people, they no longer invoke Schumacher's name to rally partisans to an unfinished battle. His friends no longer need to blow him up to heroic proportions, while his foes can be charitable to a man whose legacy they have ceased to fear. The time has come, therefore, for a dispassionate biography that seeks neither to praise nor to condemn but only to understand.

Lewis Edinger, Professor of Political Science at Washington University, St. Louis, has performed this difficult assignment in a superb manner. He has spared no pains to assemble written and oral information, and has interviewed about a hundred people ranging from close surviving political associates to Schumacher's relatives, his personal physician, and even the "girl friend" of his Stuttgart years before 1933. The SPD *Parteivorstand* (the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party) in Bonn made much confidential material available to him, and Schumacher's secretary, Annemarie Renger, gave him a copy of Schumacher's annotated appointment calendar for the seven years 1945-1952. It is most unlikely that any new information will come to light to overthrow the picture Edinger has drawn on the basis of such exhaustive sources—although the novelty of his approach, and the controversial character of his judgments, preclude

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his work from being "definitive" in the sense of making additional treatments either unlikely or unnecessary.

Edinger has woven his encyclopedic materials into a well-organized narrative. Three chronological chapters carry the story of Schumacher's career up to 1945: they deal with his early life, where the author emphasizes the psychological consequences of Schumacher's becoming a cripple during the First World War; his brilliant political career in Württemberg between 1920 and 1933, with special attention to the traumatic shock he suffered when the triumph of Nazism abruptly terminated that career; and the decade of imprisonment by the Nazis, during which his will and ability to survive was fortified by a messianic faith that he was destined for leadership in a post-Nazi Germany. Four topical chapters cover the historically important seven years from 1945 to 1952: they analyze Schumacher's interpretation of the German postwar setting, which proved mistaken on all essential points; his role as "monocratic leader" of the revived SPD in which he was brilliantly successful in dominating the party but completely unsuccessful in making it the dominant force in West German politics; his role as "patriotic leader" of the German nation against the "occupation regime," a role that aroused furious resentment among the Western powers without paying dividends among the surprisingly pro-Western and nonnationalist German electorate; and his role as "champion of the common man" in an effort to replace capitalism and authoritarianism with democratic socialism, an effort that failed in the face of the successes of Erhard's "economic miracle" and the attractiveness of Adenauer's paternalistic-authoritarian style of government. Edinger judges Schumacher's *political* career a clear-cut failure (whatever may be said about his moral greatness or inspiring example). Chapter 9—the central chapter of the book—seeks to *explain* this failure in the light of Schumacher's "compulsive-obsessive personality" which blinded him to political reality and led to irrational conduct that was *dysfunctional* in terms of his desired goal of attaining power and remaking Germany.

Though Edinger has written an outstanding biography his purpose is not primarily biographical in the conventional meaning of the term. It is stated, rather, in his subtitle, "A Study in Personality and Political Behavior." Edinger, as a political scientist of the behavioral orientation, is interested in studying the interaction between three factors—personality, political setting, and role behavior; and he is concerned about the applicability of this method to the study of leaders other than the German Socialist. In analyzing Schumacher's personality he

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employs the most modern psychological tools; in analyzing the political setting he is concerned primarily with what "situational factors" make for the political success or failure of different types of leaders; in analyzing political role behavior he uses the time-honored analogy between politics and the theater, with such key concepts as chief actor, counterplayers, role expectation, and so on. Edinger's employment of a disciplined and self-conscious "conceptual framework" unfortunately forces him to use a good deal of the jargon of clinical psychology and behavioral political science, with adverse consequences for the readability of his book; but the gain far exceeds the loss in view of the author's unfailing penchant for asking the right questions and his admirable persistence in finding answers based either upon the best information available or (as in the case of Schumacher's personality development in childhood) upon intelligent and cautious inference from admittedly inadequate source materials.

II

Edinger's interest is centered upon explaining the general failure of Schumacher's postwar career. It was, of course, not all failure. Schumacher succeeded in rebuilding, within a year after the collapse of the Third Reich, a coherent and disciplined SPD, with a large popular following in each of the three Western occupation zones. The party was based largely upon the stock of surviving pre-1933 comrades but demonstrated *some* appeal to outsiders and *some* abandonment of anachronistic Marxist ideological shackles. He frustrated Grotewohl's attempt to build throughout Germany a "Socialist Unity Party"—with the East Zone pattern of domination of a Socialist majority by a Communist minority—though this historical achievement should not be overrated because the attempt, even if temporarily successful, could not have survived the coming of the cold war. He exercised considerable influence upon the provisions of the Basic Law drafted by the Parliamentary Council in 1949, especially the strong position of the Chancellor (which Schumacher expected to fill after the 1949 elections) and the concentration of fiscal powers in the Federal Government rather than in the individual *Länder* (states). (The latter provision was reluctantly accepted by the three Western governments following Schumacher's ultimatum of April 20, 1949.) He drove Adenauer some distance to the Left in the early domestic legislation of the Bonn Republic, as in the famous Codetermination Law of 1950. His greatest achievement was, however, quite unintentional: his in-

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transigent hostility to Adenauer and all nonsocialist forces precluded the formation of a "Great Coalition" between the SPD and the CDU (the Christian Democrats), which was advocated by many during the years 1947-1949. His insistence upon a clear-cut confrontation between government and opposition polarized German political life; but the opposition's basic loyalty to the existing constitutional order was—in sharp contrast to the situation under Weimar—unquestionable. This polarization meant an approach to a *de facto* two-party system under which a constitutional transfer of power through elections became a genuine possibility. That it has so far not occurred is largely due to the misguided *substantive* policies into which Schumacher led, and sometimes even forced, his party; but Schumacher nonetheless made an important contribution to the basic health of the democratic structure of the Bonn Republic.

III

Schumacher's successes were not inconsiderable; but the historian (like Schumacher himself) is primarily impressed by his failure to achieve his basic goals: an independent, reunited Germany with a democratic socialist domestic structure. His failure was due to two basic reasons: his mistaken assessment of postwar realities, and his inflexible personality, which refused to learn from its errors and failed to adapt SPD policy to a course likely to yield success. Edinger ascribes the intellectual failure to "historical memories set in a Marxist though ethnocentric frame of reference" (p. 77)—in short, the application of mistaken Weimar analogies, irrelevant Marxist categories, and an untimely nationalist outlook.

The thinking in terms of Weimar analogies led Schumacher to exaggerate the postwar fascist danger; he too readily affixed the fascist label to all Conservative and clerical forces, and refused to acknowledge the fact that both were quite anxious to make a success of the newly installed democratic constitutional system. Schumacher believed that uprooted and disinherited Germans wanted a charismatic "tribune of the people" like himself (in brief, a "good" Hitler, espousing "good" aims but not eschewing nationalist demagoguery); in fact, however, they wanted a cool, unemotional, somewhat colorless patriarchal leader like Adenauer. Schumacher believed that Marshall Plan aid might lead to results similar to those produced by the American loans of the 1920's whose sudden withdrawal contributed to the collapse of the German economy during the Great Depression.

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The Socialist leader also mistakenly believed—following a long-standing Marxist fallacy—that Germany's lower classes wanted a radical reconstruction of German economic life; in fact they had a desperate craving for the restoration of "normalcy" and were perfectly willing to retain capitalism if it brought economic results. Schumacher failed to foresee the constructive possibilities of Erhard's neo-liberal policies, and made himself ridiculous by constant predictions about looming economic disasters that never happened. He failed to see that *any* form of collectivist economic planning, even that of democratic socialism, had been discredited—however unfairly—by Nazism and communism, and even by the alleged bungling of Attlee's Labour government, not to speak of the brilliant successes of America's postwar capitalism.

Schumacher vividly remembered the power of nationalism during the Weimar period, and the irretrievable damage done to the SPD by its antinational image. He resolved to make the SPD the party of national patriotism *par excellence*—only to find that most Germans had become "good Europeans" in their outlook and wanted above all to win full "acceptance" from the West. Schumacher's needling of the Western powers, and the resultant hostility of Western statesmen toward him, proved a serious political liability; the fact that his passionate desire for reunification contrasted quite sharply with Adenauer's Rhenish provincialism and his valuing Western integration above reunification, proved no advantage in a country where nationalism had subsided following its megalomaniac flowering under the Nazis. The worst handicap to Schumacher's pursuit of power was the image of a cantankerous nationalist who "could not get along" with Germany's newly found Western friends. His constant, almost paranoid, denunciation of a Western-clerical-Conservative conspiracy bent upon buttressing German "reaction" and perpetuating German disunity carried little conviction with the German electorate.

A further liability on the road to power—one throwing a very unfortunate light upon the postwar German mood—was Schumacher's heroic record of suffering under the Nazis. Since the record of most Germans had been—to say the least—far less heroic, they could not *identify* with Schumacher on this crucial point: to do so inevitably led to feelings of uneasiness or, at best, guilt. Postwar Germans certainly did not want a *pro*-Nazi leader, but a man like Adenauer, with an excellent *non*-Nazi record but with no heroic resistance activity and little *conspicuous* suffering, suited their psychological needs perfectly. When Schumacher claimed that the SPD, and more especially,

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that he himself, had an *exclusive* moral right to govern postwar Germany *because* Socialists had suffered under Nazism, he provoked emotions that were certain to prove catastrophic to his political ambitions. His readiness to forgive all "small Nazis," and his desire to win over young Waffen SS men to the Socialist cause, could not cancel the tactical blunder of a claim to political power upon the basis of moral superiority, however well justified.

IV

The erroneous character of Schumacher's analysis of the German postwar situation became apparent after the disastrous outcome of the 1949 elections; yet Schumacher did not change either his analysis or the tactics based upon it. Why did so intelligent and power-hungry a man persist in stupid errors that precluded the attainment of power? Edinger finds the answer in Schumacher's compulsive-obsessive personality, which made conduct objectively dysfunctional for the attainment of political success subjectively functional to the psychological needs of the "inner man." Edinger notes in Schumacher the following symptoms of a compulsive-obsessive politician: a monomaniacal absorption in politics; a compulsion to engage in aggressive conduct; strident and autocratic self-assertion that could not tolerate "equal" personal relationships; extreme touchiness concerning any questioning of his courage, morality, or wisdom; inability to acknowledge error or to apologize for wrong conduct; sharp intolerance and refusal to compromise with antagonists deemed morally inferior; "lone-wolf" isolation that involved extreme self-orientation and the refusal to confide in anyone; and, finally, a messianic conception of his own qualities which was closely connected with a "closed-mind dogmatism" that in turn frequently led to a distorted view of reality because it was marked by *a priori* conceptions of the world. He was impervious to new information incompatible with his prejudices, and clung to stereotyped expectations about how others must behave even if they repeatedly acted otherwise. His rigid internal consistency provided him with a sense of logical mastery, though his empirical premises were frequently invalid; and he showed a compulsive desire to make sharp, unambiguous distinctions between blacks and whites, ignoring the fact that the real world is composed mostly of intermediary greys. Since his behavior was obviously neither psychotic nor pathological in a clinical sense (p. 299), Schumacher occasionally suspected that he was wrong, and this must have led to strong inner tensions; he

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resolved these, however, by clinging all the more strongly to his established "orientation patterns."

Edinger explains Schumacher's irrational conduct as that of "a man compulsively striving to relieve intense personality tensions by means of adaptive mechanisms that had proven effective in the past for maintaining the equilibrium of the personality system" (p. 297). What mechanisms? Militant absorption in political struggle, domination of friends, and provocation of his enemies. Edinger dismisses rival hypotheses that Schumacher's conduct is best explained in terms of megalomania, subconscious guilt feelings, or simply physiological factors, i.e. the continuous pain resulting from bodily harm wrought by Nazi imprisonment (pp. 365-66, n. 49); he develops as the most plausible explanation the existence of inferiority and anxiety syndromes, going back to childhood, which led to a compulsive obsession "to prove himself." Edinger attaches special importance to the need to get away from feminine influences in early life (Schumacher was the only son in a family with three older sisters). The loss of his arm in battle led to a sense of shame and incompetence for which Schumacher tried to compensate through aggressive political self-assertion (his acid political style was notorious even before 1933). The Nazi accession to power proved a traumatic experience to which Schumacher responded by defiantly courting imprisonment when a more prudent man would have gone into exile. His need to assert his masculinity, to be unflinching, dedicated, and aggressive was no doubt enhanced by the degradation of ten years of imprisonment under the Nazis—but Edinger insists that the unfortunate personality syndrome that contributed to Schumacher's postwar failure was already present before 1933. He was not only a victim of Nazism; he was also a victim of his own personality.

This impressive psychological analysis is certainly not *provable* in every point; but it has the great merit of fully explaining what the author set out to explain. The major biographical lacuna is the failure to show how and why Schumacher became a Socialist in 1918 (certainly a very unusual step for the academically trained son of a businessman in Wilhelmine Germany). This biographical gap is caused, no doubt, by simple lack of evidence, since Schumacher was extremely reticent in later life about the crucial years 1915-1920, from his release from military hospital to the launching of his political career in Württemberg. It should be noted, however, that if Schumacher's personality was as compulsive-obsessive as Edinger thinks, he was certainly misplaced in a party run by eminently "normal," complacent, non-

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compulsive, nonobsessive bureaucrats. Would Schumacher's personality needs not have been served better by becoming a monarchist, Nazi, or Communist—more especially since he was always strongly nationalist and radical in outlook? His deliberate option for the SPD was presumably the result of specific intellectual convictions and moral values. It appears to this reviewer that Edinger's analysis of Schumacher's conduct concentrates too much upon psychological compulsions, too little upon intellectual convictions. He does not, of course, ignore the latter altogether; but he certainly does not do justice to Schumacher on his "road to socialism" as a thinking man who deliberately chose socialism from a multiplicity of political alternatives open to him.[1]

To conclude: Edinger has written exactly the book he intended to write. It is without question the best study of Schumacher yet written; it is, in the opinion of this reviewer, one of the three or four best biographies available about any German statesman of the twentieth century; and it is a pioneering achievement in the methodologically new field of the study of political leadership through the use of exact techniques derived from political science and psychology.

[1] The same criticism applies to a somewhat pedestrian study of Schumacher that appeared too late for Edinger to use: Waldemar Ritter, *Kurt Schumacher: Eine Untersuchung seiner politischen Konzeption und seiner Gesellschafts- und Staatsauffassung* (Hannover 1964). This work is valuable, however, for its *systematic* exposition of Schumacher's views on the SPD, German reconstruction, national unity, European security, and his theories concerning socialism, democracy, and the national state. Ritter's approach provides a useful counterweight to Edinger's: whereas Edinger overpsychologizes at the expense of Schumacher's intellectual stature, Ritter strives too hard to present Schumacher as a great thinker. Edinger is sometimes overcritical where Ritter errs on the side of eulogy.

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FOREIGN AID THEORY

Where Do We Go From Here?

By GERALD GARVEY

John Pincus, *Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, 221 pp. $6.50.

THEORIES rarely spring full-blown into existence, unpreceded by a cumulative buildup of organized empirical data upon which generalized observations can be based and against which their validity can be tested. Generations of data crushers normally prepare the way for the single heroic theorist—less dramatic, they, than he; but hardly less important.

The potential value of an exhaustive survey of existing data in the foreign aid cost-sharing field is illustrated by John Pincus's recent book *Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing*. Pincus gives us facts, not interpretation. His volume is not to be regarded as a dramatic rehearsal of new insights. And though theory is badly needed in this area, the book does not pretend to be an exercise in theory. But neither is it, even though its conclusions are nothing if not inconclusive, an unimportant book.

Bacon, in his essay "Of Studies," wrote that scholarship serves three purposes: delight, ornament, and ability. Pincus's little volume will delight few readers. The prose is hard going; the computations are exacting and always painfully explicit; the interminable tabular displays of figures are indeed formidable. But the book will and should ornament the shelves of all scholars interested in the economics and politics of foreign aid. It will be useful not only as a reference and source book, but also as a comprehensive guide to the received literature on the technical economic aspects of the subject.

The use of studies for ability, Bacon suggested, "is in the judgment and disposition of business." It is in this respect that Pincus's book has its real value—in terms of the questions that it raises, and they are many, rather than in terms of the answers that it gives, for these are disappointingly few.

Where do we go from here? What is the agenda, the right ordering of scholarly business in the foreign aid field? Can we continue to rely on technical economics for conclusive findings, or even for valued insights, or must we turn to politics, psychology, sociology, and an-

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thropology? What is the relationship between technical essays like Pincus's—*rich in data, but short on theory*—and the broader questions raised by prominent contemporary political and social commentators such as Henry Kissinger, Barbara Ward, Gunnar Myrdal, Hans Morgenthau? These are among the queries immediately suggested by Pincus's investigation. These are the questions that furnish the main framework of this review.

I

Since the 1920's, economics has been increasingly preoccupied with the construction of formally elegant and logically rigorous theories. Particularly in such microeconomic fields as consumer demand, utility theory, and price analysis, economic theory at the hands of writers like J. R. Hicks and Paul Samuelson has become rarefied, simplified. But, some feel, it simultaneously has become less relevant to the real world.

From its original status as the "dismal science," economics proceeded to elevate itself among—or rather, *above*—all the other social sciences. Economics is now the dazzling discipline. In leading institutions, mathematics was substituted for the more traditional German and French reading prerequisite to the Ph.D. This, plainly, was a brave, and certainly an obvious, manifesto of independence from economics' less theoretically developed, but perhaps more "humanistic," sister disciplines. New techniques worked themselves into the syllabi of graduate economics study, and later even into undergraduate training in the field. Research on game theory, linear programing, and time series analysis produced a corpus of literature both impressive in scope and ambitious in its hopes to establish economics on a rigorous mathematical base.

But the concern of many economists with methodological problems had a hidden cost: it diverted the discipline from a commitment to the full richness, full diversity, and full sensitivity to humanistic values that had characterized the early political economists' writings. Adam Smith and Parson Malthus were, it should be recalled, not economists in any narrow sense. They were moral philosophers and political scientists first.

During the period of The Great Desiccation of psychology and sociology from economic theory, tensions in the developing societies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America necessitated a search for effective strategies of economic development. To translate development strategies into working foreign aid policies, and not less important, to ac-

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count for the unprecedented compounding of prosperity in the developed nations during the post–World War II period, a new focus emerged within the discipline. The stagnation theorists of the thirties passed their torch to the growth theorists of the fifties.

The issues associated with social development, however, are not tractable to simple formulation in mathematical terms. Nor would the hardiest econometrician assert that such issues are neatly describable by even the most sophisticated statistical models. Each hard-won insight into the developing areas' difficulties opened still newer intellectual issues; each new perception introduced new dilemmas of foreign aid policy and practice. These problems required an order of perception and sensitivity not normally associated with mechanistic model-building. It is perhaps not altogether unfair to observe that the recent emphasis on the study of economic development has once again made a social science of economics.

Consider, for example, the range of insights needed to understand the motives behind the United States' annual bestowal of its foreign aid largess on nations great and small, friendly and sometimes not too friendly. Humanitarian considerations count for much in this area, and altruistic motives will doubtless continue to play a major role in determining the pace and direction of U.S. foreign policy. Calculations of international power as well as of U.S. national interest are quite obviously factors too.

Yet another factor is the self-image of the United States. In the Marshall Plan, the Alliance for Progress, and similar programs, the United States has assumed unprecedented responsibilities, and in doing so has viewed itself as having long borne a disproportionally large share of the economic burden both of free-world defense (NATO and SEATO) and of the long-term program to help put emerging Africa, Asia, and Latin America on the road to economic self-sufficiency. To support this belief we now have the authority of the Report of the Clay Committee to the President in April 1963, which Pincus cites: "We are convinced that the burden of sustaining foreign assistance to the less-developed countries is falling unfairly upon the U.S. and that the industrialized countries can and should do more than they are now doing. The present inequity is even more apparent when one adds defense expenditures to economic assistance to determine the national shares in the total expense of protecting and advancing the free world's well-being" (p. 110).

With notable understatement, Pincus argues in effect that the United States, while no doubt innocent of guile in its claims, is still and all

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innocent of knowledge of the real facts. U.S. dominance in carrying the foreign aid burden is a myth, writes Pincus. It is for this finding that the volume is most likely to be regarded as important.

II

During the next decade, Pincus estimates, required—or rather, *desired*—growth rates in the emerging areas will entail increases in net annual capital inflows of $5 billion annually above 1962 levels, and very possibly more than $5 billion. And whence will the needed capital come? Experience suggests that trade volume increases and commodity policy adjustments, together with private investment, can be relied upon to supply only a fraction of the needed sum. Stepped-up economic aid therefore appears to be the only way to fill the deficit.

Unfortunately, total aid is not today being provided in the needed amounts. Nor, in relative terms, are most European countries carrying their appropriate shares of the overall burden. The term "appropriate" is, of course, value-laden. And Mr. Pincus is sensitive to the formidability of the task of giving meaning to the "criterion of equitableness." Despite theoretical uncertainties surrounding income criteria, compounded by woefully incomplete empirical data, Mr. Pincus notes that ability-to-pay measures are finding increasing acceptance in principle as the basis for financing international organizations. But as noted above, he finds that practice conforms most imperfectly to theory. National contributions diverge widely from those suggested by acceptable ability-to-pay standards.

Drawing on detailed studies of data maintained by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Pincus finds that in terms of real cost, the United States contributes significantly less in all aid categories than its DAC submissions indicate. "Other major donors," Pincus reports, "except France, overstate their aid values even more" (p. 142). To the extent that some countries give aid in the form of high interest loans, their actual contributions represent a smaller proportion of gross national product than are revealed by DAC submissions—this by a factor that is particularly evident in the cases of the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Portugal.

Mr. Pincus is the first to avow the inconclusiveness of many of his calculations. And he virtually admits that he has produced less a book than a series of loosely-connected research notes. Thus, he describes the volume as "primarily a study of methods for equitably sharing

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the costs of economic assistance to underdeveloped countries" (p. 1). It is therefore suggested that the reader who is less interested in the basis for aid-demand proceed immediately to Chapter 3, bypassing the first two chapters. Chapter 3, in turn, the author characterizes as being of "limited relevance" (p. 55). This chapter concludes with an exhaustive set of computations whose inconclusiveness leads Pincus himself to describe the entire discussion as largely a "scholastic exercise" (p. 92). Chapter 4, a detailed survey of the burden-sharing history of past international banks and service organizations, ends with the hardly provocative observation, "There are no Marquis of Queensbury rules that still hold fast when money and national interest are at stake" (p. 112).

At this point the book is half done. At this point, and not before, the reader encounters the really significant information—that having to do with the discrepancy between myth and fact in the magnitude of the Western nations' aid contributions—only to find that Pincus has added little that is new to his own previously published and widely accessible research in the area.[1]

Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing underscores the need to appraise both the success and the significance of the recent convergence of technical economics and political theory in the foreign aid field. In an area in which political considerations are of transcendent importance, Pincus tries to dodge most major policy issues. Though he eschews value-charged analysis to the maximum extent possible, it is questionable whether in its place he makes full or satisfactory use of the sophisticated frameworks normally found in international economics: the book is "numbers-rich," but theory-poor. Nor, finally, is it certain that the book is empirically significant. Pincus reaches few conclusions that have not previously been suggested, albeit from a smaller data bank, by prior scholars of international economics.

Why does Pincus manage to give us so few final or definite answers about foreign aid programs or cost-sharing theory? The answer lies in his assumption, followed with characteristic if unfortunate thoroughness through most of his 221 pages, that "it is much more fruitful to draw a dividing line between things that are and are not measurable by a common scale, and consider them apart" (p. 51). One cannot criticize an author for carefully limiting the scope of his work. But to limit the scope to "measurable units" in an area that defies

[1] See, for example, Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XLV (November 1963).

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measurement is not so much to guarantee methodological acceptability as it is to limit the usefulness of the entire work.

The $5 billion per annum figure estimated as necessary to sustain growth rates in the emerging states is highly uncertain. It is also to be noted that this figure is based on considerations of acceptable growth rates as determined by the emerging states' desires, largely without regard to their ability to absorb aid in amounts appreciably larger than those currently being supplied. The estimate is, therefore, highly sensitive to any number of assumptions regarding the aspirations, expectations, and economic capacities of emerging and donor nations alike. But few of these assumptions receive more than the most fleeting consideration.

As a result, Mr. Pincus's elaborate computations and densely packed pages of figures tend to be suffused with an aura of unreality, perhaps even of irrelevance. The important lesson—suggested by Pincus more or less in spite of himself—seems to be that in both donor and recipient states political objectives and values, not economic considerations, are the basic determinants of international burden-sharing practice. *And if of the practice, then why not of the theory as well?*

Mr. Pincus has collected and digested available statistics and findings in a field whose interest matches its manifest importance. In demonstrating the inconclusiveness of these findings, he has perhaps cleared the way for future work of a more productive sort—work that can emphasize theories of international cooperation which pay full heed to the important, but as yet not fully explicit, political and sociological factors that are really decisive.

III

For the past quarter century or so, two theories regarding the roles of individual states in the Western political community have vied for acceptance among statesmen and scholars. The first of these two views, expressed with frequent and well-known eloquence by President John F. Kennedy and perhaps most forcefully advanced in the scholarly literature by Henry Kissinger, Gunnar Myrdal, and Barbara Ward, holds the Western state system in general, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in particular, to be a true cultural community. Kissinger, for example, writes of the European community: "If the states bordering the North Atlantic were to split up into a congeries of squabbling sovereignties, it would be a final proof to all the uncommitted nations of the bankruptcy of the liberal values of the West. The

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United States would find itself isolated not only physically but also spiritually. . . . The source of our culture and our values would then be alienated. Americans, for the first time in our history, would live in a world where we were foreign in the deepest sense, where people would share neither our values nor our aspirations."[2]

Palpably, this view implies high expectations that the developed countries of the West have strong cultural incentives to join together—sharing not only values and aspirations, but also the burdens of assistance to less prosperous states.

This approach holds that states are not merely Hobbesian political men writ large, bent on maximizing their own security—even, if need be, at the expense of the security and prosperity of the others. Rather, it holds that most developed nations are heirs to Western cultural traditions. This heritage outweighs the policy differences that rise and recede among them; the elements of commonness in their interests far overbalance their topical frictions and divergences in policy.

The opposing view—whose most articulate exponent is, of course, the redoubtable Hans J. Morgenthau—sets forth from a more pessimistic concept of the mainsprings of both individual and national actions. Dubbed by its adherents, with more than a little self-consciousness, the "realistic" theory of politics, the Morgenthau position views common action among states as the product of national interest: hard-headed appraisals of the contributions of aid programs to each nation's long-run security interests, not humanitarianism or altruism, provide the only sure guide to policy. Sweeping metaphysical visions (à la Kissinger) of an international *Gemeinschaft* produce programs that are misguided in concept and almost certainly mischievous in their effects.

Economic Aid and International Cost Sharing inevitably draws one's interest to the running debate between the "community school" and the power-politics theorists which has paralleled so much of the U.S. foreign aid policy discussion since World War II. What is the basis for Pincus's apparent assumption that the Western nations are sufficiently bound together by history and destiny that some measure of equitable "sharing" is indicated? Pincus denies us an explicit answer; remaining first and last the technical economist, he makes virtually no reference to the intellectual tradition within which he is working.

There is nevertheless underlying Pincus's work at least implicit acceptance of some notion of an international, and more particularly

[2] *The Necessity for Choice* (New York 1961), 199.

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of a Western, community. The words "cost sharing" in the title of the book assume the existence of a basis for some kind of cooperative action, even if not for an explicit responsibility upon each developed nation to share the burden of economic aid to the emerging nations. How sensitive are questions of the feasibility and desirability of equitably shared aid ventures to the validity of this assumption?

An important aspect of any approach to these questions concerns the diverse motivations for cost sharing prevailing among nations today, as well as the relationship between these motivations and donor nations' historic foreign aid traditions. Pincus hints that there is an interaction, more or less real and more or less significant, between aid levels and such motivations as humanitarianism or national desires for increased commerce, expanded markets, and strengthened security. The humanitarian motivation, for example, Pincus sees as an especially prominent basis of national policy in the case of the Scandinavian nations; commercial motives bulk relatively larger in importance in the cases of Germany and Japan.

At this point—the point where analysis raises questions about the causes and longer-run policy goals and implications of foreign aid—a satisfactory account of the burden-sharing issue must become more than an essay in technical economics. For example, a glance at historical contexts reveals built-in ideological preferences in favor of particular foreign aid objectives within donor nations and particular kinds of welfare goals within recipient states.

Pincus's repeated assertions that France is clearly paying far more than its share by any burden-sharing criterion surely would have gained in depth had they been accompanied by references to French desires to maintain cultural influence abroad. Though aid commitment figures reported to DAC and repeated by Pincus show France as ranking first among donors in terms of aid as a percentage of gross national product, it is by no means clear that France's prominence among Western nations in the aid effort indicates French leadership in terms of contributions to an objective commonly held by the nations studied—and evaluated—by Pincus.

The DAC agreement requires only that participating countries contribute at least one percent of their GNP to the developing nations, and lists no further criteria for the granting of aid. The greatest share of French aid to Black Africa supports French personnel providing technical services abroad. This aid is quite largely limited to the realm

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of cultural affairs, and is conditioned by the requirement that its recipients fall within the French cultural orbit. Under the *Communité Française*, formed in 1958, France agreed to contribute aid to all participating countries. The rule has been one of exclusion as well as of inclusion. When Guinea and Mali refused to join, for example, France immediately withdrew all aid.

It is equally understandable that Canada and Germany, never world colonial powers, should feel less obligation to the emergent ex-colonial states. Then too, the reasons for Germany's limited burden-sharing effort can hardly be appraised except within the context of German foreign affairs during the past century. Indications of a revived German expansionist threat—whether groundless or not, whether manifested by a larger NATO commitment or by a market-expanding increase in private international investment—might open Germany to serious political reprisals. Is German parsimony, as reported by Mr. Pincus, in small measure but the obverse of German prudence?

The tendency to envision aid as both an unquestioned necessity among the developing states and a national objective among the more prosperous Western countries is expressed by Barbara Ward in *The Rich Nations and The Poor Nations*[3] and by Gunnar Myrdal in *Beyond the Welfare State*.[4]

Miss Ward is not so much interested in techniques for developing an integrated international community as she is in the question of the developed nations' moral and economic responsibilities. She invites a hard look at the practical consequences of their failure to date to raise the poorer nations' levels of prosperity. Miss Ward explores the differing patterns of development in the West (rich) and East (poor), suggesting—as the volume before us does not—methods for framing a common policy. Indeed, many of Pincus's empirical observations first gained wide readership in the pages of Barbara Ward. It was she, for example, who estimated the capital investment requirements of a traditional society as exceeding the five percent per annum level, and very likely increasing to between twelve and fifteen percent—figures consistent with Pincus's.

Myrdal is a more thoroughgoing "community theorist," perhaps reflecting the Scandinavian background in which goal conflicts have been most nearly resolved. He assumes the existence of an international "public interest" in a developing international economy, arguing not

[3] (New York 1962). [4] (New Haven 1960).

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that there is a historical cultural tradition that leads to integration, but that the "Great Awakening" of moral consciousness among developed states has lead to a common belief system. Myrdal's conviction that only a substantial degree of economic planning will enable satisfactory development is well known. But planning alone will not do the job. Social integration—a sharing of values as a prerequisite to common action—is essential for international economic integration, and to this extent we may question whether or not Pincus's cost sharing assumption is realistic.

The point raised by the "community school" theorists is really quite fundamental to the burden-sharing question in general, and to equitable distribution of the costs of foreign aid in particular. It goes to the central question of the motivations and incentives of states. Given the existence of a true community of values among the developed states, the burden-sharing issue should be amenable to political solution among the donors in exactly the same way that issues of tax progressivity and wealth-redistribution within states are solved peacefully through the political process. In the absence of common foreign aid objectives, on the other hand, it is doubtful whether the problem is soluble at all. For suggestive treatment of this most crucial of issues, students of international relations will have to search elsewhere than in the pages of Pincus's book.

As on the supply side of the foreign aid equation, so too on the demand side. There are cultural explanations for the differences in the degrees of aid acceptance by developing nations. Pincus's assumption that "from the recipients' point of view . . . the benefits of aid clearly outweigh its costs" (p. 41) seems consistent, so far as it goes, with the findings of other economists, as well as of anthropologists and sociologists, who have studied the question. There is a basic desire for economic change among the developing nations' populations. Many of these nations, however, have but limited cultural capacity to absorb the foreign influence that inevitably accompanies aid.

Standard-of-living improvements are acceptable only so long as they do not necessitate excessive changes in established behavior patterns, so long as they do not too drastically or too quickly overturn too many accepted values. Colonialism in Southeast Asia began with mere financial arrangements; it ended with the European nations in complete social and political control. With the costs of freedom still within their historic memory, is it not understandable that Cambodia, Burma, and Indonesia should reject offers of aid in favor of neutrality?

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IV

If Pincus is *of*, he seems nevertheless not to be *in* the "community school." In his first chapter, he informs the reader that the word "burden" is inappropriate because the aid is "given in exchange for expected benefits" (p. 49)—clearly implying the *quid pro quo* motivation, the rational calculus of gains and costs usually identified with the power-politics approach to international relations. Indeed, if one feature dominates all others in Pincus's writing, it is his firm commitment to a thorough and hardheaded look at the elements of national interests that underlie aid programs—yesterday, today, and (as nearly as he can predict) for the future.

Few would gainsay Pincus's belief that appeals for capital will continue to produce burden-sharing problems. But a query may fairly be raised: Why must this proposition be merely an assumption? Can it not be placed on firmer theoretical ground, setting forth from the realization that burden-sharing questions must be viewed as an integral part of developed countries' long-range foreign policy?

"The West is not forced to spend public funds in the interest of less developed countries," Pincus writes, "but it has made a political decision to do so. Unless it is much more successful than it has been so far in persuading private investors to substitute their funds for official contributions, it will have to carry this burden until the political decision is reversed or the need for external capital passes" (p. 36). Pincus has shown, however tentatively, that this need is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future. Thus, his own inquiry suggests that the requirement to focus on the rationality underlying the decisive political motivations becomes correspondingly more compelling. The point of departure for most scholars interested in this question will not, however, be Pincus's book, but rather the more explicitly theoretical work of the type contained in Mancur Olson's recent and splendid study, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*.[5]

When strictly economic aid (that is, aid not directly related to military or collective security interests) is considered, the relation between cost and benefit in terms of the donor's national interest is tenuous at best—difficult to establish even in principle, and almost impossible to do so in practice. In the alliance field, with NATO as the obvious example, it is not a great deal easier to measure the ben-

[5] (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

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efits that each NATO member receives from its contribution to the alliance. Even if it were, Pincus rightly observes that there would be no necessary relationship between the benefits accruing to each member and the member's ability to pay.

Nor is there any satisfactory technique for appraising the kind of contributions that alliance members should make. Equity and economy of effort, Pincus claims, require some degree of specialization on each nation's part in providing various resources for the alliance—for example, the U.S. provides NATO's major deterrent forces, while the Federal Republic of Germany supplies a relatively (though not absolutely) larger share of the alliance's land armies.

While the present NATO system partially satisfies the specialization requirement, it remains true that the very nature of a military alliance makes it unlikely that specialization can proceed as would be indicated strictly by considerations of economic rationality. Increased use of untied aid contributions within the European partnership, together with a more comprehensive mobilization of European technical assistance resources, would presumably work in the direction of specialization. But in the military field, few nations can be expected entirely to give up the broad base required for their own war potential in order to achieve in appreciable degree the efficiencies that attend specialization and division of labor.

Conceding Pincus's claim that there is no theoretically adequate means of establishing a satisfactory criterion of equity in burden-sharing, there are nevertheless a number of considerations that help us to predict what nations *will* do, even if not what they *should* do.

Where, as in the case of military alliances, there is an apparent basis in self-interest for nations faced with a common adversary to bind themselves together for mutual defense, both the stability of the alliance ("stability" in the normal sense of economic analysis) and the probable apportionment of the cost burden will tend to depend on two factors. The first of these, as Olson points out, is the extent to which defense can be regarded as a public good—that is, a good which, when produced by one member of the alliance, is shared without cost by all other members. Second is the degree to which the nations perceive their security to be put in jeopardy in the absence of a common effort.

In NATO, the deterrent value of United States strategic nuclear forces is, on the assumption that American promises to aid a threatened ally will be honored, a public good. The deterrent effect of U.S.

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missiles and bombers is shared fully by all the NATO allies. Thus, every new missile and bomber produced by the United States for its own needs adds to the advantage of all the allies as well, regardless of whether these allies help defray the costs of the new systems. None of the other NATO nations, therefore, has any economic incentive to spend one additional cent for bombers or missiles of its own.

On the other hand, it is plain that if the deterrent should fail and the Western allies were to become involved in a major war on European soil, then the war-fighting capabilities of the men and matériel provided by the United States would not be equally shared by the other NATO nations. A missile intended to deter can do its job regardless of who purchases it, regardless of where it is located. But the usefulness of a howitzer or a tank in combat is restricted to the immediate area in which the weapon is operating. In an international climate in which fighting is envisioned, therefore, the NATO allies are under strong incentives to carry a larger share of the collective burden, simply because they do not get a "free ride" from the United States.

This goes some distance toward explaining such inequities in NATO burden-sharing as in fact today exist. Despite widely publicized efforts by the United States to build both a strategy and a force posture capable of supporting a strong conventional war-fighting capability in the NATO area, some Europeans have maintained with equal firmness and have made equally public a preference for relying on nuclear capabilities to deter Soviet aggression. If deterrence biases NATO planning, it is no less to be expected that the economic logic of the "free ride" will be felt, and burden-sharing questions will plague the alliance.

The conclusion clearly changes, and changes drastically, if the commitment of the major contributor, the United States, to mutual defense is abandoned. The free ride depends, as noted above, not only upon the existence of U.S. nuclear forces capable of deterring Soviet attack. Equally essential is the assumption that the United States will come to the aid of its allies in the event of an attack in Europe, even an attack not associated with Soviet strikes on the continental United States. If the credibility of the American commitment should ever come seriously into question, then the European nations would have a much stronger incentive to provide their own deterrent and defense forces.

V

One sentence in Pincus's book more than any other summarizes the lesson of his efforts. Speaking of the difficulty in determining the

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degree of progressiveness that is appropriate for international as well as national taxation, Pincus observes, "Economic analysis, never having been able to answer this question satisfactorily, has delivered it over to politics" (p. 60). What is true in the case of progressive taxation seems no less applicable to most other areas of foreign aid policy. Important data and important insights are to be found in essays in technical economics such as that represented in the book under review. But major breakthroughs in the state of our theory must await sophisticated analysis of social, psychological, and political influences on national incentives and motivations.

Writing in an early issue of this journal, the economist Charles E. Lindblom of Yale observed, "Judging by their common practice of applying the term 'political theory' to what in other disciplines would be called the history of doctrine, it would appear that to many political scientists political theory has only a past—no present, no future."[6] Similarly, judging by the inconclusiveness of so many of Pincus's findings, as well as by their virtual irrelevance to the most significant questions of national motivation and incentive, the thought occurs that technical economic analysis can perhaps offer significant lessons in the future study of international burden-sharing—but that at present it provides little insight, nor has it, in the field of cost sharing, much more of a past.

This brings us full circle—back to the theme of The Great Desiccation in economic theory with which this review began. It also brings up what is perhaps the crowning irony in the recent history of economics. In the 1920's a concerted effort was made to eliminate psychology from economics. Yet in the field of foreign aid, the most fruitful theoretical advances are to be made by building upon such work as has already been undertaken by the members of the "community school" and the power-politics theorists—essentially psychological and political analyses of the motivations and incentives that underlie national action and policy. In this sense, Pincus's book is not to be regarded as a turning point in our knowledge; but perhaps it can be made to serve as a starting point.

[6] "In Praise of Political Science," *World Politics*, IX (January 1957), 241.

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CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICAN POLICY

By JOSEF KORBEL

Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965, xi, 203 pp. $5.95.

"THE Cold War in Europe has lost its old meaning," claims Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski in the opening sentence of his slim and thought-provoking book; he then proceeds to prove convincingly that policies which shaped the destiny of Europe in the 1950's are badly outdated in the 1960's, hindering, in fact, progress toward a reconciliation between the two antagonistic parts of the Continent.

The tragic hot war in Vietnam has become the focus of American political activities, blurring our vital national interests in European affairs and blinding us to promising prospects of change in the crucial East-West relationships on the European political scene. Absence of a pressing crisis over the divided Germany tends to dull the political acumen of Washington and its sensitivity to this problem, a problem that cannot be solved by an indefinite perpetuation of the status quo but, rather, one that demands our careful initiative. Western Europe, though basking in the sunshine of prosperity and renewed confidence in its own national vitality, is still in continued need of the American shield of security. Last but not least, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have witnessed in the recent past significant and suggestive changes not only within the individual countries but also in their mutual relations and in their contacts with the West, changes that require a reevaluation of the American position and a new approach.

Unlike many other scholars, Brzezinski sees these three paramount questions—the division of Germany, Western Europe's revival, and the release from the suffocating past of new energies in Eastern Europe—as one closely interrelated problem, one that invites a fresh, integrated concept and novel, coordinated steps, free from the shackles of outmoded clichés.

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I

Few scholars, if any, anticipated in Stalin's time any significant prospect for a change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. "The Greatest Teacher of Mankind," to use only one of the deifying epithets, instructed his pupils in a methodology of politics characterized by utter uniformity and absolute centralization of all aspects of life. His truth of "scientific socialism" not only brooked no varied interpretations of past and current happenings but also possessed an equally scientific recipe for the future. The satellites were ordered to follow identical methods and to imitate Soviet goals. In addition, in their relations with the Soviet Union they were reduced to the impotence of dwarfs vis-à-vis an omnipotent giant. The countries that had once enjoyed a tradition of political, economic, and cultural contacts with the West were now cut off from this beneficial experience and were required to orient themselves almost exclusively on Moscow. Their trade with Russia in 1937 had amounted to only eight percent of their total foreign commerce; in 1953, it reached eighty percent, a figure that spoke eloquently of their almost total dependence upon the Soviet Union. Cultural life, which to these nations had been for centuries an object of tender care and a source of great pride (arts and literature were frequently a telling weapon in their struggle for independence) succumbed to a humiliating process of russification. Any discussion was stifled, and one could hear or read only declamatory statements that originated in Moscow.

However, "terror as a system of power is a delicate art," as Merle Fainsod put it, and it renders diminishing returns if not applied in carefully measured and diversified doses.

Lenin's dictum that "without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" was long forgotten by Stalin, and his treatment of the satellite countries was governed by the theory of counterrevolutionary, stagnating, absolutist rule.

This writer had a long conversation with Milovan Djilas in March 1948 about the problem of relations among the Communist states. Djilas mused in his typical, original, and poetic way: "The top leaders of the Communist parties are now studying the principles which should govern the mutual relations of people's democracies. Personally, I am of the opinion that a period is forthcoming, and it may last several decades, when the individual Socialist states will develop independently but closely linked together. They will form a bouquet of Socialist flowers bound by common ideals but of different scents because

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of their different tradition, culture, economic standards, and ways and means of solving their political and economic problems. Lenin's theory dealt with the question of how to materialize socialism by different approaches, but as in his time there was no other Communist state besides the Soviet Union, he did not envisage the problem of what the relations should be among countries which have established communism already. *This is a new idea which I am studying now.*"[1]

Djilas did not finish his study, and the problem continued to plague the Soviet world. The conflict between the Soviet and the Yugoslav Communist parties brought it into the open and, in George F. Kennan's view, originated, besides the Communist victory in China, a trend that finally led to the current polycentrism in the Communist movement.[2]

It is evident that Khrushchev, after the brief period of Malenkov's "new look" that distinguished itself by ideological confusion and economic chaos, became aware of the necessity of reforms in both the Soviet Union and its relationship to other Communist countries. After a courtship with Tito in 1955, he enunciated the following year at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU two new theorems that ran contrary to Stalin's policy: the equality of the Communist parties and states, and the right of every country to pursue its own path toward socialism. He was, of course, less than sincere in these escapist pronouncements which were forced upon him by the complex issues of his own struggle for supremacy in the Soviet leadership and the calamitous heritage of Stalin's rule. Nevertheless, they were understood by some East European principals, in the words of a Polish journal, as a "green light" to ascertain their own national interest.

What ensued needs only cursory recapitulation. From the Poznań uprising, through the intraparty upheaval in the Polish Communist ranks and the Hungarian national revolution, to a numberless series of manifestations of diverse political, economic, and cultural interests—intensified and accelerated by the Chinese-Soviet rift—all these developments, punctuated by Khrushchev's attempts to win recognition of Soviet leadership, only compromised the implementation of his theory. The allegiance to an all-embracing Marxism and the pragmatic necessity to respond to individual national needs produced conflicts that have led scholars to abandon usage of such terms as "satellites" and "Soviet bloc" when analyzing these developments.

It was in 1936 that Nikolai Bukharin met Hamilton Fish Arm-

[1] Josef Korbel, *Tito's Communism* (Denver 1951), 337.
[2] Kennan, *On Dealing with the Communist World* (New York 1964), 37-38.

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strong in Paris. With "complete assurance, Bukharin explained at length that national rivalry between Communist states was an impossibility—'by definition an impossibility' " because they would be governed by "the consensus of Marxist truth," and "the unity and harmony of Communist society were not a theory but 'eine spontane Realität.' "[3]

In fact, however, with the seats of power located now in many Communist capitals (and no longer limited to Moscow), varied, mutually contradictory interpretations of the theory replaced the consensus of Marxist truth, and the "spontaneous fact" of harmony and unity collapsed under the pressure of centrifugal forces which caused, to use Richard Lowenthal's words, "a disintegration of a secular faith."

II

It is against the backdrop of these momentous changes that one can attempt to evaluate Professor Brzezinski's latest work. True, most scholars have recognized the significance of these changes, and have offered new analytical insights, but few of them have dared to offer conclusions and practical policy recommendations. Brzezinski has, so to say, "leaped over the Iron Curtain" to see Europe as an entity and to suggest as an alternative to its partition a series of cautious, conciliatory moves in which the United States could and should play a leading role. He would be the first to admit the speculative nature of his reasoning, but one does welcome its lucidity and its imaginative quality extending well beyond conventional thought.

Neither Eastern nor Western Europe has been satisfied with the status quo. Both camps are divided within themselves, searching for their national individuality. In Eastern Europe, the Rumanian example of opposition to Moscow became contagious because "it was a classic in graduated defiance" (p. 23) and the Soviets had no choice but to respect this self-assertion. In contrast, the sudden changes in Yugoslavia in 1948, and in Poland and Hungary in 1956, invited a violent Soviet reaction. Today "international politics have returned to East Europe and, by the same token, East Europe is returning to international politics" (p. 25). This is one of Brzezinski's key observations, which he supports by pointing to restrictions of Soviet influence in the area as well as to the area's expansion of contacts with the West. Accompanied as this development is by a process of ideological erosions, nay even ideological demoralization, renewed cultural vigor,

[3] Armstrong, *Tito and Goliath* (New York 1951), ix, x.

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economic reforms, and even criticism of some essential aspects of Marxist theory, nationalism has demonstrated its ascendancy over the artificial lure of proletarian internationalism. It has done this, however, without necessarily opening a path toward democratization.

Of all these forces contributing to the fragmentation of Communist thoughts and actions, one perhaps needs additional attention: the factor of intellectual revival and of moral reevaluation of a kind. It is difficult to weigh the significance of the "great debate" about such immeasurable phenomena—as, for instance, against concrete acts of economic reforms—but in the countries in which intellectuals have traditionally made the principal thrust for progress, their current intensive engagement in critical appraisal of some philosophical aspects of Marxism may herald further promising prospects. "To shift the emphasis from revolution to evolution, from institutionalized terror to an institutionalized respect for the dignity of the individual, from the expectation of universal conflagration to peaceful coexistence, from Lenin to the young—not the old—Marx . . . is after all no mean undertaking," states one analyst, although in somewhat exaggerated terms.[4] To plead for a "socialist humanism," for a "human man," not a "mass man," is indicative not only of the long road the new Marxist (and is it still Marxist?) generation has travelled from Stalin's degenerative brutality but also of the moral dilemma the Communist regimes have created.

Parallel to this moral exposure, many Communist philosophers have also addressed themselves to the problem of alienation which undermines the sense of responsibility and cohesiveness in the Communist society and which, according to Marx, was characteristic only of the capitalist system.[5]

This change, accompanied by a similar though still retarded development in the Soviet Union, invites rethinking of the West's attitude to the Central and East European countries. Western Europe, naturally more familiar with the area than is the United States, has already recognized the significance of the change and the opportunity it offers.[6] Visits at a high level have been exchanged, and trade and cultural contacts have been expanded. General de Gaulle coined the phrase "Europe to the Urals" and tries to capitalize on France's tra-

[4] Edmund Demaitre, "In Search of Humanism," *Problems of Communism*, XIV (September-October 1965), 30.

[5] See, for instance, Adam Schaff's book *Marxism and the Individual*, as reported in the *New York Times*, December 25, 1965.

[6] See, for instance, Michael Gamarinkov, "Eastern Partners for Western Businessmen," *East Europe*, XIV (September 1965), 17-24.

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ditional friendship with most of the countries in the region. Even Germany, the key country in East-West European relations, limited as she is in the range of diplomatic activities by the self-imposed Hallstein Doctrine, has worked toward a rapprochement. As long ago as 1960, a committee of the Bundestag examined the question of East European–German relations and in June 1961 the Bundestag voted a resolution calling upon the government to pursue a policy of reunification and friendly relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The German Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schröder, recently recommended a flexible policy, possibly even extending diplomatic recognition to the East European countries, without, however, impairing the Hallstein Doctrine.[7]

Nor has the American government been heedless of the changes in East Europe, but it has been slow in formulating practical policy conclusions. In fact, argues George Kennan, somewhat forgetful of the historical perspective, we have been trapped by our own past policy that created the division of Europe and are now limited in using in a positive way the polycentric developments in East Europe.[8] From containment, followed by futile declarations on liberation, we have finally taken cognizance of evolutionary opportunities—a cognizance marred, however, by such inconsistent acts of Congress as first to extend, then deny, and then extend again to Yugoslavia and Poland the most-favored-nation clause. Dean Rusk, while acknowledging the changes in Eastern Europe and encouraging their further evolution toward national independence, stated realistically, however, that our capacity to influence these trends was very limited.[9]

President Johnson has advocated a policy of hastening "the slow erosion of the iron curtain," of building bridges and increasing "the flow of peaceful trade between Eastern Europe and the United States."[10] In a communiqué signed in December 1965 with Chancellor Erhard, he confirmed this policy,[11] apparently making, however, a lasting relaxation of tensions in Europe and in West-East relationships conditional upon progress toward reunification of Germany—an approach that is the reverse of Brzezinski's recommendation.

Professor Brzezinski suggests a number of steps in the process of "peaceful engagement in Europe's future" and in the move "from confrontation to cooperation" to end her partition. In his opinion, the

[7] "Germany Looks at Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIV (October 1965), 15-25.
[8] Pp. 45-49.
[9] *Department of State Bulletin*, L (March 16, 1964), 390-96.
[10] *Congressional Quarterly: Weekly Report*, XXIII (May 14, 1965), 940.
[11] Johnson-Erhard communiqué, *New York Times*, December 22, 1965.

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United States cannot disengage itself from Europe. (Here he differs with George Kennan who has advocated for years a qualified military disengagement which he has seen as a precondition to an East-West rapprochement.) Nor can Europe end partition, according to Brzezinski, as a result of her own policy. "This partition can only be ended if American-Soviet confrontation in Europe is gradually transformed into cooperation" (p. 132). The Soviet Union must not be alienated by the efforts of expanded social, cultural, and trade contacts; on the contrary, it should seize upon them as an opportunity for a meaningful, constructive, peaceful coexistence.

Such scholars as Kennan and John C. Campbell, as well as such statesmen as Dean Acheson, support Brzezinski's reasoning (although Campbell does so rather cautiously, and Acheson proposes a different procedure starting with private discussions).[12] Kennan, however, warns particularly against a policy of demanding "political concessions as a *quid pro quo* for normal commercial transactions . . . for Communist countries will never yield to overt demands of this nature."[13] Not that Brzezinski would subscribe to such a simple-hearted approach; he does, however, suggest using trade as a political lever by extending American economic assistance whenever an East European country increases its independence from Moscow and vice versa (p. 154).[14] He further suggests extension and simplification of travel, goodwill construction programs, extension of scholarships, exchange visits by prominent persons, promotion of multilateral economic ties at different levels between the two parts of Europe, and invitations to European powers, including the Soviet Union, to join in formulating an all-European economic development plan. In all these steps, America should provide an inspiring initiative and leadership.

III

However, Brzezinski's book should be chiefly valued—it should be said again—for its relating of the West's policy toward an all-European cooperation to the problem of German unification. Differing with Kennan, who sees in an acquiescence in the fact of two Germanies a decisive step toward East-West accommodation, "a regrettable necessity of the present epoch . . . to be left to the healing hand of time,"[15]

[12] Campbell, *American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead* (Minneapolis 1965), 106; Acheson, "Europe: Decision or Drift," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIV (January 1966), 205.

[13] P. 32.

[14] Joseph Rothschild identifies himself with this policy of "awards." See his *Communist Eastern Europe* (New York 1964), 90.

[15] P. 48.

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Brzezinski sees in the unification a principal goal leading in turn toward a general East-West pacification—not by the old-style Adenauer policy of pressure but by a gradual rapprochement with Eastern Europe and Russia, by removal of their mistrust and fear of Germany, and by isolation of East Germany. Once normal relations with Eastern Europe are established, the existence of East Germany becomes an anachronism and possibly a matter of embarrassment to Moscow. To hasten this end, we should promote a German-Polish reconciliation and face the reality of the Oder-Neisse boundary without, however, endangering friendly relations between Washington and Bonn. As a first step, the United States might open a consulate in Szczecin or Wroclaw, then initiate a NATO pledge not to use force to change the boundary, issue a solemn declaration by the President expressing the desirability of ending the German-Polish feud, and finally work toward the recognition of the present frontier "at the moment that Germany is reunified" (p. 143).

This procedure must not jeopardize West Germany's close cooperation with the West and would have to be preceded by a German nonpartisan declaration renouncing territorial claims—a demanding assumption considering the German internal political scene and politics in general. For Germany, the reunification has become, according to Brzezinski, the principal problem, a contention that is disputed frequently by other observers who, when speaking of German reunification, have become fond of using in reverse Gambetta's famous statement, "Parlons-en toujours, n'y pensons jamais."

German statesmen have themselves softened in their position on the Polish-German boundary. Schröder, for instance, stated that West Germany could not express herself *now* about a question that can be settled only at a peace conference.[16] The Federal Republic's Minister for Refugees, Johann Baptist Gradl, recently went a step further, stating that the boundary of 1937 would not have to be restored in every detail, and adding that while a peace treaty would have to be signed by a government of a unified Germany, its substance could be negotiated beforehand. A settlement could not be achieved without sacrifice, he stated, nor on the other hand could Germany consider such sacrifice without guarantees of security.[17]

Only recently, on March 25, 1966, Chancellor Erhard took another step toward normalization of West Germany's relations with the

[16] P. 20.

[17] *Der Spiegel*, XX (January 17, 1966), 22-28. Richard Lowenthal reflects a similar opinion in "The Germans Feel Like Germans Again," *New York Times Magazine*, March 6, 1966, 44.

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Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, seeking friendship in particular with Poland and Czechoslovakia. He offered an exchange of declarations renouncing use of force in international disputes and a standstill agreement on, and a phased reduction of, nuclear weapons on both sides of the Iron Curtain within a general plan of European security and preservation of the balance of power. He asked for an equitable solution of the German question, confirming, however, his government's position on the boundary problem, i.e., a willingness to negotiate after the reunification.[18] Such declarations signify progress, but they still must sound rather timid and unpromising to the Polish government which is not eager, as Brzezinski rightly states, for a settlement because of its own political position on the home front.

Under these circumstances, American initiative must be cautious and limited. However, officially, we do not seem to have made any progress. We continue to repeat such generalities as "We must work for the unification of Germany," though admittedly recognizing in a somewhat vague way the need to meet "the history-laden concerns that all understand."[19] Or, we state, together with Chancellor Erhard, in an equally conventional fashion, our "strong determination to pursue all opportunities for attaining as soon as possible the common objective of the peaceful reunification of Germany. . . ."[20]

If the key phrase is "all opportunities," pursuance of them is not immediately apparent. Yet, Brzezinski believes that by isolating East Germany and capitalizing on the new climate in the other countries of Eastern Europe the situation can be made ripe for new bold steps toward an all-European settlement which would eventually include Germany's reunification.

Henry Kissinger also supports a policy of isolation of East Germany (as Lowenthal does) and a "common [Western] conception of East-West relations."[21] However, he starts from different premises and reaches in some respects different conclusions. He does not underestimate the importance of Communist ideology, as Brzezinski seems to do, and warns against the ostensible Soviet love for peace. Without a common policy and a specific program, and with every allied leader (De Gaulle in particular) giving the impression that he can solve the East-West problems, the West has embarked on a suicidal course containing "a series of time bombs."[22]

[18] *New York Times*, March 26, 1966.
[19] President Johnson's statement, May 7, 1965, in *Congressional Quarterly*, 940.
[20] Johnson-Erhard communiqué. As Lowenthal says, "The mere occasional repetition of ritual declarations in favor of [reunification] is not enough" (p. 47).
[21] *The Troubled Partnership* (New York 1965), 189. [22] *Ibid.*, 206, 209.

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In contrast to Brzezinski, Kissinger believes that "Germany is growing more vulnerable to Soviet cajolery or Communist blackmail"[23] as her increasing national consciousness tends to lead her toward a policy of independence, though not quite toward a revival of the Rapallo relationship. Campbell, however, does not exclude a "Soviet-German deal,"[24] a prospect that is not anticipated by Brzezinski nor by many other scholars, although one should not ignore the emotional aspects of the frustrated aspirations of German people to unity.

Nor does Kissinger subscribe to Brzezinski's hypothesis that détente will facilitate the unification of Germany; on the contrary, it may lead Moscow to the conclusion that it has become unnecessary.[25] In this view, he is supported by Alfons Dalma who believes that détente "in the perspective of the German circumstances . . . reveals itself as a dangerous and not ineffective tactic and weapon of Soviet cold war strategy" and only helps to solidify the Soviet ties with Eastern Europe.[26]

IV

A juxtaposition of Brzezinski's book and some thoughts of a few other scholars only points to the complexity of the problems we face when trying to move from the dead-end policy of status quo. Any offered approach carries the inevitable burden of speculation and uncertainty; in any course the United States may take, it must inexorably consider the multitudinous influences and positions over which Washington has limited or no control. Brzezinski's book, however, has the strength of flexible propositions and a dynamic spirit, a quality the administration seems to lack, as its attention to the explosive issues in Europe as well as to their solutions is impaired by the crisis in Southeast Asia.

[23] *Ibid.*, 208.
[24] P. 106.
[25] P. 212.
[26] In Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West* (Baltimore 1964), 118.

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I

A COUNTRY characterized as the greatest threat to world peace is viewed with a set of attitudes that are complex and often contradictory. "The enemy" is not only hated and feared, but he also exerts a peculiar fascination, so that the viewer sees him either beset by fatal flaws or filled with superhuman determination and capacity, or both. In the kinds of questions we raise about an "enemy" and the answers we give, we are in danger of reflecting as much about our own psychological state as about reality.

Now that the cloak of "Devil Incarnate" which Russia inherited from Germany and Japan has been passed to China, it is common to think of China in cataclysmic terms. Since China has produced a nuclear explosion and achieved a moderate economic growth rate, the frightened are preoccupied with the question of whether China (which not too long ago quietly gave up hope of surpassing England in steel production within the next fifteen years) will soon have the economic capacity to take on the combined might of the U.S. and the USSR. At the same time, to those preoccupied with finding fatal flaws, no flaw has seemed more obvious and more basic than the failures in agriculture which arose during the Great Leap Forward. Because of "rigid ideology" and an excessive population, so the argument runs, China cannot meet its needs for agricultural production and hence can never make rapid economic progress. To be sure, each of these two common stereotypes, though contradictory, has a kernel of truth. But at a time when a proper understanding of China is of critical importance, preoccupation with the haunting nightmares and devastating flaws only complicates the issues.

It is refreshing then that Professor Walker, in his *Planning in Chinese Agriculture*, has been able to look past these stereotypes and the cold-war rhetoric on both sides of the bamboo curtain to examine how

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Nevertheless, China's decision to collectivize in 1955 was a sudden one, and within one year virtually every farm household was brought into an agricultural producer's cooperative. Enough documents have been published by the Chinese to indicate that prior to the end of July 1955 there had been debates even in the very highest circles about how fast collectivization should proceed. In early July 1955, in the first major publication detailing the First Five Year Plan, Li Fu-ch'un, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, had cautioned about the need to proceed slowly. According to this announcement, one-third of the peasant households were to be incorporated in lower-stage cooperatives by 1957. Before the end of the same month, Mao announced a much more rapid program of collectivization, and by the end of 1956 ninety-seven percent of China's peasants were in cooperatives, mostly higher-stage cooperatives. No policy between 1949 and 1955 more clearly bore Mao's personal imprint nor enjoyed his fuller participation than the decision to collectivize. Mao ended the debate in his classic speech of July 31, 1955: ". . . Some of our comrades are tottering along like a woman with bound feet, always complaining that others are going too fast. . . . This is not the right way at all; it is wrong. The tide of social reform in the countryside—in the shape of cooperation—has already reached some places. Soon it will sweep the whole country."[2] It did.

[1] This comparison is being systematically explored by Tom Bernstein of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University.

[2] Reprinted in the Foreword by Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank to *Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).

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Behind the decision to collectivize at this time were concern for raising production and for obtaining enough grain and industrial crops from the countryside to supply the expanding cities and the army, fear that some farmers were approaching the disaster level because of lack of grain, and fear that the revival of the power of richer peasants might make collectivization more difficult as time passed. The spring of 1955, with its severe grain shortages, had frightened many leaders. The plan for unified buying and selling of grain had first been introduced in late 1953. This program had greatly raised the amount of grain procured by the state but because the quotas had been so high, many farmers in early 1955 faced disaster because of shortages of grain for their own use. In other areas, farmers had failed to deliver their quotas. The original delivery quotas had been based on "normal expected yield" so that peasants would be motivated to produce more without worry that the excess would simply be absorbed by the state. But the claims of lack of food by many peasant households in early 1955 forced the regime to start the "Three Fix" campaign, which not only set quotas for (1) buying and (2) selling but also attempted to obtain accurate (3) production records to ensure that each household had the minimum necessary grain. These production records were not easy to obtain since individual peasants were likely to understate their production; moreover, individual peasants had become very resistant to turning over grain following the heavy 1954 collection. Collectivization could ease the collection problem and ensure that each household was given the necessary minimum. Furthermore, there were grounds for believing that in the long run collectivization might lead to increased agricultural yield. Fragmentation, as Professor Walker makes clear, wasted land and impeded the adoption of new management techniques and the extension of irrigation and water conservation techniques. Furthermore, evidence available to the leaders made it clear that rich peasants were not joining cooperatives because they thought they could do better outside. There was a sense of urgency in collectivizing based on fear that the gains of land reform were gradually being dissipated as the rich peasants were gaining power in the rural areas, as they had in USSR. If rich peasants continued to gain power, the capitalist path would become increasingly attractive, making eventual socialization much more difficult.

But the regime had no illusions that collectivization could avoid short-run problems and dislocations. Indeed it was immediately after a very successful harvest had been reaped and stored that Mao felt free to announce the speed-up of collectivization. Collectivization in

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1955, by most accounts, went more smoothly than in the Soviet Union, but Professor Walker makes it perfectly clear that collectivization caused serious problems in China as well. The sudden reorganization of agriculture led to considerable resistance on the part of those who felt they stood to lose from collectivization. To ease the problem, collectivization was handled in two stages. In the earlier stage, the lower-stage cooperatives, the members were to be paid partly for the property used by the cooperative (land, animals, and so on); in the higher-stage cooperatives members were to be paid only on the basis of their labor. To ensure that cooperatives were in the hands of those who stood to gain from them, the regime took great care in handing the positions of power within the cooperatives to the poorer peasants. Yet the sudden reorganization of farm households into cooperatives, the loss of private ownership, and the pooling of labor under the direction of politically reliable local leaders who were not necessarily the most competent in dealing with agriculture production inevitably led to dislocations. Even according to Chinese Communist figures, there had been 101,718,000 pigs in 1954 before the speed-up in collectives and 84,400,000 in 1956 after collectivization. The killing of livestock in turn affected the availability of fertilizers.

With collectivization, as in USSR, most of the land was turned over to the agricultural producer's cooperatives to manage, and only a small part, about five percent of the arable land, was retained by the peasant households as private plots for raising vegetables and livestock for their own use or sale. With the disruptions of collectivization, the private plots were important in providing food, income, and stability to the peasants. Although in fact the private plots were at first much smaller than the five percent guidelines permitted, and their produce probably accounted on the average for only a little more than ten percent of the caloric intake, they did make an important contribution in balancing the diet. Indeed, in various parts of the country, they provided a source of income which amounted to as much as fifteen to thirty-four percent of the peasants' total income.

Nevertheless, the dislocations and disaffections caused by the rapid collectivization provoked criticism of overzealous cadres who limited the peasants' land. An atmosphere of anxiety dominated the highest levels of officialdom at the Eighth Party Congress in mid-1956. Animals had been dying from neglect; cash income, despite the private plots, was very low; fertilizer was in short supply; the flow of subsidiary products from the countryside to the city had declined. By early 1957 officials were sufficiently concerned about the growing dis-

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solution of collectives that they made further concessions. In the spring of 1957 prices for pigs and oil-bearing crops were increased. And in June 1957, the leading agricultural planner, Teng Tzu-hui, announced that private plots could be expanded from five percent of the arable land to ten percent of the arable land.

This solution in turn led to different problems that were not simply ideological. For one thing, the richer peasants were earning a much higher proportion of their income from private plots, a fact that was discouraging to the regime and to the poor peasants. Furthermore, the time and energy expended on the enlarged private plots seriously curtailed the amount of work the peasants were willing to do on the much larger proportion of land owned by the collectives. Since private marketing of produce from these larger plots was disturbing not only because it gave rise to ideological reversals (the revival of capitalism), but also because it made it difficult to motivate peasants to work hard for the collectives, in August 1957, the free market was abolished. During 1958, to strengthen the collective economy, private plots were abolished in most areas.

Despite the careful reasoning behind the abolition of the markets, the Great Leap Forward and its communes initiated in 1958 were clearly inspired by relatively unrestrained utopian visions of overnight modernization. Once some of the excesses and misunderstandings of the Great Leap Forward policy had been cleared up in the Sixth Plenum of December 1958, and some measure of central control reestablished in the Seventh Plenum of the spring of 1959, a new attempt was made in the fall of 1959, at the widely publicized Tenth Anniversary celebrations, to push the Great Leap Forward through to the end. Only some months after it had become obvious that these policies had failed, at the end of 1960 and in early 1961, did the regime undertake a major retrenchment. The regime never officially admitted its errors, but in fact its bold retrenchment was directly contrary to its conceptions about the continued process of socialization. Private plots were revived, free markets were reopened, material incentives were reinstated to motivate peasants to work for their production teams, the size of communes was radically reduced, and the small team again became the basic accounting unit. Furthermore, the order of priorities of the First Five Year Plan (heavy industry, light industry, agriculture) was reversed, and this reversal was not easy to explain to cadres trained in the inevitability of the historical progress toward socialism. Indeed, the socialist education campaign, which has been going strong since the fall of 1962, has a heavy burden to bear:

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it must keep high the banner of socialist thought despite the temporary retreat from the socialist path.

II

When one moves from considerations of overall policy to the impact of policy changes on the village, one is confronted with a much vaster array of ignorance. Despite good surveys of land ownership patterns, such as J. L. Buck's prewar classic, *Land Utilization in China*, no serious attempt has yet been made to analyze the patterning of village structure for China as a whole, for either the pre-1949 or post-1949 period. China now has some million-odd villages; for the period before 1949 there is a handful of village studies in the best anthropological field-work tradition, and since 1949 there is one such study—C. K. Yang's study of one village, covering the period up to 1951.[3]

Professor Yang was conducting a village study in Southern China at the time of Communist takeover and he remained there for two years. Although his notes were confiscated before he left, he recorded his findings shortly after leaving China. The result is a volume in the best tradition of anthropological village studies. Yang's work is really in two parts: the first composed of a village study before and immediately after takeover, the second a summary, based on various Communist sources, of some of the major changes in collectivization since 1951. Aside from C. K. Yang's work there have been since 1949 several less-detailed village studies. One represents a four-day study by the Australian anthropologist Geddes, who in the relaxed period of the Hundred Flowers was permitted to visit a village previously studied by Fei Hsiao-t'ung.[4] Geddes's visit was admittedly brief, but in four days he collected a considerable amount of useful material. Two books by David and Isabel Crook deal with villages not far from Peking.[5] Mr. Crook, who has had anthropological training, is committed to the Communist Chinese regime and has lived and taught in Peking since 1949. While these two books could hardly be called objective accounts, they do present some useful information. And then there is the report by Jan Myrdal.

Myrdal, a Swedish journalist, was given the opportunity to spend thirty days in a model village in the Yenan area. Lacking a background in Chinese studies, and working through an assigned interpreter,

[3] Fortunately some other important studies are now in progress, such as the study of a production brigade by John C. Pelzel of Harvard University.

[4] W. R. Geddes, *Peasant Life in Communist China* (Ithaca 1959).

[5] David and Isabel Crook, *Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten-Mile Inn* (London 1959), and *The Yangyu Commune Chose Progress* (London 1965).

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Myrdal decided to get the peasants to tell their own story while he faithfully recorded their accounts. Mr. Myrdal's report is not entirely uncritical, although in some ways the book reads much like the local Communist Chinese press of 1961-1962. In this period the peasants and workers who had suffered most before 1949 recalled their stories of bitterness under the Kuomintang to eager young reporters and novelists. These stories admittedly emphasized one side of reality; in Myrdal's stories, however, one sees some glimmers of village life in those areas where political concerns would least inhibit the peasants in describing their lives. But because Mr. Myrdal was able to obtain little information on the reactions to food shortages (although he mentions in passing the existence of the problem), on "contradictions" within the village, on some of the real issues in the formation of cooperatives and communes, and on the context of the kinship organization or production team organization, his accounts do not achieve the level of analysis found in Yang's book.

Assuming that Yang's village is representative of many villages in China (and despite some pecularities of his village—its suburban location, its nearness to Hong Kong, its nearness to a major river, the lateness and slowness of land reform in Kwangtung—most of the problems mentioned by Professor Yang have been discussed frequently in the Chinese Communist press in relation to villages in many parts of the country), one can get some feel of what land reform meant to a village. However, it is more difficult, even for a trained and competent observer like Yang, to make sense of village happenings after 1949 than before, since many important decisions after 1949 have been made outside the village and an aura of fear and secrecy surrounds their consequences.

To the Chinese Communists, land reform was more a political than an economic problem. To be sure, the transfer of land from the rich to the poor had economic consequences, but this was viewed as only one aspect of the transfer of power, i.e., the removal of the economic basis of power from the ruling classes in rural areas. Fearing the revival of the power of the rich in the countryside, the Chinese Communists eliminated many who might have served as pillars of resistance (according to their own estimates only 800,000 were killed throughout the country during land reform, but some estimates run much higher), and this lesson was not lost on those who remained. Before the peasants were given the land, they were required to take part in accusation and "struggle" meetings in which they brought to light all the bad qualities of the former powerholders of the village.

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In Russia the kulaks had returned to power; in China these meetings reached such a high pitch that the authorities could reasonably hope that the rich had been permanently discredited. In case the peasants still doubted, they were warned of the risks of resisting the regime.

As Professor Yang makes clear, land reform had a great impact on village structure. Land reform was billed as a class struggle, but the change in power did not follow strictly social class lines. Often, older leaders were replaced by younger ones in the same family, and leaders less responsive to the Communists were replaced by those more responsive, even though their class status was the same. Women, who had previously not taken part in village affairs, were now an organized force represented in discussions of any important village matter. Clans were replaced with organizations that were clearly subordinated to Communist Party control: first, mutual aid teams; later, agricultural producers' cooperatives; and still later, production teams. After 1949, education and public health programs were greatly expanded under the direction of organizations sponsored by the new government. Customs that interfered with government policies were attacked as superstitions. Stubborn clan leaders were attacked for misuse of funds or lack of consideration of other clan members. Despite these changes, until collectivization in 1955-1956, most peasant households continued to till the soil individually as before. The clan had been a social unit, a religious unit, a unit that looked after welfare and educational expenses, but rarely an economic producing unit. The household had remained the production unit. Collectivization meant the formation of a new economic unit that reorganized labor. Although the cooperative was an economic unit rather than a governmental unit, the cooperative for the first time brought the Chinese village into a comprehensive economic plan. Contracts could be made between the local governmental unit and the cooperative, and agricultural production was geared to quotas consistent with the national goals. With collectivization and the incorporation of village production into a national plan, the government began a twelve-year program of agricultural improvement designed to introduce into the cooperatives new technology that would in the long run greatly increase agricultural productivity.

The harvests following collectivization were disappointing. Many peasants were annoyed with the increased regimentation, and new techniques had to be tried before they were adequately tested and un-

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derstood. Having completed collectivization, the regime decided to ease the pressure for fear of arousing too much resistance, but in most places production suffered. In 1957 the province where the greatest advances in production were made was Honan. Here, in response to droughts, large irrigation projects had been undertaken, and the masses had been mobilized in large-scale work projects. To free able-bodied women for labor, the elderly women were to take care of the children and the sick, and to prepare meals for everyone. This approach, having proved successful in Honan in late 1957 and early 1958, was selected as the model for the entire nation.

The expansion of the Honan model into the nationwide commune movement was in part a product of sensible planning, but the form it took and the extremes it reached were products of an agrarian utopianism. It involved too much mobilization and too little solid planning and coordination. Since it came immediately after the frightening anti-Rightist campaign, those who might have exercised a restraining influence were afraid to speak out. The mess halls, the supply system, the double-bladed plow, the deep plowing, the work around the clock, the reassignment of labor from the farm to rural industry all proved to be more painful than productive.

Communization was excessive, but "enemy psychology" made it seem more excessive to Westerners than it was in fact. Despite the mess halls and the nursery schools, no serious attempt was ever made to destroy the family household as the basic social and residential unit. To a Westerner, communes mean mass mobilization, communal living. Although this aspect of communes soon faded quietly, another aspect of communes less noticed by Westerners remained firm: the establishment of governmental economic planning at a lower level than ever before, i.e., in the townships (communes). The establishment of commune headquarters in the former market towns has meant the growth of a rural infrastructure concerned with public administration, agriculture and industrial production, education, and public health. To be sure, when these units were first established, the cadres were inexperienced and serious errors were made. The communes have not become smoothly-oiled machines but they do represent an attempt to replace traditional practices with rational economic organization and planning. The process is disruptive, as is rapid economic development elsewhere, but over the years the programs that do not produce results are being discarded in favor of those that do.

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III

Mao rose to power on a peasant platform, and the "adaptation of Marxism to Chinese conditions" inevitably meant assigning the peasantry a central role. Paradoxically, the high priority given to agriculture in China today has not been a result of this peasant platform but of the failure of agriculture to produce enough during the first two Five Year Plans. Indeed, the peasant revolution, led by the proletariat, aiming to make the society more proletarian, is now encouraging many of the proletariat to go to the countryside to become peasants. The inevitable progress toward socialism has now progressed from giving first priority to heavy industry to giving first priority to agriculture, from communal organization to a revival of private plots and private marketing. Perhaps it is no wonder that so much energy must be put into the campaign to preserve ideological orthodoxy. But the Western student looking for crises should keep in mind that despite the ideological tensions, the adjustment in the last several years has been a more rational one, and that agricultural output has been increasing by a modest amount. So far there is no indication that this more rational approach is to be upset in the Third Five Year Plan which begins this year. And lest the accent on agriculture prove confusing in a country led by the proletariat aiming to industrialize, it is all clarified in mainland Chinese study sessions where overzealous comrades who have to be reminded to walk on two legs are given the wonderfully vague and felicitous slogan "Agriculture as the foundation, industry as the leading factor." In America we lack the study sessions, but in the light of "enemy psychology" preoccupied with leaps forward and backward, perhaps the most important contribution of the works here reviewed is to remind us, too, that the Chinese walk on two legs.

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